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CHAPTER I 
PURPOSE OF STUDY AND DEFINITION OF FEDERALISM 
Federalism is a common pol i t ica l  term which de sc r i be s  a number 
of governmental  sy s t ems  of the  20th Century.  Federalism h a s  been incorpor- 
a t ed  i n  varying forms in to  t he  governmental sy s t ems  of the  United S t a t e s ,  
Switzer land,  t h e  Federal  Republic of Germany, Canada ,  Austra l ia ,  Ind ia ,  
Brazil,  Aust r ia ,  t h e  Union of South Africa, the  Union of Soviet  Soc ia l i s t  
Republ ics ,  Yugoslavia ,  Mex ico ,  and  Argentina. I t  i s ,  however,  a far 
more complex principle than  most  persons  r ea l i z e ,  a s  wi l l  present ly  be  
demonstra ted.  
I .  PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The purpose of t h i s  s tudy  is t o  ana lyze  one  form and one ins tance  
o f  federa l i sm,  i . e .  , federal ism a s  i t  w a s  es tab l i shed  and a s  it h a s  devel-  
oped i n  theory and practice in  the  Federal Republic of Germany from 1 9 4 9  to  
1 9 6 3 .  The  form of federal ism found i n  th i s  young nation h a s  cer ta in  unique 
a s p c c t s ,  al though it d o e s  f a l l  within the  broad l imits  of tradit ional  federal  
pr inciples .  These  unique a s p e c t s ,  their  implementation i n  a modern nat ion,  
and their  continuing evolution i n  the  government of the  Bundesrepublik are  
of continuing concern to  contemporary poli t ical  s c i en t i s t s .  
' ~ i , b c r t  G . Ncurnann, European and Conlparative Government 
(Third Edition; Ncw York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,  19 6 0 ) ,  p. 679.  
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In the following chapters a n  attempt is made to  present a depth- 
ana lys i s  of the scope and nature of West  German federalism today. In 
order t o  do  th i s  adequately,  the historical  background of West  Germany a s  
well  a s  the  general  nature of federalism must first  be examined. To obtain 
the  da ta  relevant t o  these  a reas  a number of scholarly sources were 
s tud ied ,  beginning with the  Basic Law of the Bundesrepublik. 
11. FEDERALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Because of the variety of forms of modern federalism, the term i s  
not ea s i ly  defined. A brief comparative ana lys i s  of systems utilizing 
federal principles and a survey of some federal theories will here serve a s  
a tool for arriving a t  a working definition. 
Theories of federalism. Contrary to  what one might think, feder- 
alism i s  not a purely modern political phenomenon. A s  a form of govern- 
ment,  federalism can  be traced back to the ancient p a s t ,  s ince federalist ic 
poli t ics were not unknown to the ci t izens of the ci ty-s ta tes  of c lass ica l  
Greccc .  Federalism of a sort was  a l so  to be found i n  some of the ci t ies  
of Medieval I taly.  It has  been developing s ince a t  l ea s t  the thirteenth 
century i n  Switzerland. 1 
' c .  F .  Strong, Model-n Political Constitutions (New York: 
G .  P .  Putnam's Sons ,  1 9 3 0 ) ,  p .  98 .  
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In the  eighteenth century, the period when modern federalism first  
became popular a s  a poli t ical  form, a federal form of government was  
viewed a s  "pertaining to  or of the nature of that  form of government in which 
two or more s t a t e s  consti tute a political unity while remaining more or less 
independent with regard t o  their internal affairs." 1 
At that  time federalism was  a n  expression of the a g e ,  i. e . , an  
age  i n  which political and economic problems were generally of a local  nature. 
Since then federalism h a s  evolved in  other direct ions,  due largely to  such 
forces  a s  industrialism, nationalism, and urbanism. Greater services  are 
now demanded of the  nation-state and overwhelming opposition to  the con- 
solidated central government h a s  declined. 
In i t s  broadest s e n s e  today,  federalism envisions the federation 
a s  the ideal  political and social  institution. It i s  characterized by a 
tendency to  substi tute co-ordinating relationships for relationships of a 
subordinate nature; to  replace command and compulsion from higher levels 
with reciprocity,  persuasion,  and law. 3 
l ~ a n s  Sperber and Travis Trittschuh, American Political T e r m s  
(Detroit: Wayne State  University Press; 1962), pp .  148-49. 
3 ~ a x  Hildebcrt Boehrn, "Federalism", Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Scic;nccs (New York: The  Macmillan CL~n1pany, 193 1) , VI , 169-717. 
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By a n y  definit ion,  the  term federalism is qui te  broad. Thus i t  is 
readi ly  adaptable  t o  implementation i n  varying forms i n  a variety of socio- 
poli t ical  s i tuat ions .  Flexibility i s ,  indeed,  one of federalism's most valu- 
ab le  a s s e t s .  Widely diversified peoples c a n  be united in  one federal na- 
t ion because the flexibil i ty of the  federal system allows local  control of 
loca l  governmental functions within t he  framework of  the  larger national 
uni t .  1 
The poli t ical  sc ien t i s t  Robert Neumann def ines  federalism a s  a 
"method through which power is divided between the  central  government 
and the  authorit ies of regional uni ts  i n  a particular country." He further 
c lar i f ies  the  concept of federalism by comparing i t  t o  its diametrical 
oppos i te ,  i .  e . , the  highly centralized unitary form of government. For in 
the unitary system the central  government makes virtually a l l  of the impor- 
tant  policy dec is ions  which must then be carried out by the regional or 
central  administrative uni ts .  
Neumann a l s o  points out that  there a re  several  variant forms of 
federalism, which he  ca l l s  "quasi-federalism." In c a s e s  such a s  the 
governments of the U . S . S.  R .  , Yugoslavia, Mexico,  and Venezuela, federal 
theory i s  mixedwith unitarypractice to form qua si-federal forms. 2 
l ~ e l i x  Morcly,  Freedom and Federalism (Chicago: Henry Regnery 
Company, 195Y), p .  2 .  
A s  a socio-political phenomenon federalism may be divided into 
two main types: centrifugal and centripetal federalism. Centrifugal feder- 
a l i sm,  the form most common to continental Europe i n  the nineteenth and 
ear ly  twentieth centur ies ,  is a reaction aga ins t  unitarism. A s  a force of 
opposition to  the  Napoleonic -: type of unitarism, centrifugal or decentral-  
ized federalism has  united with unpolitical forces; and i n  i t s  extreme form 
may border on anarchy. On the &her hand,  centripetal federalism, a s  a 
conservative f ~ r c e  , emphasizes and guarantees solidarity and union in  a 
strong s t a t e .  I t  s e e k s  to weaken or even to  destroy particularism-and 
separatism. This type of federalism seems to  be more popular in  the 
present era .  
As time has  passed federalism has  become a more common and a n  
ever more complicated theory of government. The r i se  of fanatical national- 
ism throughout the world has been a primary cause  i n  the growth of popularity 
for the federal form of government, because i t  allows diverse socio-political 
ent i t ies  to be united in a s table  nation-state.  Federal theories have a l so  
been increasingly encouraged and adopted by international organizations, 
a s  only federal forms are  feasible when the federated units involved retain 
almost complete sovereignty. 1 
One should not ,  however, confuse the pure federal form with that 
l ~ o c l ~ m ,  w. G. , yy .  170-172. 
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of the  loose confederation. The two types do have certain common character- 
istics, but the  confederation is clear ly  distinguishable a s  a much more de-  
centralized union. I t  can be regarded more specifically a s  a "comprehensive 
and cohesive form of international administrative union, whereas a federal 
system is regarded a s  a multiple government i n  a single state." '  One could 
a l s o  consider the  confederation to  be merely a "c lose  al l iance."  Basically 
th i s  means that  the "internal sovereignty" of each member s ta te  remains 
largely unimpaired while its "external sovereignty" is decreased only by a 
very small  degree.  The most obvious point of dist inction between the two 
forms, however, is that  i n  a federal union, because of the delegation of 
some overriding authority t o  the  central  government, a national capital  will 
necessar i ly  be es tab l i shed .  3 
The federal  form of government is a l so  recognizable through 
several  common political forms which are  to  be found in every true federal 
government. Thus,  in a genuine federal system one f inds,  under various 
names and in varying forms, a common execut ive,  a federally constituted 
legis la t ive body (an upper house or chamber usually representing the feder- 
ated un i t s ) ,  and some form of judicial body which has  the authority to decide 
' ~ r t h u r  W. Mscmahon, "Federation," Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Scienccs (Ncw York: The  Macmillan Company, 1931) ,  V I ,  173.  
L ~ t r o n g ,  loc .  c i t  . 
3 ~ o r c l y ,  . a., p .  1. 
jurisdictional d i sputes  arising within the  regional-central relationship. 
The main factor making a system federal i s  the nature of the 
distribution of powers between the  regional units and the  central authority. 1 
Clear  determination of th i s  requires a consti tution, which i s  obviously the  
most bas i c  need of a federal  s t a t e .  A federal constitution may be con- 
ceived of a s  a t reaty or lega l  contract. It is a n  agreement between political 
units which del ineates  the powers that  the federating units will retain and 
those  tha t  will be placed under the  authority of the central government. 
The s t a t e  i n  which the "reserve powers" are  ass igned to  the  federal authority 
wil l  tend to  be more unitary, however, than the s ta te  i n  which the federated 
units re ta in  the "reserve powers." This division of powers implies that  
neither the federal  authority nor the federated units will always be supreme 
for there i s  a n  ultimate authority above both of them--the federal constitu- 
t ion.  
To ensure a las t ing and just division of powers in  a federal 
system two political insti tutions are  essent ia l .  The first is a judicial body 
with the ultimate authority to decide jurisdictional disputes  between the 
fcdcrated units and the federal  authority. T k  second i s  a constitutional 
amending process which will require agreement among most or a l l  of the  
regional authorit ies before the basic  constitutional framework can  be legally 
a l tered.  
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In pract ice ,  the  amount of power given to such a judicial body has  
var ied,  but i n  a completely federalized s t a t e  th i s  body i s  supreme in  i t s  
power t o  resolve confl ic ts  between the federal  authority and the federated 
uni ts .  This i n  turn gives  r i s e  t o  the  question concerning the process to  be 
used  i n  making changes i n  the  federal  constitution. The constitution is 
necessar i ly  i n  writ ten form due to the  fine balance on  which the  division of 
powers between federal  authority and federated units r e s t s .  In federal 
consti tutions the abi l i ty  t o  change the consti tution,  the amending process ,  
should not be s o  easy that  frequent tampering with the bas i c  law will occur. 
Thus most federal  consti tutions a r e  commonly thought of as "rigid" , be - 
c a u s e  they may be changed only according to  s t r ic t  conditions which a re  
L A y r r b L c  ul Lieu1 1 y 1 1 I I p l l ~ U .  A
As previously s ta ted the trend towards federalism h a s  increased 
over the  decades .  Nationalism and industrial ization have been pointed out 
a s  causat ive factors of this  t rend,  but the importance of the federal form 
i tsel f  should not be overlooked. In countries where great diversity in 
geography, r a c e ,  language,  religion,  or culture ex is t s  the federal system 
is the most readily adaptable  form of government, for i t  al lows both unity 
and divers i ty  to ex i s t  together within a common union. In f ac t ,  one finds 
that fcclcral forms of  government have been adopted mainly because of unique 
pol i t ical ,  s o c i a l ,  and geographical conditions in specif ic  a r e a s ,  and not 
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because  federalism w a s  considered merely the most efficient form of govern- 
ment per se. Thus socio-political and geographical factors can be con- 
sidered the  main c a u s e  for the  popularity of federalism. 2 
To a s s u r e  continued succes s  and consis tency in  a political system 
which contains  s o  many diverse  elements a process  of constant adaptation 
must be buil t  in .  This i s  a function o f  t he  previously mentioned federal 
judicial  body. The federal  judicial body through i t s  opinions can  give 
spec i f ic  direction to  adaptation of national-regional intergovernmental re la-  
t ionships  to  meet changing needs.  This is a common federal phenomenon. 
I n  sum, when considering federalism a s  a governmental form, 
one should keep i n  mind tha t  the  true federal s t a t e  will  have three b a s i c  
charac te r i s t ics .  Firs t ,  there will be consti tutional supremacy or ultimate 
authority of  the  federal  union resting in the document upon which i t  was  
founded. Second, a n  areal  distribution of powers will ex is t  between the 
regional units  and the federal authority. Third, a supreme judicial authority 
will have the power toreconcile disputes  which a r i s e  between the federated 
units and the federal  a u t h ~ r i t y . ~  These three elements will a l s o  be helpful 
l ~ e u r n a n n ,  OJ. a., pp. 681, 688-89. 
2 ~ o c h r n ,  OJ. . , p .  170 .  
3Neumann, x. a. , p. 6 8 9 .  
4strong, w. cit, , p .  6 1. 
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i n  attempting to  differentiate one federal system from another in the following 
pages .  
In seeking t o  analyze federalism further it is useful to  examine 
intimately ac tua l  governments which are  based on  federal principles. The 
most logical choice of federal  systems to  examine would include the govern- 
ments of the  United S ta tes  and Switzerland, as they are considered t o  be the 
two c l a s s i c  examples of modern federalism. In historical  context these two 
s t a t e s  were the  f i rs t  nation-states to  adopt federal systems of government 
(the United S ta tes  a t  the end of the eighteenth century and Switzerland in  
the  mid-nineteenth century),  although i n  Switzerland federalism had i t s  
roots a s  far back a s  the thirteenth century. Both countries have unique 
federal forms, and both a re  therefore important in considering variant forms 
of federalism. They have a l s o  served a s  models for most of the federal 
governmental systems which have been created after their establishment. 
Federalism as practiced in the United States .  A s  previously 
s t a t ed ,  the governmental system of the United States  i s  one of the c l a s s i c  
examples of federalism and one of the first  systems to  employ the modern 
concepts of federalism. The original constitution of the United S ta t e s ,  
which was  drafted in 1787, i s  the oldest  written federal constitution s t i l l  
in  u s e  today. 1 
' ~ c r b e r t  J .  Spiro , Government Constitution: The Political 
S ystcm s of Dcmocracy (Ncw York: Random H ~ ~ u s e ,  Inc. , 1 9 5 9 ) ,  p. 113. 
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I t  has  been said that  federalism in  coming to  dwell in  the govern- 
mental system of the  United S ta tes  was  "historically ordained. " This view 
is based on  the  fact  that  the thirteen original English colonies had been 
individually es tabl ished and had developed widely varying socio-political 
pract ices  by the  time that  they joined i n  revolt. The diverse  political 
ent i t ies  could only be combined in  a general union i f  a great degree of 
divers i ty  could be protected. So ,  for a variety of reasons ,  the government 
of t he  United S ta tes  was  created "not only a s  a federation of semi-sovereign 
S t a t e s ,  but a l s o  as one of balanced authority, in  which i t  would be extreme- 
l y  difficult t o  es tab l i sh  a nationwide monopoly power of any  kind. "' It  
was  neither a unitary s t a t e ,  nor a loose "confederal" one--it was a sort of a 
half-way house.  
To examine the federal system of government in  the United States 
one must s tar t  when i t s  constitution was  being drafted. The Constitutional 
Convention that created the s t i l l  functioning constitution met in the 
summer of 1787. T h e  Convention was  preceded by two events which influ- 
cnccd i t s  de lega tes  to a great extent: the War of Independence (1775-83) 
and the creation of a loose Confederation made up of the former thirteen 
colonics (1781-89). The Congress of the Confederation had actually called 
the Constitutional Convention. In creating a wholly ne\v constitutionthe 
cc )nvc .n t ion  dclcgatcs  drew upon institutions from ather governments, but 
they  a l s o  made a number of important innovations,  among which were most of 
the  provisions concerning federalism. l The consti tutional draft prepared by 
the Convention went into  effect  i n  1789 and ex i s t s  today with only twenty- 
four formal amendments added t o  the original document. 
The federal  principle as embodied i n  the  American Constitution 
might be summed up in  th i s  manner: 
"We the people" have ,  i n  the Federal Consti tution,  made a 
divis ion of the  powers of government between the Federal govern- 
ment i n  Washington and the governments of the  several  s t a t e s .  
The divis ion of powers s o  prescribed w a s  not devised by either 
the  previously exis t ing central  government or the  s t a t e s  acting 
a lone ,  nor can  i t  be amended or abrogated by the act ion of 
either type of governmental agency act ing a lone .  3 
The most prominent feature of the  federalism created by the 
Consti tutional Convention i s  the separation of powers, which was  carried 
to a considerable degree .  In addit ion to the areal  separation of power 
between the s t a t e s  (federated units)  and the federal authority,  power has  
a l s o  been divided between the three branches of the federal authority 
(judiciary,  execut ive ,  legis la ture) .  This sharp separation of powers was 
purposely included by the consti tutional framers to  prevent any  monopoly 
of power in  any  one a rea .  In other words,  a "checks and balances" system 
w a s  included within the broader federal framework. 4 
l ~ p i r o ,  OJ. a., pp. 143-46. 
2 ~ t r o n g ,  op. g. , p. 103 .  
3 ~ .  Brooke Graves, American State Government ( B ~ s t o n :  D .  C. 
Heath and Company, 1 9 5 3 ) ,  p .  15. 
4 ~ o r c l ~ ,  OJ. Qt-. , p p .  4-5. 
Turning t o  t h e  more t radi t ional  a s p e c t s  of federa l i sm,  one  f inds 
i n  Article X of t h e  American Const i tu t ion t h a t  power is spec i f i ca l ly  divided 
be tween  t h e  federa l  author i ty  and t h e  severa l  s t a t e s .  In  Article X pure 
federa l i sm is c l e a r l y  e v i d e n t ,  as a n y  powers not de lega ted  t o  t h e  federal  
author i ty  or  prohibited t o  t h e  states a r e  the re in  reserved t o  t h e  states. The 
federa l  author i ty  is l imited t o  t h e  a c t i o n s  which it c a n  const i tu t ional ly  
p u r s u e ,  as  a r e  t h e  states. l The principal  r e s idua l  power of t h e  states is 
commdnl y referred t o  a s  the i r  "po l i ce  power. " Under t h i s  power t h e  state 
a s s u m e s  t h e  right t o  control  and c a r e  for t h e  " h e a l t h ,  morals ,  s a f e t y ,  and 
welfare  of i t s  people .  " Other  a r e a s  of ac t ion  a r e  e x p r e s s l y  precluded 
from state author i ty .  T h e s e  a r e a s  inc lude t h e  conclus ion of a l l i a n c e s ,  
maintaining a s tanding army,  and t h o s e  f ie lds  i n  which s t a t e  ac t ion  would 
in ter fere  with t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h e  nat ional  government. 
Article I V  of the  American Const i tu t ion is sometimes known a s  
t h e  "Federa l  Article" b e c a u s e  it inc ludes  in te r s t a te  obl igat ions .  By 
t h i s  a r t i c l e ,  the  s t a t e s  a r e  obl igated  t o  d o  cer ta in  t h i n g s ,  and the  national  
government is obl igated  t o  guarantee  every  s t a t e  a republican form of gov- 
ernment.  It s p e c i f i c a l l y  ob l iga tes  the  severa l  s t a t e s  t o  co-operate with 
~ o h n  H.  Ferguson and Dean E .  McHenry,  The American Svstern of 
Government (New York: McGra y-Hill Book Company,  1959) ,  p. 75.  
3 ~ i l f r c d  E . Binklcy and Malcom C.  M o o s ,  & Grammar of h e r i c a n  
Pol i t ics :  National  Government (New Y~>rk: Alfred A .  Knnpf , 19491, 
pp.  87-88, 94. 
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each  other by extending one another "Full Faith and Credi t" ,  granting extra- 
dit ion and assur ing t o  everyone the  " privileges and immunities" of United 
S ta t e s  Ci t izenship.  1 
Of almost equal  importance to the  separation of powers are  the 
mutual t i e s  which bind the s t a t e s  and the federal authority together i n  a 
federal  union. The American Consti tution guarantees the  several  s t a t e s  
that  t he  federal authority will  maintain for them: a republican form of 
government; equal  representation in  the  upper legis la t ive  house; internal 
tranquili ty and defense  from invasion or dismemberment; and equali ty 
before the courts.  Each s t a t e  i n  turn assumes  certain responsibil i t ies 
toward the federal  authority: seeing that  federal e lect ions  a re  properly held; 
choosing presidential  electors;  protecting civil l ibert ies of a l l  United States  
c i t izens;  and carrying out federal court orders.  2 
Included i n  the bonds of union are  a l so  powers which are  shared 
by t h e  federal authority and the s t a t e s .  These "concurrent powers" in- 
clude: taxing and borrowing; adopting legislation in  a reas  of mutual 
interest;  regulation of commerce; and sett ing up courts.  3 
l ~ e r ~ u s o n  and McHenry , loc .  c i t .  
' ~ i n k l e ~  and Moos ,  z. &. , p .  91 .  
3 ~ e r g u s o n  and McHenry, loc .  c i t .  
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Thus a type of "partnership" ex is t s  between the several  s ta tes  and 
the federal authority. The s t a t e s  actual ly  a re  unequal partners i n  this union, 
for although both ex i s t  as partners for the  benefit of all the people, the 
powers of the federal authority i n  acting for a l l  s t a t e s  cannot really be 
challenged. Moreover, the federal courts are  the umpires of the federal 
system. 
A broad area e x i s t s ,  however, which is not covered by the Con- 
st i tution. In this  area of vagueness ,  policy i s  the  controlling factor. 
Today the American people a s  a general policy expect more services  from 
their governmental system than ever before. Many times only the federal 
authority has  the power and funds to  carry on vast  service programs. At 
the same time, the American people wish to  maintain vigorous s ta te  
government. Since the depression of the 19301s ,  the evolution of federal- 
ism i n  the  United States  has  developed mainly in this public service area.  
The federal authority has  gradually encroached on powers formerly thought 
t o  belong only to the s ta tes ;  i . e .  , there i s  a tendency toward "federal 
centralization." Yet i t  should not be expected that the  federal-state 
relationship could remain s ta t ic  forever, nor even for two hundred years. 
Altered economic and social  conditions demand changes in governmental 
authority. In  the history of the  United States such changes have almost 
always tcndcd to g ive  t h e  federal authority additional powers a t  the expense 
of t h c  s t a t e s .  T h i s  trcnd may be antifederal in  nature; yet when new powers 
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were  refused t h e  federa l  author i ty ,  c r i s e s  genera l ly  perturbed t h e  Union.  1 
Today t h e  federa l  author i ty  i n  the  governmental  sys tem of t h e  
Uni ted  S t a t e s  p o s s e s s e s  v a s t  powers s c a r c e l y  dreamed of b y  the  const i tu-  
t iona l  f a the r s .  The powers of t h e  federal  author i ty  h a v e  grown enormously 
i n  commerce and  t a x  f i e l d s  i n  order t h a t  t h e  demands  of twent ie th  century  
life may b e  properly met. It is fortunate t h a t  t h e  American Const i tu t ion 
h a s  proved t o  b e  as f lexible  as t o  a l low adap ta t ion  without  t h i s  destroying 
t h e  federa l  s y s t e m .  2 
Th i s  l e a d s  t o  another  important  innovation b y  t h e  American con-  
s t i tu t iona l  framers concerning federal ism; i.  e. , t h e  right impl ic i t ly  g iven 
to t h e  federa l  judiciary t o  null ify l e g i s l a t i v e  or  execu t ive  acts as  uncon- 
s t i tu t iona l  in  order t h a t  t h e  supremacy of t h e  federal  Const i tu t ional  may be 
mainta ined.  The f i r s t  judicial  case dec la r ing  s u c h  a n  act (or part  of a n  a c t )  
unconst i tu t ional  w a s  t h e  famous M a r b u r y v .  Madison opinion.  In t h i s  d e -  
c i s i o n  the  Supreme Court  expanded i t s  functions t o  inc lude original juris- 
d ic t ion  over  cases which in i t i a l ly  were  only  under i t s  appe l l a te  jurisdict ion.  
In  s o  d o i n g ,  t h e  Supreme Court c a u s e d  const i tu t ional  amendments to be few 
i n  number and  cons t i tu t iona l  development to  evolve  smoothly.  The American 
' ~ i l l i a r n  Anderson,  The Nation and the  S t a t e s ,  Rivals or Partners? 
(Minneapol is :  Univers i ty  o f  Minnesota  P r e s s ,  1 9 5 5 ) ,  pp.  134-46. 
2 ~ e r g u s o n  and McHcnry,  w. c x . ,  p p .  7 1 ,  7 4 ,  101.  
Civil  War was  the  only exception t o  this  ru le ,  and then the Constitution and 
i t s  order had to  be restored by force. 
Following the Civil  War,  the adoption of the thirteenth,  four- 
teen th ,  and fifteenth constitutional amendments were important s t eps  i n  the  
evolutionary development of the American federal Constitution. In effect ,  
the Amendments, added by the  northern victors,  used the s lavery i ssue  to 
give the  Supreme Court power to  prohibit certain actions by the s t a t e s  
aga ins t  their  own c i t izens .  These amendments are  s t i l l  having repercus- 
s ions  today. 1 
Further centralization of powers in  the federal authority occurred 
a s  a resul t  of t he  two World Wars  and the "great depression. " Especially 
during the depression the prestige and power of the s t a t e s  suffered a s  
Congress  and the  federal  execut ive,  through numerous aid administering 
agenc ie s ,  undermined the s t a t e s '  control of relief. 
Thus,  due i n  part to  the dynamic character of changing t imes,  
the federal authority has  gained power in  a n  anti-decentralization trend a t  
the expense of the several  s t a t e s .  This has  occurred chiefly through the 
national assumption of former s ta te  powers in the a reas  of commerce, tax 
and pollce powers. Nevertheless ,  the additional burdens which have 
l ~ p i r o ,  OJ. a. , pp. 2 3 ,  879 .  
2 ~ r a v e s ,  T. &., p p .  2 3 ,  879. 
18 
thereby been thrown upon the federal authority have caused the  revival of 
in te res t  i n  a movement to  restore some of the s t a t e ' s  powers and former 
prerogatives. 1 
After having examined the principal theories on which the federal 
system of the  United S ta tes  is  based ,  it is now necessary  to  examine the 
machinery through which these  theories a re  applied. As a federal union 
the United S ta tes  cons is t s  of fifty federated units ( s t a t e s ) ,  which have 
grown from the  original thirteen. Being a federal union, each of the s t a t e s  
maintains a system of bureaucracy, courts ,  and local  government. The 
s t a t e s  a re  represented in  the  federal union through the  upper house of the 
federal legis la ture  (the Senate) according to constitutional provision. Each 
s t a t e  is represented equally by two senators.  The s ta tes  are a l so  repre- 
sented indirectly i n  the  federal  authority,  a s  former governors often at ta in  
high posit ions in  the federal bureaucracy. 
The Senate ,  a s  the representative body of the federated s t a t e s ,  
has  two important and exclusive powers. The Senate alone must approve 
t reat ics  made by the President of the union by a two-thirds majority. 
Simple Senate majority approval is a l so  required for presidential appoint- 
ment of diplomats,  federal  judges,  and other high federal officials.  These 
two powers can be compared to  the one exclusive power of the lower house 
(the Mouse of ~ c p r ~ ~ ~ n t a t i v e s )  , i . e . , the right to  init iate a l l  revenue bil ls .  
' ~ i n k l c ~  and M c ~ o s ,  OJ. G. , p. 99 .  
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Otherwise the constitutional powers of both houses  are  theoretically equal.  
The executive branch of the  federal authority i s  headed by a 
president. The presidency of the  United S ta t e s ,  as a single office,  com- 
bines more functions than similar offices i n  any  other federal system. The 
President has  the  central position in  the  American system, a s  established 
by the  Consti tution, and even more s o  a s  built by tradition and practice. 
Generally,  the  President and Congress bargain with one another in order 
to  a t ta in  mutually sat isfactory ends.  In practice h is  power over the legis-  
la t ive branch is much greater than h is  actual  legal  powers would imply. 
His  role a s  head of one of the  two parties i s  a s  important a s  his constitu- 
tional right to  a suspensory veto over legislative enactments.  
The judicial branch i n  the United States  is "a  hierarchy of feder- 
a l  courts topped by a Supreme Court ." The nine members of the Supreme 
Court a re  appointed for l i f e  by the President subject to  Senate approval. 
The Supreme Court ,  by i t s  ear ly  refusal to i ssue  advisory opinions and in 
i t s  use of "discretion" in choosing c a s e s  to  be heard,  has  shaped i t s  own 
rolc.  I t  has  power to overrule the decis ions of both s ta te  and federal courts 
of lower l eve l s .  It can declare s ta te  and federal legislation unconstitutional. 
Through i t s  rolc a s  " supreme arbiter,  " the Supreme Court has kept federal- 
s t a t e  relationships o n  a smooth course of evolution, i .  e .  , except for the 
Civil  War. 
T h c  proccss of change leads u s  to  i7nc last important considera- 
tion: t h c  c o ~ ~ s t i t u t i o n a l  mending proccss.  The  amending process ,  as  se t  
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forth i n  Article V of  our Consti tution, is another important innovation of the  
consti tutional fathers.  They solved the perplexing problem of combining 
s tabi l i ty  with adaptabili ty by making the amending process difficult but 
possible .  Two methods were made available for amending the Constitution, 
but only one has  been used. This method allows the Constitution to  be 
amended if both houses  of Congress pas s  the proposed amendment by a 
two-thirds vote and i t  is in turn ratified by three-fourths of the s t a t e s .  
Here again a federal principle i s  upheld in  allowing the s ta tes  t o  have the 
final word on a n y  formal change in  the Constitution. 
In summing up the nature of the American federal system, i t  can 
be said that i t s  efficiency has  varied. Politics alone have often been the 
deciding factor in  the functioning of the system, a s  i t  cannot be concluded 
that  administrative decentralization in  itself has  made the system work. 
To obtain a complete picture of American federalism one would have to  
consider how and why the federal Constitution was  created,  how i t  has 
evolved,  and how i t  has  retained i t s  vitality. 1 
Federalism as practiced in Switzerland. The Swiss Confederation 
has the longest history of federalism of any of today's federal s t a t e s .  
Although called a confederation, i t  i s  actually a true federal s ta te .  The 
Swiss  fedcral tradition began in  the thirteenth centurl. when three dis t r ic ts  
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were ab l e  to throw out their autocratic Austrian rulers.  By the seventeenth 
century the l oose  union of  the  original three d i s t r ic t s  had expanded into a 
league of thirteen s t a t e s .  I t  continued i n  th i s  manner, with only s l ight  
changes ,  until 1848. In  1848, a federal consti tution was  adopted which 
es tabl ished a federal  union of cantons.  l This union came about after a 
religious c ivi l  war and restored order by placing a constitution on  the 
tradit ions of the  former league of s t a t e s .  The constitution of 1848 was  
radical ly  revised in  1874. This revised version i s  the  bas i s  of the present 
Swiss  governmental sys tem,  but i t  h a s  a l s o  undergone considerable change 
by being amended aver  forty times s ince  i t  was  revised in  1874. 
A federal  system was a prerequisite for a n y  Swiss  union, for 
bes ides  having four language groups within her population, the various 
federated units (cantons) had developed very diverse governmental forms 
prior to unification.  Though these  varying governmental forms have now 
d isappeared ,  the Swiss  s t i l l  strongly support the idea of local  self-govern- 
ment. 
l s t rong ,  OJ. & ,  pp. 1 0 7 - 8 .  
2 ~ o h n  Clarke Adams , e t .  a l .  , Foreign Governments and Their 
Backqrounds ( ~ e w  York: Harper Brothers, 195 0) , p.  403. 
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Swiss federalism is based chiefly on cantonal tradition and prac- 
t i c e s ,  but the Swiss  consti tutional framers a l s o  looked to  the American 
system when they  created their federal system. Theoretically the  Swiss 
Confederation is less federal than the United States  because the cantonal 
consti tutions depend on the federal authority rather than on the federal 
consti tution. Cantonal rights , a s  well a s  national rights , are  as secure 
a s  i n  the  United S ta t e s ,  however, because of the  use  of init iative and re- 
ferendum in  the Swiss  system. l The present Swiss Confederation consis ts  
of twenty-five federated un i t s ,  s ix  of which are  half-cantons and 19 full 
cantons.  The federal authority of the union consis ts  of a bicameral legis-  
la ture ,  an executive counci l ,  and a weak federal judicial body. 2 
In examining the Swiss constitution one finds that federalism i s  
employed in a very different manner than in  the United States .  The federal 
constitution there provides for legis la t ive supremacy. But, a s  previously 
mentioned, the employment of initiative and referendum preserves the 
federal system by reserving some power for the several  cantons. The cantons 
can bc regarded a s  possessing a degree of theoretical sovereignty because 
3f this  instrument. In general ,  however, the federal authority i s  viewed a s  
supreme. I n  c a s e s  of conflict  between the two levels  of government, the 
'strong, OJ. , pp. 108-9. 
2 ~ p i r o ,  w. &. , p p .  5 6 ,  58. 
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will of the federal. authority always prevails. 
Other practices which are  quite different from the American system 
of federalism are  the cantonal administration of federal legislation, l and the 
constitutional right of the cantons to  negotiate certain agreements with 
foreign countries (subject to  approval by the  federal authority). Otherwise 
the more traditional relationship exis ts  with the federal authority monopoliz- 
ing foreign affairs ,  commerce, communication, the military and monetary 
systems. The federal authority cannot levy direct taxes on the Swiss people, 
but must obtain revenue indirectly by taxing the cantons. In areas of mutual 
interest the federal authority and the cantons share concurrent powers. 2 
The few remaining areas  which are not delegated to the federal authority 
remain exclusively in the control of the cantons. Thus i t  can be said that 
federalism does exis t  in Switzerland because of the nature of the relationship 
between the federal authority and the cantons. But, a s  in the United States,  
the federal authority continues to encroach on the few remaining areas 
wherc cantonal power is sti l l  dominant. 3 
The machinery o f  the Swiss government also has several unique 
3spccts  which vary not only from the federal forms of the United States but 
l ~ c l a m s ,  ct  a l . ,  z. &. , P. 4 1 3 .  
' ~ i l l i a m  Bcnnett Munro, The Governments of Eurape (New k '~ rk :  
The Macmillsn Company, 1938),pp. 778-79 .  
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also from most  o ther  federa l  systems. The S w i s s  l eg i s la tu re  is the  supreme 
organ of the  federa l  union. Somewhat uncommon is  t he  fact that  the upper 
chamber (Consei l  des 'etats)  has  no spec i a l  powers and, therefore, is theo- 
re t i ca l ly  equa l  to t h e  lower  chamber (Conseil  -). In practice the 
upper chamber ,  which e q u a l l y  represents the cantons, h a s  far less influence 
t h an  t h e  lower chamber.  Yet bills a r e  introduced s imul taneously  i n  both 
chambers  and must  be approved by both chambers to become law. l Again 
it should  be noted t ha t  l eg i s l a t i ve  supremacy and dominance of t h e  lower 
chamber are balanced by the pract ice  of in i t ia t ive  and referendum. 
The leg i s la tu re  also has the t a s k  of e lec t ing  the  impoflant federal 
o f f i c ia l s  of t h e  judicial  and  executive branches of the  Swiss government. 
The most  important a r e  the  e l e c t i ons  of t he  plural chief execut ive  office 
(Consei l  fkdkra l ) .  This  s even  man  execu t ive  is e lec ted  by a joint s e s s i o n  
of t h e  l eg i s la tu re .  It funct ions  in  a manner similar  t o  that of t h e  commission 
form of municipal  government. Each member of the  execu t ive  a c t s  as  the  
head of a department o r  agency  of t he  federal  government.* Every year the  
l eg i s la tu re  elects two of the  execu t i ve ' s  members to act a s    resident and 
vice pres ident  of t he  S w i s s  nat ion.  They h a v e  no important consti tut ional  
powers ,  howcver,  a s  the  o f f i ces  a r e  nece s sa ry  chief ly  for diplomatic 
l ~ u n r o ,  OJ. cA., pp. 779-81). 
Z ~ d a m s ,  ct*. , LI. c&. , pp. 414-15.  
purposes.  I t  is important t o  note that  in  the  e lect ion of the executive the 
federal  principle is maintained by the practice of giving three cantons 
permanent representation.  Also,  no more than one member of the executive 
can  be chosen  from any  canton, and a l l  members have equal s t a tu s  on  the 
execut ive council.  2 
Besides their  executive powers, the members of the  Swiss execu- 
t ive  council also have legis la t ive  and judicial functions. The council a c t s  
as a type of ministry for the  legis la ture  and introduces most of the  important 
b i l l s  for l eg is la t ive  consideration.  If the bil ls  a r e  defea ted ,  the executive 
council  need not resign.  In  the judicial field the executive council ha s  
only small  powers concerning administrative law. Formerly the executive 
council  had greater powers in  this  f ie ld ,  but t hese  have now been assumed 
by the federal judiciary. 3 
The federal  judiciary of Switzerland i s  topped by a single con- 
s titutional court (Tribunal fbdbral) consist ing of twenty-six judges , who 
are  a l s o  e lected by the legis la ture  in  joint s e s s ion .  In  real i ty ,  the court 
i s  more l ike  a whole judicial system than one court. The judges are  
ass igned  to  various fields of jurisprudence and rarely meet together in a 
l ~ u n r o  9. cif. , p.  7 8 2 .  
'spire , OJ. c&. . p .  58. 
3 ~ u n r o ,  op. &t. , p p .  783-84. 
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body. One of  t h e s e  judicial divis ions  upholds t he  federal nature of the  Swiss 
state, a s  i t  d e a l s  with conflicts ar is ing between the federal and cantonal 
iuthoritie s . The cantons a l s o  have their own judicial systems , a s  well a s  
;ome administrative courts which a re  joint federal-cantonal courts. 1 
The h ighes t  federal court d o e s  not have the power to  review legis-  
a t ion or t o  p a s s  on  i t s  consti tutionali ty.  The lack of this  power has  re- 
;ulted i n  a n  unusual ly  large number of consti tutional amendments. Never- 
h e l e s s ,  the  bas i c  structure of the  Swiss  governmental system has  remained 
issent ia l ly  unchanged. Swiss  poli t ics have been,  and a r e ,  "adaptable and 
I f ic ien t .  " When problems have a r i s en ,  they have been recognized and 
rovided for promptly. 2 
I n  the summing u p  Swiss  federalism one must conclude in  the  
inal a s  sessmcnt  that  "reserve powers" are  possessed  by the cantons,  and 
zat the  consti tution i s  supreme. Although there i s  no judicial review, the  
onsti tution i s  made flexible through amendments which can come from the 
~ c a l  l eve l s  of  government, i . e .  , through the process of initiative and 
.fcrcnclum. Yet for a l l  i t s  f lexibi l i ty ,  Swiss federalism i s  a l s o  stable.  
I pas t  decades  i t  ha s  functioned well and has  proven i t s  own worth a s  a 
~vc rnmcn ta l  form. 
tit., p p .  4 4 9 - 5 0 ,  458.  l ~ d a r n s ,  e t  31. , x. -
2strong, op. G., p. 110. 
c i t . ,  p .  110. 3strc)ng, op. -
CHAPTER I1 
THE HISTORY OF FEDERALISM IN GERMANY 
I. EARLY STAGES 
Early i n  the nineteenth century the United States  and Switzer- 
land already had fairly well developed federal forms of government, but in 
Germany events  which would lead to the  establishment of true federal forms 
a century and one-half later were just beginning. The history of federalism 
i n  modern Germany begins with the French Revolution of 1789 ,  which was  
followed by Napoleon's march across  Europe. At that time Germany, a s  it 
is known today,  did not ex is t .  Before the Napoleonic Wars the  German 
a reas  of Europe were contained in the remnants of the Holy Roman Empire 
"which was  but a political shadow without any  substance.  " This so-  
called Empire consis ted of over three hundred independent s t a t e s ,  which 
made u p  the "Germanies. " Napoleon, however, redrew the map of Europe, 
3nd in  creating the Confederation of the Rhine (18 06- 18 14) greatly reduced 
the number of independent German s t a t e s .  The victorious European Allies,  
nceting a t  the  Congress of Vienna (1814-1815), after the defeat and abdic- 
Ition of Napoleon, did not choose to re-establish a l l  af the former inde- 
~ c n d c n t  German s t a t e s .  l T h i s  reduction of the number of German s ta tes  
'J. Ss lwyn  Shapiro , M~>dern and Cantemporary European His:or\? 
18 15- 1952) (1953  cditiiin; Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Cornpan!-, 1962)  , 
1 .  101. 
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to thir ty-nine and the  es tab l i shment  of t h e  German Confederation (18 15 - 1866) 
were t he  two original  even t s  which began a pol i t ica l  trend on  which federalism 
i n  Germany could l a t e r  build. The forces of nineteenth century consti tut ional  
l ibera l ism and  nationalism should also not  be  excluded as causa t ive  factors 
i n  t h e  development of German federalism. 
Why might t h e s e  even t s  and  forces  be  considered a s  t h e  begin- 
ning of German federal ism? Mainly  because  they  a r e  the  ba s i s  of two 
condi t ions  which a r e  e s s e n t i a l  for the  formation of a federal union. Most  
modern federa l  s t a t e s  have  e i the r  been l oose ly  joined i n  a confederation,  a s  
is t h e  c a s e  he r e ,  or  under t he  rule of a common sovereign prior t o  their  uni- 
f ica t ion.  Secondly ,  t h e  federated uni ts  of a federal  s t a t e  generally want 
unif ica t ion but not complete unity and the  consequent  l o s s  of a l l  sover-  
e ignty  t o  the  union.  In the c a s e  of Germany, nat ional is t ic  movement and 
even  a n  al l-German confederation were empirical  facts. Both of t he se  
e lements  a re  fundamental for the foundation of a unified s t a t e ,  as well as 
being read i ly  adap tab le  t o  federal  forms. 
This  f i rs t  German Confederation w a s  a very loose  union. I t  pos - 
s e s s e d  no common execut ive  or judiciary,  but i t  did s t a r t  a federal  t radit ion.  
I ts  l eg i s l a t i ve  o rgan ,  a Diet  which met a t  ~ rank£ur t /Main ,  took ,an a form 
l ~ a r s h a l l  Dil l  , Jr . , Germany: A_ Modern History (Ann Arbor: 
U nivt.1-sity o f  Michigan P re s s ,  196 1, p .  69.  
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which has  served a s  a model for German federal upper chambers up to  the 
present day .  The Diet was  actual ly  a chamber of ambassadors,  i t s  members 
being appointed by the loca l  s ta te  rulers. The delegates  had to ac t  in  
accordance with their ruler ' s  instructions,  and they could be recalled a t  
any time. l The confederation was  not a great s u c c e s s ,  and i t  was  quite a 
novel idea  i n  tha t  age .  But even though this  loose union of sovereign s ta tes  
was  not poli t ically effective,  i t  was  important a s  a n  all-German political 
ent i ty  and a s  a bas i s  for future unity. 
The next event which influenced the growth of a German federal 
tradition was  the creation of a Customs Union (Zollverein) by Prussia in  
18 19.  Although dominated by Prus s i a  and instituted for selfish economic 
reasons ,  the Customs Union was politically important because i t  accus-  
tomed the German people to a federalist ic union of German s ta tes  (exclud- 
.ng Austria),  and because i t  tied the s t a t e s  closer together in a mutually 
x n e f i c i a l  federal relationship. The union grew gradually, and by 1844, 
~ l m o s t  a l l  of the German s ta tes  were included within i t s  tariff boundaries. 2 
In 1848 a wave of revolution swept across  Europe and Germany. 
In March 3 1 ,  1848, a group of revolutionary German liberals met a t  Frank- 
u r t / ~ a i n  and decided that elections should be held throughout the German 
3 0  
s t a t e s  to  choose a representative German parliament. The Diet of the German 
confederat ion (also a t  ~ rankfu r t )  had los t  the support of the  various princes 
and i t  became assoc ia ted  with the demands for e lect ions.  Irregular elections 
came to  be he ld ,  s o  that an  unrepresentative parliament was elected.  The 
new parliament thus inherited the  legal  powers of the former Diet. Assuming 
that  it represented a l l  of the German people,  it immediately began to  draw 
up an  all-German constitution. This work continued into 1849. By that time 
it was  apparent that  Austria must be excluded and that  Frederick William of 
Prussia would have to  be the emporer of the new political union i f  it were to 
endure. In March, 1849, a constitution creating a federal union with a 
hereditary emperor was  adopted. I t  provided for a bicameral legislative 
body, whose upper chamber was  to be appointed by the governments of the 
s t a t e s ,  and whose lower chamber was  to  be elect ive.  Frederick William IV 
2f  Prussia did not accept  the emperorship when it  was offered to him. His 
*efusal of the crown caused the new political enti ty to be aborted,  and ir! 
1850 t h e  Diet  of the German Confederation was re-established. Although 
.he federal s t a t e  which was  envisaged by the 1848-49 constitution was 
ibolishcd before having a chance to prove i t se l f ,  the fact that i t  had been 
.stablishcd In theory was  significant for the future. 
Thc next important phase in the development of German federal- 
r;nl l ~ c c ~ a n  i  1866 and continued up until the end of IV~r ld  War I .  ~ h l s  
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inc luded t h e  North German Confederation and t h e  German Empire. In  1866 
Ot to  von Bismarck, t he  Pruss ian  Prime Min is te r ,  goaded Austria in to  war. 
The wel l  t rained Pruss ian  army i n  the  Seven Weeks  War  e a s i l y  defeated t he  
Austrians and her  southern German allies. After d ic ta t ing the  terms of the  
peace  t r e a ty ,  Bismarck created t he  North German Confederation after  de -  
c lar ing t he  old German Confederation ncn-existent .  1 
The North German Confederation cons i s ted  of twenty-two German 
states north of t h e  Main  River. I t s  const i tu t ion w a s  chief ly  t he  personal  
work of Bismarck. This  const i tu t ion,  adopted i n  1867 by  a n  e lec t ive  con- 
vention and rat if ied by  t he  member s t a t e s ,  al lowed Pruss ia  to  dominate 
the  new federa l i s t i c  union. 2 
Bismarck had prepared the  document carefully a n d ,  with minor 
changes ,  i t  remained i n  force a s  the  consti tut ion of the  German Empire 
(1871-1918) up t o  t h e  end of World War I .  The Pruss ian king was  the  here-  
j i tary  president  of t he  Confederat ion.  He named a chancellor  who w a s  
-espons ib le  t o  him only .  The f i rs t  chancellor  (Bismarck) ac ted a s  a one-man 
zabinct .  H e  w a s  a l s o  the  chairman of the  upper chamber of the  legis la ture  
:Bundesrat). Actually t he  members of  th i s  upper house  were ambassadors  
'eprcscnting the  autonomous governments of the  member s t a t e s .  Pruss ia  
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had the most votes (17) i n  this  body. Only the  upper chamber had the right 
to introduce legis la t ion into the lower chamber of the legislature (Reichstaq). 
In rea l i ty ,  the  king, through the chancellor,  controlled the seemingly demo- 
c ra t ic ,  federal s ta te .  1 
11. THE GERMAN EMPIRE (1870- 1918) 
In 1870-71, just three years after the establishment of the North 
German Confederation, another important event occurred in  the history of 
German federalism: the German s t a t e s  defeated the French in  the Franco- 
Prussian War and thereupon established the German Empire. The Empire 
consis ted of twenty-five kingdoms, principali t ies,  and free c i t ies  from 
both northern and southern Germany. It  superceded the North German 
Confederation a s  a political enti ty but retained i t s  federal form.' The 
Empire might bes t  be pictured a s  " a  federation of monarchies. 
The Empire, l ike the two confederations before i t ,  remained a 
federation of unequals . Because of s i z e ,  population, and the new consti - 
tut ion,  Prussia continued to  play a dominating role. Prussia ruled and paid 
only "reluctant deference" to  the  requests of the other members of the fed- 
eration. Thus the Empire was federal in form but was  never a true federation. 
l ~ i l l ,  OJ. G t . ,  p .  140. 
2 ~ l ~ a p i r o ,  OJ. &. , pp.  2 4 8 - 4 9 .  
3 ~ o r e l ~ ,  OJ. c. , p. 2. 
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The constitution of the Empire divided governmental powers between 
the  federated units and the imperial authority. I t  was  quite generous i n  
the  number of  powers which it left to  the federated units.  The most impor- 
tan t  of t hese  was  the  degree of competence which i t  gave to  them in  their 
administration of federal law. 
A parliament, similar to  that  of the  preceding North German Con- 
federation, was  the legis la t ive organ of the  Empire. A Bundesrat represented 
the federated units and a Reichstag the people. The Bundesrat had fifty- 
eight members unequally distributed between the various federated units. 
Members were appointed by the heads of their own unit government for 
indefinite terms. Voting was  by blocs according to  instructions received 
from the de lega tes '  home unit. The Bundesrat was the dominant chamber 
under this  system, chiefly because of i t s  power over the actions of the 
Reichstag,  and a l so  because of i t s  right to a c t  a s  a supreme court in certain 
in s t ances .  Nearly a l l  o f  the important bills originated in  the Bundesrat. 
The Reichstag was  inferior,  although theoretically equal in the lawmaking 
process ,  because i t  could be dissolved a t  any  time by the emperor with the 
concurrence of the Bundesrat. 3 
Besides furthering the federal tradition in Germany, the Empire 
' ~ u n r o ,  OJ. &., pp. 601, 604-5. 
2 ~ d a r n s ,  :t a l . ,  w. &. , p. 8 7 2 .  
3 ~ u n r c > ,  op. e., p .  605. 
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period i s  important because Germany then experienced parliamentary govern- 
ment for t h e  f i r s t  time. Also, one could for the first  time use  the term 
"Germany," a s  t h e  Empire was  the first truly unified German national s ta te .  
Of course ,  particularist sentiment remained strong, a s  can be seen by the 
construction of the  Bundesrat in  particular and in the federation in  general. 
But, a t  t he  same time, the  adoption of a federal system allowed for this  
particularist element while establishing the tradition of a federal authority 
i n  a newly unified s ta te  composed of a l l  the German s ta tes .  
, 
! 
The German Empire, supposedly the strongest and most efficient ! 
! 
government of i t s  d a y ,  fell  apart i n  November, 1918.  I t s  total  collapse 
surprised the world. After suffering defeat in World War I ,  the German 
Emperor, William 11, abdicated and turned the government over to the social-  
i s t  leader Friedrich Ebert, who established a provisional republican govern- 
ment. ' This provisional government then authorized the signing of the 
armistice and sought t o  carry on the functions of government until a new 
consti tution could be drafted. 
111. THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC (19 19 - 1933) 
After universal male elections based on proportional representa- 
tion wcrc he ld ,  a constitutional assembly met a t  Weimar in February, 1919. 
l.[bid., pp. 5 9 9 ,  607 .  
The assembly s e t  about the  t a sk  of drafting a new constitution for the German 
state as quickly as  possible.  A constitution was  finally adopted in  the 
summer of 1919 after lengthy argument and d iscuss ion .  This Weimar Consti- 
tution must be considered in detai l  because the federalism i t  embodied was 
la te r  used a s  a pattern by the framers of the Bonn Basic Law. 2 
The Weimar Constitution' s most striking a spec t  was i t s  great , 
length.  I t  clearly showed the influence of American, Swiss ,  and French 
governmental sys t ems ,  yet was  created mainly from German precedents. 3 
I t  consis ted of t he  two main sections:  (1) the first 108 art icles deal t  with 
the structure and function of the federal authority; (2) the l a s t  58 art icles 
dea l t  with the bas i c  rights and duties of the people. When the Weimar 
Constirution was  created,  most political scient is ts  thought of i t  a s  " the 
model of modern consti tutionalism." Unfortunately, i t  was not adapted 
to  meet change or the problems of the chaotic times in  which i t  was estab-  
l i shed .  A s  a resul t  i t  was  replaced by a dictatorship l e s s  than fifteen 
years a f te r  i t  had been adopted. 4 
Turning back to the constituent assembly,  one finds that a t  the 
1 Ibid. , p.  609 
2 ~ d a r n s ,  -- et a l . ,  *. a., P .  8 8 7 .  
3 ~ p i r o ,  =. &. , pp.  419, 421. 
4 ~ i l l ,  w. &. , p .  2 4 9 .  
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o u t s e t  of  d i s c u s s i o n s  the  b a s i c  problem w a s  whether to  e s t ab l i sh  a unitary 
or  a federal  German s t a t e .  A g rea t  dea l  of popular sentiment favored the  
creat ion of  a new uni tary  s t a t e ,  which would have  meant a break with 
federa l  t radit ion and  t he  predominance of Pruss ia .  Part icularist  sent iment ,  
a spec i a l l y  among the  Bavarian d e l e g a t e s ,  could never be  overcome. Hence ,  
:he i s s u e  w a s  decided i n  favor of a federal  s t a t e .  Thus ,  the  various s t a t e s ,  
low ca l l ed  Laender ,  were  i n  a posit ion t o  re ta in  a great  dea l  of res idual  
)ewer, whi le  t h e  new federal  authori ty had little more rea l  power than its 
x-edecessor i n  the  Empire. l Federalism w a s  given more emphasis  i n  t he  
Neimar Republic than  i n  its predecessor  , however,  chief ly  due t o  the  ab -  
; en ce  of t h e  heredi tary  emperorship of the  Pruss ian King. On the  other 
land,  one could see the  weakness  of federal ism in  that  Laender boundaries 
:ould be e a s i l y  changed and new Laender created with l i t t l e  trouble. 
The Weimar Const i tu t ion maximized the  powers avai lable  to  the 
edera l  author i ty  under a federal sy s t em,  leaving hardly a n y  for the Laender. 
h e  federa l  author i ty  w a s  delegated exc lus ive  powers i n  a r e a s  concerning 
1e national  i n t e r e s t ,  a s  we l l  a s  unrestr icted powers to l eg i s la te  in  such 
r e a s  a s  soc i a l  welfare  and industr ial  controls .  The federal authori ty 
l s o  had the  right to  put forward "fundamental principles" on such  sub jec t s  
s t axa t ion ,  educa t ion ,  rel igious groups ,  e t c .  , a s  guides  for the  Laender 
?g i s la tu rcs .  I n  a l l  c a s e s ,  federa l  legis la t ion took precedence over that  
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enacted by the Laender. Judicial review was  available a s  the means of de-  
ciding federal -Laender jurisdictional disputes .  l 
Thus the Weimar Constitution attempted to  transform the German 
nat ion,  i n  one motion, from an  "imperial autocracy" into a federal repub- 
lic. Unfortunately, th i s  attempt carried things "too far and too fast".  2 
The resu l t s  were catastrophic for the cause of the Republic and federalism 
i n  Germany. 
To grasp more clearly how federal principles were actually ap-  
plied i n  the  Weimar Republic, i t  is necessary to  examine the machinery of 
the Republic 's  government. The legis la t ive branch of Weimar consisted of 
a bicameral parliament. The Laender were represented in the upper 
chamber (Reichsrat) by one or more de lega tes ,  but no one Land was allowed 
to control more than two-fifths of the chamber. The members of the 
Reichsrat were again more or l e s s  ambassadors from the Laender govern- 
ments. The powers of the Reichsrat included the right to initiate legisla- 
tion and to return disapproved legislation to the lower chamber (Reichstaq) .' 
Actually, the Reichsrat was  not given a chance to pass  directly on legisla- 
tion coming from the lower chamber, since bills went directly to the Presi- 
rlcnt. The Reichsrat ' s  veto was merely suspensive,  s ince when i t s  
logg and Zinc, w. a. , pp .  630-3 1. 
' ~ u n r o ,  s. G., p .  611 .  
b i l l ,  . . , p .  267. 
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ob jec t ions  were  filed with the  Minis t ry  t he  Reichstag could aga in  consider 
t h e  l eg i s la t ion  i n  ques t ion .  But, if the  Reichstag did not wish t o  reconsider 
t h e  l eg i s l a t i on ,  t h e  Pres ident  had t he  cho ices  of pigeonholing it indefinitely 
or  turning i t  over t o  t h e  people i n  a referendum. 1 
From the  above  descr ip t ion of t he  powers of the  Reichsrat  it is 
c l ea r  t h a t  t h e  Reichstag w a s  des igned t o  be t he  predominant legis la t ive  
chamber and chief  lawmaking body of t h e  Weimar Republic. Although s e t  
up t o  be a body wi th  v a s t  p res t ige ,  t he  Reichstag w a s  of l i t t l e  practical  
value  d u e  t o  t h e  mult ipl ici ty of poli t ical  par t ies  within i t .  I t s  ins tabi l i ty  
c an  be s e e n  from t h e  fac t  tha t  the  length of office for Minis t r ies  i n  the  
Republic averaged e igh t  months. 2 
The most novel provisions of the  Weimar Consti tut ion deal t  with 
the  office of the  Pres ident .  The Weimar President  was  given a broad and 
imposing l i s t  of powers ,  which were weakened only by the  requirement 
tha t  the  chancel lor  or minister  concerned approve h i s  a c t i ons .  The chan- 
ce l lor  and Minis t ry  were i n  turn responsible  to the  Reichstag.  The most 
notorious of t he  Pres iden t ' s  powers w a s  embodied i n  the  famous Article 48 
3 f  t h e  Const i tu t ion.  This  a r t i c le  gave  him power t o  rule by decree  i n  c a s e  
~f a  national  emergency; and almost  anything could be made to appear a s  
l ~ u n r o ,  =. a, p. 616. 
'oa" and Zinc ,  w. &. , p p .  633,  638-39.  
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s u c h  i n  t h e  troubled t i m e s  of tha t  e ra .  This power w a s  abused  a lmost  from 
t h e  beginning of t h e  Republic. I t  a l s o  al lowed anti-Republic forces  ultim- 
a t e l y  t o  d e s t r o y  t h e  Weimar Government. 
In  a summary, one  might conclude tha t  t h e  Weimar Consti tut ion 
and t h e  federa l  sys tem which it es tab l i shed  fai led b e c a u s e  t h e y  were ahead 
of t h e  t i m e s .  Germany i n  t h e  1920 ' s  w a s  not r eady  t o  a c c e p t  such  a com- 
p l e t e  parl iamentary regime. Structural  w e a k n e s s e s  within the  Consti tut ion 
itself may a l s o  be  blamed.  I t  is c l e a r  now tha t  t h e  Weimar Gw ernment 
w a s  not properly set u p  t o  so lve  t h e  grave  economic and other problems 
t h a t  were  s o o n  t o  occur .  1 
Yet d e s p i t e  i t s  se r ious  i n a d e q u a c i e s ,  t h e  Weirnar Republic w a s  
a true federa l  s t a t e  c rea ted  with good in tent ions .  Its federal  a s p e c t s  
inc luded cons t i tu t iona l  supremacy,  d is t r ibut ion of powers between the  
federa l  author i ty  a n d  t h e  Laender,  and a federal  court  t o  dec ide  d i spu tes  
be tween  t h e  two l e v e l s  of authori ty.  But a s  a federal  s t a t e  i t  w a s  unique 
because :  (1) the  d iv i s ion  of powers w a s  not firmly fixed; (2)  t he  Laender 
wcrc represen ted  unequal ly  in  the  Reichsrat ;  and (3) the  popularly e lec ted  
president a c t e d  a s  c h i e f  execu t ive  through a ministry responsible  to  the  
i e i c h s t a g  . 2 
IV. OCCUPATION PERIOD (1945-1949) 
I t  is impor tant  t o  beg in  a n y  cons ide ra t ion  of t h e  p resen t  government 
of t h e  ~ e d e r a l  Repub l i c  wi th  t h e  occupa t ion  period fol lowing World W a r  11, 
as t h a t  period w a s  t h e  formative s t a g e  for t h e  governmenta l  s y s t e m  and 
c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  Bonn Republic .  Also  important  is t h e  f a c t  t h a t  during 
t h i s  t ime  t h e  All ied occupy ing  powers  in tervened a good d e a l  i n  the  c rea t ion  
of t h e  n e w  governmen ta l  s y s t e m ,  e s p e c i a l l y  b y  r e se rv ing  for t h e m s e l v e s  
t h e  r ight  t o  p a s s  f i n a l  judgment  o n  a n y  cons t i t u t iona l  document  which  t h e  
G e r m a n s  might  d r a w  up.  
T h e  o c c u p a t i o n  period may  b e  d iv ided  in to  two d i s t i n c t  p h a s e s ,  
but  o n l y  t h e  f i r s t  p h a s e  (1945-1949) is t o  b e  cons ide red  h e r e .  I t  is not  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  d e a l  wi th  t h e  second  p h a s e  (1949-1955) ,  b e c a u s e  during 
t h i s  p h a s e  t h e  government  of t he  Fede ra l  Republic  had  a l r e a d y  begun t o  
func t ion  under  t h e  Bas ic  Law. Respons ib i l i t y  had b e e n  t aken  by  t h e n  
from t h e  mi l i t a ry  governors  and  p laced  i n  t h e  h a n d s  of c iv i l i an  occupa t ion  
a u t h o r i t i e s .  T h e s e  c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  mere ly  supe rv i sed  and  a s s i s t e d  
t h e  ncw German  Government  but  d id  not in te r fere  wi th  t h e  a c t u a l  funct ion-  
ing of t h e  new s y s t e m .  Allied mi l i ta ry  forces  were  main ta ined  o n  German 
s o i l ,  h o w e v e r ,  as  a s e c u r i t y  measure .  1 
Naz i  Germany cap i tu l a t ed  i n  M a y ,  1945,  and  t h e  Allied f o r c e s  o f  
loeu and  Z i n c ,  w. &. , p p .  703-1 .  
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Great Britain, the United States  and the U . S . S . R . proceeded to take control 
of a l l  German territory wes t  of  the Oder-Neisse l ine.  After complete control 
of a l l  Germany was  gained,  the Allied troops were redeployed so  that they I 
might occupy separate  occupation zones.  Russian armies occupied the 
eas te rn  zone , the  British the northwest zone, the Americans a south and 
central  zone ,  while the French were invited to occupy the southwest Zone. 
Until the la t ter  s tages  of World War I1 the Allies had not given 
much attention to  drawing up a plan for occupation, s ince their foremost 
objective was  to  win the war. In fac t ,  the  problem of occupying Germany 
was  not studied i n  detai l  until the  Potsdam Conference in  July, 1945 ,  
a f te r  the fighting in Europe had ceased .  At the Potsdam Conference, 
which was  attended by the heads of the Russian,  British, and American 
governments, several  agreements were made concerning Allied occupation 
of Germany. Prior to th i s ,  a t  the Yalta Conference in February, 1945, 
the Allied leaders  had merely s e t  vague aims for occupation: i . e .  , Germany 
would be divided into occupation zones; the French would be invited to 
participate in  occupation; and a co-ordinated administration of the  four 
zones would be assured under some form of central authority in Berlin. 2 
The leaders  a t  Potsdam proceeded to fill out the detai ls  of this brief outline. 
2 ~ i r , n c l  H .  Laing , c t  a l .  , Source B G J ~  i n  European Gcvernments 
(Ncw Yor-k: William Sloanc Associates , I n c .  , 1959), p p .  3 4 4 - 4 5 .  
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I n  t h e  Potsdam Protocol the  Allies s t a t e d  tha t  the i r  objec t  i n  occu-  
la t ion  was " to  prepare for t h e  even tua l  reconst ruct ion of German poli t ical  
i f e  o n  a democra t i c  b a s i s  and for eventual  peaceful  cooperat ion in interna- 
iona l  life. " A l s o ,  i n  t h e  Potsdam agreement t h e  All ies decided t o  t r ea t  
bccupied Germany as a n  economic  unit wi th  t h e  pol i t ica l  s tructure being a s  
lecentra l ized as poss ib le .  No cen t ra l  government w a s  t o  be  es tab l i shed  
mmediately . 1 
The agreement  reached a t  Potsdam is  important to  t h i s  s tudy  of 
he German federa l i sm because :  (1) i t  l e f t  the  future open for t h e  crea t ion 
f a cen t ra l  German government which would be built  from the  bottom up; 
2) t h e  fa i lure  of occupied Germany t o  be t rea ted  a s  a n  economic unit  
a s t e n e d  the  es tab l i shment  of the  Federal  Republic.  
By September ,  1945,  i t  w a s  a l ready  apparent  tha t  the  Russ ians  
rere not wil l ing t o  coopera te  i n  administering the  occupation zones with 
~c other  th ree  Al l i e s ,  s i n c e  the  Sovie t  zone frontier had been sea led  off.  
h e  th ree  wes te rn  occup ie r s  a l s o  sharply  d isagreed among themselves  i n  
: g a d s  to occupat ion policy.  2 
At Stuttgart  i n  September of 1946,  Secre tary  of S ta te  Byrnes 
a d e  c l e a r  the  American policy toward occupied Germany. Although h i s  
 bid., p p .  351-53.  
2 ~ c l n m s ,  e t  a l . ,  w. . , p. 8 7 6 .  
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s p e e c h  conta ined little tha t  w a s  new,  it did set forth official  American 
policy as  of 1946.  This  policy was:  that  t h e  time had come to  regard 
"zonal  boundaries" on ly  for secur i ty  purposes and not a s  economic or 
pol i t ica l  uni ts ;  tha t  t r ans  portat ion,  communication, and posta l  se rv ices  
should b e  organized for Germany as a whole; tha t  t h e  German people be 
a l lowed t o  govern themse lves  under a provisional German government a s  
soon  as  poss ib le ;  and tha t  t h i s  provisional government should prepare a 
"draft  of a federa l  const i tu t ion for Germany. " 2  
In  1 9 4 7 ,  t he  United S t a t e s  made its policy for a future federal 
form of German government even  more def in i te .  The Joint Chiefs  of Staff 
d i rect ive  1779 s ta ted :  
. . . t h e  most  const ruct ive  development of German poli t ical  life 
would be i n  the  es tabl ishment  throughout Germany of federal  German 
s t a t e s  (Laender) and the  formation of a centra l  German government 
with careful ly  defined and limited powers and functions.  All powers 
sha l l  be  ves ted  i n  t he  Laender excep t  such  a s  a r e  express ly  de le -  
ga ted  t o  the  Cent ra l  government. 3 
The British were  a l s o  i n  favor of es tabl ishing a c en t r a l  German 
government with a federal  form a t  tha t  time. They did not require,  how- 
:ver, tha t  s new German centra l  government be a s  ful ly federal a s  the  
logg and Zinc ,  w. a. , p .  8 7 6 .  
'united S t a t e s  Department of S t a t e ,  Germany (1947-1949):  The 
; t o ry  in  Documents .  (Publication 3556.  Washington: Governinent Printir.9 
l f f i c c ,  1950) ,  p p .  4 -7 .  
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Americans o r  French demanded.  The Russ ians  could not e v e n  be  approached 
on t h e  s u b j e c t .  The  d i s u n i t y  and d ivergent  v iews of the  All ies  were  soon  
so g r e a t  t h a t  t h e  R u s s i a n s  and t h e  French would not implement the  provi- 
s i o n s  of t h e  Potsdam Protocol  re la t ing  t o  t h e  e s t ab l i shment  of cent ra l  
admin i s t r a t ive  a g e n c i e s  i n  Germany.  l 
O n e  o f  t h e  main t o p i c s  o f  d i s c u s s i o n  at the  1947 conference of 
foreign min i s t e r s  i n  Moscow concerned t h e  nature (unitary ve r sus  federal)  
o f  a future c e n t r a l  government for Germany.  At t h i s  point the  United S t a t e s ,  
F r a n c e ,  a n d  Britain s tood together  behind the  plan for a decent ra l ized  cen-  
t r a l  government ,  a s  opposed  t o  Russ ian  suppor t  of a unitary sys tem.  By 
1948 t h e  s p l i t  and  t h e  t e n s i o n  between the  three  Wes te rn  All ies  and the  
R u s s i a n s  had reached  a g rave  point .  The Centra l  Allied Control  Authority 
broke d o w n ,  and  it w a s  q u i t e  apparent  tha t  some form of occupat ion  mach- 
ine ry  higher than t h e  zone l e v e l  would be needed in  the  three western  
z o n e s .  The u l t imate  withdrawal of the  Russ ians  from the  Allied Control 
Authority seemed  a good jus t i f ica t ion  for the  e s t ab l i shment  of a cent ra l  
government i n  W e s t e r n  Germany.  
The British and Americans ,  rea l iz ing  the  inadequacy  of the  cen-  
tral cont ro l  au thor i ty ,  had by th i s  time a l ready  implemented a " bizonal  or- 
gan iza t ion"  t o  s c ~ p c r v i s e  the i r  two z o n e s .  This bizonal  administrat ion 
logg and Z i n c ,  OJ. g. , p .  707 .  
2un i t cd  S t a t e s  Dcyc~rtment o f  S t a t c ,  w. &. , p p .  58-9. 
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might be considered a federa l  type  structure.  The bizonal  machinery includ - 
e d  a bicameral  l eg i s la tu re .  The upper chamber o f  t h i s  unit  represented t he  
Laender wi thin  t h e  zones  equa l ly .  There w a s  a l s o  a n  execut ive  council  of  
six as wel l  as  a high court.  This functioning "bizonia" government was  
important because  it gained French support for t he  es tabl ishment  of a central  
government for a l l  of Wes te rn  Germany. As t he  French s aw  t h e  worth of 
t h i s  new s y s t e m ,  t h e y  s lowly began t o  integrate thei r  own zone into the  
s t ructure  of " bizonia" . 1 
After further d e l a y  and hes i t a t ion  on t h e  part of t he  three West-  
ern  All ies , a dec i s i on  t o  begin the  work of creat ing a Wes t  German Sta te  
w a s  reached at t he  London Conference i n  1948.  The bizonal experiment 
had been u se fu l ,  but i t  w a s  only t rans i t ional  i n  nature. Finally,  France 
a l s o  had come t o  t he  conclus ion tha t  further d e l a y  in  re-establishing a 
Wes t  German S ta te  would be dangerous .  
Meet ing a t  the  London Conference were representa t ives  of 
France , Grea t  Bri tain,  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  and the  Benelux countries.  The 
Benelux countr ies  had been invited to  a t tend because  of their  spec ia l  
in teres t  as neighbors o f  the  new W e s t  German Sta te .  After meeting from 
February to June ,  the  diplomats a t  London i s sued  the  following recommen- 
'OCJCJ and Z inc ,  O J . ~ . ,  p p .  7 1 6 ,  7 4 3 - 4 4 .  
' ~ c i i n ~ ,  ad. ,s. a., P. 361 .  
. . . the  delegates  have agreed to  recommend to  their governments 
t ha t  the  military governors should hold a joint meeting with the 
Ministers-President of t he  western zone in Germany. At that meet- 
ing the Ministers-President will be authorized to convene a Consti- 
tuent Assembly in  order to  prepare a constitution for the approval of 
the  participating s ta tes .  
The constitution should be such a s  to  enable the Germans to 
play their part in  bringing to  an  end the present division of Germany 
not by the  reconstitution of a centralized Reich but by means of a 
federal  form of government which adequately protects the rights of 
the respect ive s t a t e s ,  and which, a t  the same time provides for 
adequate  central  authority. . . 1 
The recommendation made by the London Conference was formally 
approved by  the governments concerned. The three Military Governors were 
then notified that  they should take further s teps  to  s e e  that a central gov- 
ernment for Western Germany was  forthwith establ ished.  
The three occupation powers, however, were s t i l l  not in com- 
?lete accord about the future of Germany. The British and American nego- 
:iators had a hard time convincing the French that a German constitution 
~ o u l d  be of l i t t le  value if i t  were not primarily a German creation. 
Vegotiations were slow because the French insisted on linking the govern- 
nental quest ion with i s s u e s  concerning international control of the Ruhr , 
h e  Occupation Statute ,  and protection of foreign investments in Western 
'united States  Department of State ,  OJ. e. , p .  7 7 .  
2 ~ a r o l d  Zinc, The  United States Germany (1944-1955) (prince- 
on: D .  Van Nostrand Company, Inc.  , 1 9 5 7 ) ,  p .  185. 
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Meanwhile the West  German political leaders had met to discuss 
the  implications of the  London Conference. In the Koblenz Resolution the 
various polit ical  fact ions agreed t o  accept  the offer t o  cal l  a constituent 
assembly  for the  purpose of drafting a constitution for West  Germany. They 
chose ,  however , t o  ca l l  the assembly a "Parliamentary Council" (Parlament- 
arischer - Rat) ,  and designated i t s  purpose a s  the drafting of a provisional 
basic  law rather than a constitution. These two changes were adopted to 
smphasize the  hope for eventual reunification. In their resolution the 
Zerman polit icians a l s o  included a l i s t  of objections t o ,  and rephrased 
some of the provisions o f ,  the London Agreement. Their main demands 
Mere that  the parliaments of the several  Laender should ratify the constitu- 
:ional d ra f t ,  rather than the  people directly and that the Laender parliaments 
should e l ec t  the members of the Parliamentary Council. 
On July 1 5 ,  19  5 8 ,  the Military Governors were informed by the 
vlinisters-President that the Koblenz Resolution was not acceptable and 
hat the London Agreement was  regarded a s  being final. Thus the Germans 
lad to back down, but they did not back down a s  much a s  the Mllitary 
;overnors had hoped. Thc occupation powers a l so  had to make some con- 
. c s s i o n s ,  among which were the acceptance of the terms "Basic ~ a w "  and 
arliamcntary Council .  " 
the Germans, the leas t  acceptable part of the London Agree- 
l e n t  was  i t s  i~ssoc id t ion  of the future constitution with all o c c u ~ a t i a n  
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s ta tu te .  They f e l t  tha t  perhaps the German people would not accept  th i s .  
Without heeding German opinion on the matter, the  three occupation 
powers went  on to  adopt a n  Occupation Statute.  ' As it turned out however, 
the Occupation Statute ,  which concerned the rights that  the  three occupa- 
tion powers reserved for themselves after the  establishment of a West 
German government, had a minimal effect  on the deliberations of the 
parliamentary Council .  I t  was  not,  i n  fac t ,  completed until after the Basic 
Law had been drafted i n  i t s  f inal  form.' The Occupation Statute remained 
in effect  until 1955, but i n  general i t  did not hinder the functioning of the 
Zerman government. The occupation powers were concerned only in  mat- 
:ers immediately concerning the occupation,  and they did not u se  their 
3owers under the Occupation Statute to interfere to a great degree with 
:he functioning of the West  German government. Occupation technically 
~ n d e d  in May,  1949, when the Basic Law was adopted. 3 
A s  regards developments in  the summer of 1948, the  next 
mportant s t ep  occurred in  August. A. that  time a committee of exper ts ,  
luthorizcd by the Ministers-President of the Laender, met a t  Chiemsee 
'Carl J .  Friedrich, "Rebuilding the German Constitution, " The 
.mcrican Poli t ical  Science Review, XLIII (June, 19491, p .  468-73. 
~ o h n  Ford Golay ,  The Foundinq of the Federal Republic of 
icrmany (Chicago: University of  Chicago P res s ,  1956), p.  2 2 .  
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to draw up  some "guiding principles" which t he  Parliamentary Council could 
re ly  o n  when  it met i n  September. The committee of exper t s ,  however, pro- 
duced more than  "guiding pr inciples ."  A complete consti tut ional  draft 
(plus t h e  r ea sons  and log ic  behind t he  various a r t i c les  of the  draft) was  the  
~ u t c o m e  of t h i s  meeting of exper t s .  The work of t h e  committee was  regard- 
sd  very highly.  In  f a c t ,  the  Basic Law, i n  its f inal  form resembled the  
"Chiemsee  Draft"  very  c lo se ly .  The "Chiemsee Draft" had ,  i n  turn ,  been 
~ a s e d  on  the  new Laender const i tu t ions  and t he  Weimar Consti tut ion.  
Also i n  August ,  1948,  the  de lega tes  t o  the  Parliamentary Council 
Mere c h o s e n  by t he  parl iaments of the  respect ive  Laender. Delegates  
vere c h o s e n  proportionately to  represent  the  strength of the  various polit- 
. ca l  par t ies  i n  t h e  lower chambers of the  Laender parliaments. Sixty-five 
i e lega tes  and f ive  observers  from Berlin were e lec ted .  By party affiliation 
he  de l ega t e s  were  divided i n  th i s  manner: Chr is t ian  Democratic/Christian 
;ocia l  Union 27; Soc ia l  Democrats  27; Free Democrats 5; German Party,  
:enter Par ty ,  and Communist Party 2 e ach .  
The Parl iamentary Council  convened on September 1,  1948, a t  
Ionn. The Chr i s t i an  Democratic l eader ,  Dr. Konrad Adenauer , was  e lected 
o a c t  a s  pres ident  of  the  assembly .  Numerous other officers were a l s o  
:hoscn.  The  work o f  draft ing the  Basic Law began immediately. 1 
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As i n  t h e  pre-Weimar period, the  immediate period before the  
parl iamentary Counci l  convened w a s  filled with strong protests  from the  
conserva t ive  bus ine s smen ,  agrar ian  in te res t s  and extreme nat ional is ts ,  
who had f ea r s  tha t  a " l ibera l  soc i a l  s t a t e "  would be  es tab l i shed .  These  
e lements  favored t h e  demand of the  occupation powers that  the  new German 
government be  federa l  i n  form. They gathered t he  force of public opinion 
behind them even  t o  a greater  degree  t han  had the  pro-federalists of  the  
pre-Weimar period. Thus t he  majority of t h e  de lega tes  took for granted 
t h a t  t h e  new sys tem of German government would be a federal  o n e ,  even 
before t h e  Parl iamentary Council  w a s  convened.  
Disagreement  occurred,  however ,  over what form the  federal 
sys tem would t ake  i n  the  new government. The ea r ly  deba tes  of  the  
Parl iamentary Counci l  made i t  c l ea r  that  t h e  federal  s tructure of the new 
government would follow tradit ional  German l i n e s .  Even the most pro- 
federa l  pa r t i e s  had no in tent ion of switching from tradit ional  German 
federalism to one l ike  tha t  employed i n  the  government of the  United S ta tes .  
Th i s ,  of c o u r s e ,  led  t o  a se r ious  misunderstanding with the Arre r ican oc-  
cupation au thor i t i e s .  For both Americans and Germans had interpreted the  
ins t ruct ions  o f  the  London Agreement (i. e .  , to e s t ab l i sh  a federal form of 
government) in  terms o f  their own exper ience  with federal ism. 1 
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The major i s s u e s  pertaining t o  federalism which confronted the  
par l iamentary  Counci l  were: (1) t h e  degree of l eg i s la t ive  authority and i t s  
d iv i s ion  be tween  t h e  federa l  authori ty and t he  Laender; (2) t h e  division of 
f inancia l  r espons ib i l i t i e s  between the  federal  authori ty and t he  Laender; 
(3) whether  or  not t o  re ta in  t he  tradit ional  council- type upper chamber of 
t he  l eg i s l a t u r e  or c r ea t e  a true sena te ;  (4) whether or not t o  include judicial 
review of legis la t ion;  (5) whether  or not t o  continue t he  tradition of "dele-  
gated adminis t ra t ion"  of federal  l eg i s la t ion .  ' How the se  i s s u e s  were 
se t t l ed  wi l l  be  s e e n  i n  t he  examination of t h e  Basic Law i n  the  following 
chapter .  
The Parl iamentary Counc i l ' s  d i s cus s ion  of i s s u e s  was  qui te  
l eng thy ,  even  by German s tandards .  At various t imes it appeared that  
agreement would not be reached.  In  January,  1949,  a committee draft of 
the  Basic Law w a s  f inal ly  produced. In February th i s  draft was  studied by 
the  three  Mil i tary  Governors ,  who regarded i t  favorably a s  a whole. 
American and French author i t ies  were d i sp l ea sed ,  however,  by the  degree 
of author i ty  which w a s  concentrated i n  the  central  government and the  
vague d iv i s ion  of  powers between the federal authori ty and the  Laender. 
T h e y  a l s o  objected t o  provisions which seemed to  continue the traditional 
Gcrman view o f  the  c iv i l  se rv ice  and t he  awarding of Land s ta tus  to Berlin. 
l f r i edr ich ,  op. c. , p .  4 7 9 .  
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As a r e su l t ,  Mili tary Governors returned the  draft t o  the  Parliamentary Coun- 
cil for further revision.  A revised draft was  then produced, but it embodied 
little change ,  for t he  Germans regarded a strong central government as more 
desirable  than a strong federal  system. By ear ly  April, 1949, the occupa- 
t ion powers had almost given up on prevailing against  German insis tence 
on  a strong centralized government. l A t  th is  time the foreign ministers of 
the  occupation powers met i n  Washington and agreed on concessions which 
would break the impasse.  Differences over the  Basic Law were finally 
resolved on April 2 5 ,  1949 .  
The Basic Law thus took on i t s  final form. It  was approved by 
the Parliamentary Council  on May 8 ,  1949, by a n  overwhelming majority, 
The Military Governors gave their approval and the Basic Law was  then 
submitted to  the  Laender parliaments for their approval. All of the Laender , 
except Bavaria, ratified the Basic Law. It became operative a s  the gov- 
ernment o f  the  Federal Republic of Germany, which began to function in 
Scptcmber , 1 9 4 9 .  3 
Thus the failure of the four occupation powers t o  come to  terms 
on tho treatment of postwar Germany a s  a political and economic whole led 
to  the establishment of the Bonn Republic. Certainly,  a t  l e a s t  init ial ly,  
'zinc,  OJ. &. , p p .  187-88. 
2 ~ o l a y ,  . - c i t . , p p .  2 1 - 2 .  
j ~ i n c ,  =. G. , p. 188. 
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they did not desire the  consequences of their disunity--i. e. , a divided 
Germany. They were forced into accepting this  situation, however, due 
to conflicts of interests and goals both i n  Germany and elsewhere in the 
world. ' The Cold War was now on i n  earnest. 
CHAPTER I11 
FEDERALISM IN THE BUNDESREPUBLIK (1949- 1963) 
I. ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL FEATURES OF THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION 
In attempting t o  analyze t he  federal features of the Basic Law, 
the  fact  must aga in  be emphasized that  th i s  constitutional document i s  the 
sum tota l  of a long tradition and heri tage of federal governmental forms 
which were unique t o  Germany. The Weimar Consti tution,  linked in  turn 
with the  "revolution of 1848, w a s  undoubtedly i t s  most potent positive 
force. " 1 
The Basic Law broadly followed the  instructions which the three 
Western occupat ion powers gave t o  the Parliamentary Council; yet i t  has  
a Germanic qua l i ty  of i t s  own. T n e  Germans,  given a wholly free hand i n  
choosing their governmental sys tem,  would certainly have chosen federal- 
i s m ,  and for three reasons:  (1) a s  a "direct  repudiation" of the centralized 
system es tab l i shed  in  the Nazi regime; (2) a s  a means of restoring auto- 
nomy to Bavaria and other part icularist  oriented Laender which had given 
i t  up reluctantly under the  f i rs t  Reich; and (3) a s  the  best  hope of reunify- 
ing divided Germany in  the future. 2 
The Basic Law def ini te ly  es tab l i shes  a federal system of govern- 
ment in  the Bonn Republic. Professor Friedrich compares the federalism af 
l f r icdr ich , op. G. , p.  463 .  
2 ~ c ~ r l c y ,  OJ. g., p .  2 7 7 .  
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the present German State  t o  the other well-known federal systems i n  this 
manner: " i t  is more federal than Austria and Canada,  about a s  federal as 
~ w i t z e r l a n d  and the  United S ta t e s ,  l e s s  federal than the German Empire 
and the  British Commonwealth of Nations. " Yet in  the past  certain cr i t ics ,  
notably the  French, have said i t  was  not really federal a t  a l l .  1 
Professors Ogg and Zinc contend that the "federal character" of 
t he  Bonn Republic is i t s  "most striking feature." To them i t  is most sig- 
nificant that  the  word "federal" appears in  the name of the new Republic. 
Furthermore, they  argue that  the Federal Republic of Germany "represents 
one of the most studied attempts to  apply federalism in a l l  political 
history. It 2 
To examine these  assumptions for the extent of their validity 
i t  i s  necessary  to  examine the structure of the Federal German Republic 
in de ta i l .  
Role of the Laender. In considering any  federal system careful 
--- 
attention must be paid to  the constitutional distribution of powers between 
the federated units and the  federal  authority, for this distribution i s  basic  
to the "interfederal  structure." In most federal structure the distribution 
of  powers between t h e  two levels  of government is blurred, however, by  
l ~ r i c d r i c h ,  np. e. , p p .  706 -7 .  
2 0 ~ ~  and Zinc,  OJ. &. , p .  748. 
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national  pol i t ica l  par t ies  and other  overriding pol i t ica l ,  soc ia l  and economic 
e lements .  This  blurring of t h e  distr ibution of powers i s ,  of course ,  a l s o  
qu i te  apparen t  i n  Wes t e rn  Germany. 
The Laender of t h e  Bundesrepublik, l ike  t he  federated units  i n  
other federa l  s y s t e m s ,  depend on  grants-in-aid and subs id ies  from the 
federa l  author i ty  (Bund) , i n  order t o  remain f inancial ly solvent .  Most  d the  
Laender governments a c c e p t  t h i s  secondary  role rather than interfere with 
a Bund-created e r a  of prosperi ty.  With t h e  disappearance of Pruss ia ,  the  
dominant German state for over  a century,  strong part icularist  elements 
i n  sou thwes te rn  Germany have  l o s t  their  "emotional target ."  New Laender 
have  a l s o  been  created which d o  not follow tradit ional  part icularist  l ines .  
Mos t  inf luent ia l  s o c i e t i e s  and voluntary organizations have been founded 
on a nationwide b a s i s ,  thereby ignoring Land boundaries.  Local political 
groups have  a l l  but d i sappeared .  From th i s  list one can  see tha t  traditional 
Land l oya l t i e s  have  been inc reas ing ly  replaced by national  sentiment a t  
the  expense  of t he  part icularist-federal  thought. Present  d a y  German 
federalism must be viewed i n  the  l ight  of  th is  growth of national sent iment ,  
for German part icularism has  l o s t  much of i t s  flavor i n  the  postwar Western  
Germany . 
' ~ s r l  Locwcns!:ein, Pc>litical Power and the  Governmental Process 
(Chicdgo: Univers i ty  of  Chicago  P r e s s ,  1 9 5 7 ) ,  pg .  288,  2 9 1 ,  304-5. 
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The Bundesrepublik cons is t s  of a union of ten  semi-autonomous 
Laender. All o f  t hese  Laender , except Saarland and Baden-Wuerttemberg , 
existed i n  1949 when the  Bundesrepublik was  es tabl ished.  Some of them 
have anc ien t  tradit ions of s ta tehood,  while others were the art if icial  crea- 
t ions  of t h e  occupation powers. Because of th i s  degree of artificiality it 
has  been quest ioned whether t he  Basic Law i s  truly a federal compact a t  
all. I t  is true tha t  t he  e lect ion of the delegates  t o  the  Parliamentary Coun- 
cil by the  Land parliaments (Landtaqe) embodied pure federalism, but these 
e lect ions  should be examined more closely.  First ,  the Parliamentary Coun- 
cil and t h e  choice of i t s  delegates  were required by a n  Allied directive. 
Secondly,  the  Laender i n  the  Western Zones could hardly be considered 
a s  true autonomous s ta tes ;  Hitler had reduced them to mere administrative 
uni ts .  The occupation powers later restored some of their former dignity, 
but not their poli t ical  autonomy. Besides,  only three Laender (Bremen, 
Hamburg, and Bavaria) had any  traditional history of genuine statehood. 
The other seven  were partially or wholly the creations of the occupation 
powers. 
In any  c a s e  the Parliamentary Council delegates  paid l i t t le regard 
to the  s t a tu s  of  the Laender. With few except ions ,  the delegates  pictured 
thcmsclvcs a s  representat ives  of the German people a s  a whole and not of 
thc Land from which they were e lec ted .  The); made this concept clear by 
v c s l i n g  t h c  SOVCI-clgnty i n  the whole German people rather than in  the 
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several Laender (Article 20 -2 ,  and the Preamble). Thus the Basic Law i s  not 
a "const i tut ive ac t "  of  the Laender but a n  enactment of the German people, 
from which both Laender and Bund receive their authority. 
The s t a tus  of the Laender within the Bundesrepublik a few years 
la ter  had not been enhanced significantly. This i s  illustrated by the 
Southwest C a s e ,  which will serve a s  a n  introduction to  the right possessed 
by the Laender of t he  Bundesrepublik. 
Article 2 9  of the  Basic Law dea ls  with the reorganization of 
\ 
Laender and the modification of Laender boundaries. This has  very important 
implications for the theory of federalism, s ince pure federalism depends on 
the ex is tence  of federated units.  Article 79-3 of the Basic Law insures the 
exis tence of Laender, but i t  does  not insure the existence of the present 
, .  
Laender. This was borne out by the decis ion of the Federal Constitutional 
Court in  the Southwest Case .  2 
The Southwest C a s e  arose out of a provisional art icle of the 
Basic Law. Article 118 provides for the reorganization of a portion of 
southwcstcrn Germany, which, af ter  much controversy and a referendum, 
became thc present Land of  Baden-Wuerttemberg. Reorganization was 
dccmed necessary because that portion of Germany had been unsatisfactorily 
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divided by the  occupation powers in  creating their respective occupation 
zones.  Linked to  Article 118 is Article 29 of the Basic Law. The latter 
art icle envisaged a "general  territorial reorganization" of Western Germany 
along more traditional l ines .  Initiative and referendum were to  be the 
means by which th i s  reorganization would be accomplished. 
However, the Military Governors did not accept  Article 29. 
They declared that  the  boundaries of the West  German Laender, except 
for the southwestern a rea ,  were to  remain fixed until such a time a s  a 
peace t reaty was  concluded, thereby suspending complete territorial 
reorganization. In the  meantime the Germans themselves,  after further 
examination of the  s i tua t ions ,  concluded that complete reorganization was 
not necessary  and offered only a few recommendations for minor boundary 
change s . 
When the Bundesrepublik gained complete sovereignty in 1955, 
Article 2 9 became operative.  Several initiative petitions were then under- 
taken ,  but none reached the referendum stage.  Further change of Laender 
boundaries at  the  present time seems unlikely, a s  the federal laws needed 
to implement the vague provisions of Article 2 9  have never evolved. 2 
Thcsc facts  show that the Laender of the Bundesrepublik possessed a higher 
'wells, w. &., pp. 17-20. 
L ~ b i d . ,  pp. 21-2. 
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degree of terr i torial  sovereignty  i n  practice than is ac tua l ly  accorded them by 
the Basic Law. 
A degree  of Land sovereignty can  a l s o  be found i n  the  various 
powers reserved t o  t h e  t e n  Laender i n  the  Basic Law. In  th is  respect  the 
Basic Law p o s s e s s e s  a strong federal  character .  A s  was  the  c a s e  i n  the  
Imperial and  Weimar Cons t i tu t ions ,  and a l s o  i n  other federal const i tu t ions ,  
t he  federa l  author i ty  (Bund) of t he  Bundesrepublik ha s  only  those powers 
which a r e  spec i f i c a l l y  granted to  it. All other powers belong exclusively 
t o  t h e  Laender (Article 70) .  Among the  most  important powers which the 
Bund p o s s e s s e s  a r e  its exc lus ive  and concurrent legis la t ive  powers. The 
Bund's exc lu s ive  l eg i s l a t i ve  powers,  which a r e  found i n  Article 73 of the 
Basic Law, a r e  not numerous and i n  general  concern only those  a r ea s  which 
require uniform treatment and regulat ion.  The Laender may even go s o  far 
a s  to p a s s  l eg i s la t ion  i n  a r e a s  falling exc lus ive ly  within the Bund's 
l eg i s la t ive  s p h e r e ,  but only  if federa l  l aw  permits (Article 71). 
A further degree  of Land sovereignty s tems from Article 32-3 of 
the Basic Law, which g ive s  the  Laender power to  negotiate international 
t r ea t i es  with t he  concurrence of t h e  Bund i n  a r ea s  where they  pos se s s  
Icgis la t ive  competence.  Similar t o  th is  provision i s  Article 32 - 2 ,  which 
~ l r ( )v idc s  that  the  Bund must consu l t  a Land i f  the Land 's  in te res t s  are  
involved in  the  conclusion of a federal treaty. 
Article 72 of the Basic Law dea ls  with the concurrent legislative 
powers, i. e . , those  shared by the Bund and Laender . This concurrent area 
a l s o  provides the Laender with a degree of autonomy. Under their constitu- 
tional concurrent powers the Laender may legis la te  a s  long a s  the Bund does 
not employ its legis la t ive powers in  the area concerned. The Laender are 
excluded from legis la t ing in the concurrent a r eas ,  however, i f  they cannot 
dea l  effectively with the problem concerned, or i f  the action might prove 
harmful to  the  federation or t o  o t h e r h e n d e r .  Thus Article 72 recognizes 
German federalism a s  i t  existed in Germany before the Nazi regime. That 
i s  t o  s a y ,  a high degree of "federal legis la t ive uniformity" again exis ts .  
For in real i ty  the  Bund controls the area of concurrent powers almost ex-  
c lusively,  s ince  the Laender are  not able to  ac t  competently on most 
matters within the concurrent sphere.  l In fac t ,  there was a good deal of 
doubt in 1948-49  a s  t o  whether the three occupation powers would allow 
this c lause  to be inserted in the Basic Law. Since neither the occupation 
powers nor the Federal Constitutional Court chose to interfere, the legis- 
lative supremacy of  the Bund in the Bundesrepublik appears to be secure.  L 
Article 7 4  of  the Basic Law detai ls  these concurrent powers. 
l ~ e l l s ,  . &. , p .  52. 
2 ~ o l a ~ ,  2.&. , pp .  6 1 - 2 .  
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Included a re :  t h e  l e g a l  and judicial  f ie lds ;  population s t a t i s t i c s ;  l aws  con- 
cerning t h e  r igh t s  of a s s o c i a t i o n  and  assembly;  l a w s  governing a l i e n  r e s i -  
dence ;  t h e  prevention of  "German cultural  t r easures"  from being removed 
abroad;  e x p e l l e e  and  refugee  affairs;  mil i tary pensions;  l a w s  pertaining to  
economic  mat ters ;  l abor  l aws ;  encouragement of sc ien t i f i c  research;  public 
welfare;  Land c i t i zensh ip ;  repara t ions  and war damages;  expropriation laws;  
t r ans fe ra l  of pr ivate  means  t o  public ownership; prevention of the  misuse  
of economic  power; promotion of fores t ry  and agriculture;  medical  law; 
regula t ion of food and s t imulant  t ransportat ion;  shipping and waterways; 
t raf f ic  and highways;  and non-federal ra i lways .  This lengthy list provides 
ample  oppor tuni ty  for Land l eg i s l a t ive  a c t i o n ,  but as previously s t a t e d ,  
federal  l e g i s l a t i o n  h a s  a lmos t  pre-empted t h i s  a r e a .  In  a n y  c a s e ,  federal  
l eg i s l a t ion  t a k e s  precedence over tha t  of the  Laender i n  a l l  c a s e s  (Article 
A concurrent  power not d i rec t ly  l i s t e d  i n  Article 74 is tha t  of 
f i s c a l  power. F i s c a l  power is a l l  important because  t h e  l eve l  of govern- 
ment i n  a f edera l  s t a t e  which controls  t h i s  sphere  wi l l  dominate the other 
l eve l .  There fo re ,  the  framers o f  the  Basic Law sought to  reinforce the 
r ights  of t h e  Laender i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  by  including a novel sys tem of revenue 
t l is tr ibution i n  t h e  Basic Law. 1 
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Between 1945-49, financial responsibil i ty was divided among the 
aender , bizonal and zonal organizations, and the occupation powers. The 
asic Law and federal  legislation have s ince transferred f iscal  power t o  the  
und and the  Laender and have defined the formula of division. Tcday the 
undesrepublik is one of the most heavily taxed countries of Europe. Com- 
ined Bund, Land, and loca l  t axes  amount t o  over thirty per cent of the 
nnual g ross  national product. This is to  be expected,  as the cos t  of pos t -  
a r  reconstruction,  payments, and defense  h a s  been high. All of this  has  
laced heavy burdens on the t reasur ies  of the  three levels  of government 
nd h a s  resul ted i n  a contest  for tax revenue, with the Bund winning the 
~ r g e s t  share .  
Indeed,  f i sca l  power is one of the most important topics deal t  
i th in  the Basic Law. In the framing of the provisions of the Basic Law 
2aling with f iscal  powers, there was agreement only on one point: that  
le over-centralized f iscal  authority of the Weimar Republic should be 
voided. Heated confl ic ts  arose among the delegates  a t  the Parliamentary 
ounc i l ,  a s  well a s  between the delegates  a s  a whole and the occupation 
~ t h o r i t i e s ,  with the result  that the final  draft  provisions dealing with the 
s ca l  power in the Basic Law (Articles 105-  115, 1 2 0 )  are very much a 
~mpromise . T h e  compromise on f i sca l  powers has  endured, however, 
I sp i te  of increased Bund centralization. Minor changes were made in  
355-56 by  amendments which brought the f iscal  pro\lisio~ls somewhat 
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more into  l ine  with tradit ional German at t i tudes .  1 
The main problem to be ironed out by the  Parliamentary Council 
de lega tes  i n  the  a r ea  of fiscal power was  one which a l l  federal constitution- 
al framers face--i .  e. , where t o  place the  power t o  l evy  and collect  t axes  
i n  t h e  federal  structure.  In  solving this  problem the Wes t  Germans spec-  
i f i ca l ly  ignored American pressure to  adopt a f iscal  structure patterned 
after tha t  of our own federal system.  They felt that  a system which gave 
both the Bund and the  Laender autonomy would create a weak economic 
base  because  of t h e  unique postwar German s i t ~ a t i o n . ~  Nor did they 
choose to  adopt  the  Swis s  f i s ca l  system which gives the cantons primary 
fiscal power,  with the  federal  authority obtaining its funds chiefly 
through indirect  methods from the cantons .  
The compromise which was  finally adopted i s  found in  Article 109 
of the  Basic Law. The Bund and the Laender are  both given f i sca l  autonomy 
over their  budgets.  The Bund is supreme, however, i n  the sphere of t ax  
leg i s la t ion ,  because  the Federal Consti tutional Court considers that the 
federal  Parliament a lone is competent to decide whether such legislat ion 
i s  needed under Article 7 2  o f  the  Basic Law. Moreover, the  Bund is  given 
exclusive tax  power over f l s ca l  monopolies and cus toms ,  and "priority" 
l ~ c l l s ,  OJ. a., pp. 59-61. 
2 ~ ~ l a y ,  OJ. a. , p p .  7 4 ,  76. 
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tax power over a l l  the  remaining direct  and indirect t axes  (Article 105). The 
financial  posit ion of the  Laender is assured by two ar t ic les  of the Basic Law. 
In Article 106 spec i f ic  t ax  revenues are earmarked for the Laender (property 
tax, inheritance tax, motor-vehicle t ax ,  beer t ax ,  a percentage of the in- 
come and corporation t a x e s ,  e tc .  ) .  Article 107  provides for a redistribu- 
tion of a portion of t h e  Land t axes  collected to  the Laender which have 
small t a x  incomes.  
The occupation authorit ies were very opposed to  this latter pro- 
vision when the  Basic Law was  adopted.  ' Final implementation of the 
"equal izat ion" provision (Finanzausqleich) w a s ,  therefore, postponed until 
amendments to  Articles 106-7 were adopted i n  1955-6. This federal maxim 
of bearing another ' s  burdens is s t i l l  not popular with the wealtheir Laender. 
Some observers  feel  that  th is  complex "equalization" scheme will i n  the  
end cause  more harm than good. They argue that  i t  will tend to intensify 
the "tug-of-war" between the rich and poor Laender, on the one s ide ,  and 
between a l l  the Laender and the Bund on the other. The winner of this 
struggle will  sure ly  be the strongest  unit involved in  the  Bund. In the 
future Bund control might be warranted, for i f  the two halves  of Germany 
arc ever uni ted,  the equalization of living standards i n  Eastern and West-  
ern Germany and the  amalgamation of their very different economic systems 
will rcquirc an  overriding f iscal  authority. 2 
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One of t h e  most  important i s s u e s  concerning fiscal powers i n  the  
Bundesrepub1ik is t h e  d is t r ibut ion of personal  income and corporation t a x  
revenues  be tween  t h e  Bund and  t h e  Laender (another form of Finanzausqleich).  
This h a s  b e e n  a n  is s u e  o f  continuing controversy ever s ince  t h e  Bunde srepublik 
w a s  founded.  The federa l  Min i s te r  of Finance h a s  repeatedly  asked  for a 
larger port ion of t h i s  income,  but the  Laender,  through the  ac t ion of the  
Bundesrat ,  h a v e  ha l t ed  moves i n  t h i s  regard by t h e  Bund. The 1955 const i -  
tu t ional  amendment set t h e  ra t io  of distr ibution for t h e s e  two t a x e s  a t  
thir ty-f ive per c e n t  for t h e  Bund and  sixty-five per cen t  for the  Laender, 
e f fec t ive  i n  1958.  Th i s  r a t io  c a n  be  modified b iennia l ly ,  however,  but 
c h a n g e s  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  Bundesrat  approval .  Moreover, i f  the federal  
l eg i s l a t ion  involved i n  t h i s  change c a u s e s  greater  expenditures on the  part 
o f  the  Laender ,  t h e  Laender ' s  percentage  of t h i s  rat io must be ra ised .  
S t i l l  another  form of f inancia l  "equal iza t ion"  resu l t s  from 
"genera l  f inanc ia l  a l lo tments"  (allgemeine ~ i n a n z z u w e i s u n q e n )  which the  
Bund provides t o  t h e  Laender.  The Bund appropriates even  larger funds t o  
the  Laender for s p e c i f i c  purposes ,  such  a s  housing and re fugees ,  through 
federa l  s t a t u t e .  Unl ike  American grants- in-a id ,  Bund appropriat ions 
genera l ly  d o  not require tha t  t h e  Laender put up a l i k e  sum from their  own 
revenues .  1 
l ~ c l l s ,  *. &. , pp. 62-5.  
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The administration of f i sca l  matters is chiefly in  the hands of the 
Laender, a s  a resul t  of  delegation of these matters t o  Laender s ta f f s  by the 
Bund. This decentralization of administration is deal t  with in Article 108 
of the Basic Law. In 1948-49 there was l i t t le  dispute over the arrangements 
made by  th i s  provision,  because a t  that  time West  Germany had neither 
the funds nor the  trained personnel t o  es tabl ish a duplicate Bund-Land tax 
administrative structure.  Furthermore, t o  avoid lo s s  of time and confusion, 
t axes  and their administration were distributed along traditional l ines 
(direct t axes  t o  the  Laender indirect  t o  the Bund). This allowed the exis t -  
ing administrative machinery to be fitted onto a theoretically dual admin- 
istrative s t ructure .  Later, a joint Bund-Land administrative organ was 
es tabl ished to  administer the "equalization of burdens" provisions. 
Since Wes t  Germany has  become economically viable,  much d is -  
content has  been expressed over this type of administrative structure. In 
1953  the Bundestag voted to  amend the Basic Law so that a unified federal 
f i s ca l  administrative organ could be es tabl ished,  but the proposal never 
passcd .  Proponents of  the legislation emphasized that a centralized admin- 
is t ra t ive  agency would increase  the efficiency of tax collection. 1 
Under i t s  predominant legislative and f iscal  powers, the Bund 
has  thus taken charge of the over-all functioning of the government of the 
B ~ n d c s r e ~ u b l i k .  Thc administration of justice and law has  become unified,  
as well  a s  the  economic sphere.  Nevertheless,  there are  s t i l l  important 
a r eas  such  a s  po l ice ,  cultural a f fa i r s  and local  government which are not 
included in  the  l i s t  of concurrent or exclusive federal powers. In these 
a r e a s ,  which a re  dea l t  with in detai l  l a te r ,  the Laender s t i l l  have exclusive 
legis la t ive  power, while the Bund has  hardly any  contact with them a t  a l l .  
~t should be pointed out a l s o  that  the Laender retain a high degree of leg- 
i s la t ive  power over general  legislation through their representation in the 
Bundesrat, not t o  mention several  other l e s s  formal a reas  where Land- 
Bund d i scuss ions  inf luence federal legislation and action. 
In addit ion to  their specif ic  legislative power, the Laender 
posses s  a good dea l  of general governmental power. Article 30  of the 
Basic Law s t a t e s :  "The exerc i se  of governmental powers and the d i s -  
charge of governmental functions i s  incumbent on the Laender insofar a s  
this Basic Law does  not otherwise prescribe or permit." This art icle allows 
for the es tabl ishment  and functioning of the Laender governments. 
The Laender governments are a l l  based on constitutions (Verfas- 
sungcn) which were adopted between 1946-1953. Some of t h e b n d  consti-  
tutions were enacted by their parliaments ( ~ a n d t a q e ) ,  while others were 
draftcd by spec ia l  consti tutional assemblies .  These consti tutions,  and 
t h e  govcrnmcntal structures they es tab l i shed ,  are  important because to be 
c f fcc t ivc  fcdcratcd units the Laender mu s t  have viable governmental 
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A ~ a b i n e t  headed by a Minister-President (Ministerpraesident) i s  the execu- 
t ive organ of each  Land government. In most Laender, stable coalition 
governments a re  now i n  power. In many Laender an  intermediate level of 
authority e x i s t s  between the  top and the local  levels  of government. I t  i s  
headed by a Land-appointed off ic ia l  (Reqierunqspraesident) . In general, 
the Laender governments of the  Bundesrepublik have a greater degree of 
self-government than i n  e i ther  the Weimar or the Nazi regimes. 1 
One a s p e c t  of  Land self-government stands out from a l l  the others,  
and i t  i s  linked c lose ly  t o  federalism; the Land administration of federal law. 
Found in  Switzer land,  a s  well  a s  in  the Bundesrepublik , this system of 
delegated administration (Auftraqsverwaltunq) allows the Laender to ac t  a s  
administrative agents  for the  Bund in  a wide range of f ields.  This process 
i s  not real ly  new to  German government, a s  i t  was a l so  practiced in  the 
Imperial and Weirnar regimes. This primary responsibility for the admin- 
istration of federal  law placed in  the hands of the Laender ac t s  a s  a counter- 
balance to  the  leg is la t ive  supremacy of the Bund. The occupation author- 
i t i es  had grave apprehensions about this concept,  feeling that i t  would give 
the Bund too great  a n  opportunity to  interfere in the sphere of Land govern- 
ment. Their opposit ion was finally overcome, and Article 83 of the Basic 
l ~ e u r n a n n ,  2. =. , pp .  454-55 .  
2 ~ r i e d r i c l ~ ,  OJ. a., p .  715.  
%olay,  OJ. &. , p .  66.  
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Law es t ab l i shes  a "presumption" i n  favor of delegated administration. 1 ~t 
s ta tes :  "The Laender execute  federal laws as  matters of their own concern 
insofar a s  t h i s  Basic Law does  not otherwise provide or permit." 
The provisions for delegated administration are a crucial point 
in the  federal  system.  Many Germans argue that  the Bund should be sharp- 
l y  limited i n  t he  administrative field. They feel that  i t  was precisely in  
this  matter tha t  t h e  federal structure of the  Weimar regime collapsed due 
to  the lack  of consti tutional checks on  federal administrative authority. 
Such l imitations a re  c lear ly  placed on the  Bund in  the Bundesrepublik. 
The range of direct  federal administration is constitutionally 
limited by provisions which specify  the degree and conditions under 
which the Bund can interfere in t he  Land administration of federal law. 
To create  th i s  l imitation,  the  Basic Law distinguishes five types of ad-  
ministration: (1) Bund administration of federal law (Articles 86-90, 
108- 1; (2 )  Land administration of  Land law (Article 3 0); Land administration 
of federal  law (Articles 83 , 84 ,  108 -3); (4) administration of federal law 
by the Laender under delegated authorization from the Bund; (Articles 8 5 ,  
108-4); and (5)  a s  a spec ia l  c a s e  of number one ,  administration of federal  
law by Bund corporations chartered under public law (Article 87-2, -3). 
T ~ I U S  i n  theory and in pract ice ,  the Laender have almost complete control 
( l f  t h e  administration of  both their own and Bund legislation.  2 
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The ~ u n d ,  of course ,  h a s  exclusive powers of administration in 
those a r eas  which a re  i n  the  realm of national interests listed in Articles 
87-90  of the  Basic Law. The Bund can add to  th i s  administrative sphere 
by creating administrative agenc ies  which fall within i t s  power to legis-  
l a te .  Since t h i s  could conceivably f i t  almost any  si tuation,  a further 
check has  been added i n  favor of the Laender. Parliamentary approval i s  
required for the  es tabl ishment  of  new areas  of Bund administrative control, 
and these  can  only  be es tabl ished in  c a s e s  of urgent need. This check 
should eliminate t he  over-centralization of the administrative structure 
a s  i t  developed i n  t h e  Weimar regime. 1 
The administration of federal l aw,  a s  well a s  Land law,  by the 
Laender i s  not without Bund supervision. The Bund authorities have 
supervisory power over administrative authorities so  that the necessary 
administrative functions may be carried on efficient1 y and in a proper 
manner. This supervisory power may be applied only in the areas  where 
t h e  Bund p o s s e s s e s  exclusive or concurrent j u r i s d i c t i ~ n . ~  The Bund a l so  
posses ses  the  power t o  formulate general administrative rules and instruc- 
tions; to  s e e  that  c ivi l  servants  are  trained uniformly; to request the sub- 
mission of reports;  and to  send out commissioners. These powers are s e t  
~ J O S ~ ~ ~  D s i l ~ o w ,  " ~ h c  C~)nst i tut ional  and Judicial Organ iza t i~n  
O f  rrsncc! it17d Germany anti SL>mc CL>mpcirisi>ns of Civil Law and Common Law 
S ~ i ; l ( ? m s , "  -- Indiana Law - Journal XXXIV (Fall,  19611, P. 2 6 .  
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forth i n  Article 85,  of the  Basic Law, and they  can  be implemented by the 
Bund only with  the  consent  of the  Bundesrat. 
I f  the  Laender fai l  to  administer federal l aws  properly, the Bund 
has  the  power t o  coerce  them to  do so .  Article 37 of the  Basic Law provides 
that  the  federal  Cab ine t ,  with the  consent of the  Bundesrat, may take 
s teps  t o  compel a Land which is "obstructive" and fails  t o  carry out i t s  
administrative du t i e s  properly t o  act i n  accordance with the will of the 
Bund. The most important of t he se  s teps  i s  the  issuing of instructions to 
the Land a s  t o  how i t  may sa t i s fy  the  wishes  of the Bund. The Land con- 
cerned d o e s  have power t o  appeal  th i s  Bund act ion to  the Federal Consti-  
tutional Court ,  though i n  t h e  meantime, the Bund may continue to  apply 
pressure on the  Land until the  Constitutional Court i s s u e s  i t s  decision 
on the matter. 1 
In concluding th i s  ana lys i s  of the  administrative structure of 
the Bundesrepublik, mention must be made of the  Wes t  German civil  
service which i s  responsible  for the administration of Bund and Land 
legis la t ion.  The c ivi l  se rv ices  of t he  Laender are  subject  to  several  
consti tutional and leg is la t ive  provisions because of their administration 
of  fcdcral law.  This regulation i s  based on the need for efficiency and 
uniformity. Article 33 of the  Basic Law s e t s  forth the "traditional principles" 
' ~ o l a ~ ,  OJ. - c i t . ,  p .  7 7 .  
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which a re  t o  be followed by the  civil  servants a t  a l l  governmental levels.  
Unlike their predecessors  i n  the  Weimar regime, today's German civil 
servants do  expec t  and accept  "policy guidance" from political off ic ia ls .  
In the higher ranks of the  c ivi l  service today, promotion a l so  depends to 
a degree on poli t ical  considerations.  Article 75 - 1 authorized the Bund 
to  enact  "framework" legis la t ion which es tabl ishes  the right t o  provide 
general principles regulating the legal  relations of persons in Land and 
local governmental se rv ice .  The local  governmental agencies are within 
the normal jurisdiction of the  Laender, but since they a l so  administer 
federal legis la t ion they  a re  subjected to  the  higher authority of the Bund. 
Between 1955-57 three important federal s ta tutes  were enacted 
under the provisions of  Article 75-1. They largely unified civil service 
regulations for a l l  l eve ls  of  government. Although they did not require 
that the Land governments adopt their provisions immediately, the  Laender 
were to enac t  legis la t ion embodying these  principles within a fixed time. 
This legis la t ion has  now been enac ted ,  but only after much controversy. 
From the point of  view o f  federal ism,  the degree of freedom allowed the 
Laender in  the  implementation of these  provisions i s  worthy of notice. 1 
r i na l ly ,  in connection with the civil service ,  another federal- 
i s t i c  provision o f  the Basic Law must be mentioned. Article 36 provided 
tha t  civil  servants  in high Bund of f ices  are to  be chosen from "a l l  ~ a e n d e r  
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in appropriate proportion," and those in lower Bund offices "should be drawn 
from the Land i n  which they  serve." 
In summing up the  position of the Laender in the federal structure 
of the Bundesrepublik, i t  c an  be said that the value of the autonomy which 
they posses s  i n  matters s t i l l  available to  them i s  substantial. The import- 
ance of the Laender as sound and functional governmental units within the 
federal system cannot be quest ioned.  The political power of the Laender 
has been vis ibly l e s s e n e d ,  however, a s  the strength of the Bund has grown. 
The completeness of the  development of administrative co-ordination be- 
tween Bund and Laender h a s  placed serious limitations upon the independent 
decision-making process of the Laender. Likewise, the political prestige 
of the Laender governments has  receded. Although the Laender have con- 
stitutional rights which should allow them to participate in the formation 
of  Bund policy,  the organizational structure of the federation in such that 
in reality i t  i s  their  own policies which are submerged by pressure from 
thc Bund . Polit ical  pressures  have thus blurred political responsibilities . 2 
Role of the Bundesrat. An upper legislative chamber representing 
--- 
~)articularist  German s t a t e  interests has  been included in German federal 
' ~ r n o l d  J .  FIcidcnhcimcr , "Federalism and the Party System: The 
Casi2 of Wcst  Germany, American Political Science Review, LII ( S ~ P -  
tcmbcr,  1 3 5 0 ) ,  pp. 827-28. 
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s i n c e  e a r l y  i n  t he  nineteenth century.  Thus the  delegates  to  the 
parliamentary Counc i l  i n  1948-49 had a weal th  of  tradition to  rely on when 
they began t o  c r e a t e  t h e  Bundesrat.  At tha t  time the  traditional federal 
 council type"  upper chamber had a good d e a l  of popular support. This 
type of  chamber w a s  advoca ted  because  i t  a l lows  the  Laender to participate 
directly i n  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  and  because  it permits immediate supervision of  
administrat ive funct ions  by  persons  who a re  d i rect ly  involved in  enacting 
them. Supporters of  t h i s  t ype  of  upper chamber justifiably pointed out its 
success fu l  ro le  i n  ea r l i e r  German governments. 
The determining factors i n  1948-49 were very different ,  however, 
from those  i n  187 1 or  19 19. The pol ic ies  of other nations linked with global 
considerat ions were  al l- important  factors not present  in  the  formative years 
of  the  other two federal  German regimes.  Besides t he  pressure brought to  
bear by the  occupa t ion  au thor i t i e s ,  t he  W e s t  Germans themselves wished 
to avoid a n  over ly  centra l ized regime af ter  their  unfavorable experiences 
with unitary government. All major poli t ical  part ies i n  1948 accep t  the  
creation of a federa l  s t ructure  as  a necess i ty .  As one of the  most important 
governmental o rgans  i n  a federa l  s t ruc tu re ,  the  upper l eg i s la t ive  chamber 
( l a c . ,  thc  Bundesrat)  ea r ly  became the  center  of  controversy a t  t he  Parl ia-  
mentary Counc i l .  
Thrcc d i f fe ren t  plans were proposed a t  the  Parhamentar>- Czuncil  
for  t he  Composition c ~ f  tho Bundcsrat.  The  most federa l i s t i c  ef the  political 
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the  CDU/CSU (Christian Democrat/Christian Socialist Union), 
supported a tradit ional German Bundesrat which would be responsible to 
the ~ a ~ n d e r .  The Soc ia l i s t s  advocated a senate-type upper chamber to 
be elected by  Laender parliaments on a proportional representation basis.  
The third plan w a s  a mixture of the  first  two and was offered by the FDP 
(Free ~ e m o c r a t s )  . 
Close ly  linked with the i s s u e  as to the form of the  Bundesrat 
was the ques t ion  of the  power which i t  would posses s  and the formula for 
Land representat ion of i t .  Debate on these  i s s u e s  followed party l ines .  
The CDU w a s  most concerned with establishing complete legislative 
equality (Gleichberechtiqunq) for the  Bundesrat. The CSU half of the 
coalition w a s  e spec i a l ly  behind this  principle. The Socialists  wanted 
the lower chamber to  have legis la t ive  superiority, and they wished to 
make the Bundesrat a s  "broadly representative" a s  possible. A complic- 
ated si tuation a rose  a s  t he  CDU attempted to form a coalition with the 
FDP and to  back a mixed form of upper chamber with legislative Gleich- 
bcrechtigung . I n  the  meantime, the Social is ts  had abandoned their con- 
cept of a senate- type upper chamber and had all ied themselves with the 
Particularist -oriented Bavarian CSU . The CDU/FDP coalition never was 
formed, thus allowing the ~ s ~ / ~ ~ c i a l l s t  coalition to create a Bundesrat 
according to their wishes .  This strange coalition of t he  most centralist  
dnd most fcdcral is t  of partics developed s comprc7nlisc plan fa r  the c"0nlWslti~11 
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of the ~ u n d e s r a t .  I t  w a s  t o  take on a form similar t o  that of the old Reichsrat 
and would have leg is la t ive  Gleichberectigung, 1 
A federal  council-type of Bundesrat was thus adopted rather than 
a  ena ate-type form. I n  general ,  i t  was felt  that  such a body would restrain 
the national party leaders  by awarding the leaders of the Land governments 
a direct voice--and i n  some instances a veto--in the  formation of Bund 
policy. The adoption of th i s  type of Bundesrat was  clearly an  attempt to 
"insti tutionalize polit ical  divers i ty ,  " a s  Bundesrat members were responsible 
only t o ,  and drawn from, the  Land cabinets.  I t  was believed that the party 
representation i n  t h e  Land governments would often differ from the ruling 
Bund coali t ion.  This wauld result  in  a very dissimilar "configuration of 
power" in each  of the two federal legislative chambers, for every Land 
government would have to  c a s t  i t s  Bundesrat votes in  a bloc after having 
duly considered both regional interests  and party composition. This has 
not been the  c a s e ,  however,  a s  a developing two-party system in the 
Bundesrepublik h a s  minimized this e f fec t .  I n  addition one party, the 
CDU, because of i t s  length in o f f i ce ,  has determined to a great extent just 
how far this  principle would be permitted to be practiced.' 
' ~ d w a r d  L. P inney  , Federalism, Bureaucracy , and Party politics 
i n  Western Germany: The Role of the Bundesrat (Chapel Hill: University 
---- 
of North Carolina P r e s s ,  1 9 6 3 ) ,  pp. 3 8 - 4 0 ,  4 2 - 4 4 ,  5 0 .  
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The s t ructure ,  general  functions,  and procedures of the Bundesrat 
are deal t  with i n  Articles 50-53 of the  Basic Law. The first of these articles 
pictures the Bundesrat as a federal  organ. Article 5 1  states:  "The Laender 
participate through the  Bundesrat i n  the legislation and administration of 
the Federation. " This concept may be contrasted to the unitary nature of 
the lower chamber (Bundestaq). The Bundesrat might be viewed a s  a contin- 
uously functioning "balance wheel." It i s  the main arena of the Bund- 
Land cooperation and conflict. I t  is a l s o  the c loses t  link between Bund 
and Laender. Y e t  i t  can  be the point where the widest diversity of their 
respective in te res t s  appears .  
The Federal  Constitutional Court may a l so  be viewed a s  a "bal- 
ance wheel ,  " but i t s  act ion is only intermittent and theoretically l e s s  i m -  
portant.' Actually i n  a functional federal system such a s  the Bundesre- 
publik, a governmental organ which directly participates in the operations 
of government can a c t  t o  preserve the federal order more effectively than a 
judicial body. This is true in  the Bundesrepublik because the Bundesrat 
acts a s  a balancer through i t s  representation of Land interests .  It allows 
the Laender to scrutinize the actions of the Bund and to  intervene if the 
latter goes beyond pre scribed constitutional limitations. 2 
Article 5 1 d e a l s  with the representation of the Laender in the 
Bundesrat. Paragraph 1 s ta tes :  "The Bundesrat consis ts  of members of the 
Laender governments which appoint and recall  them. Other members of such 
governments may a c t  as subst i tutes ."  Paragraph 2 dea ls  with the numerical 
formula by  which each  Land shal l  be represented: "Each Land has a t  least  
three votes; Laender with more than two million inhabitants have four, 
Laender with more than s ix  million inhabitants,  five votes. " Ba&n-Wuerttem- 
berg, Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Northrhine-Westphalia , 5 votes each; Hesse , 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, 4 votes apiece; Bremen, Ham- 
burg, and the  Saarland , 3 votes apiece; and Berlin 4 non-voting members, 
making a total  of  4 1  voting members. Under this formula there i s  not such 
great disparity of representation a s  was present in the Imperial and Weimar 
upper chambers. In f a c t ,  the Laender are now almost equally represented. 1 
Finally,  Paragraph 3 of Article 5 1  s ta tes :  "Each Land may dele-  
gate a s  m a n y  members a s  i t  has  votes.  The votes of each Land may be 
cast  only a s  a bloc vote and only by members present or their substi tutes." 
The provision for bloc voting has  especial ly  important implications because 
m a n y  of thc b e n d e r  governments are coalitions. Where coalition Land 
90vcrnmcnts d o  exist, this  provision makes i t  necessary to  arrive a t  a 
COmpromisc before the b n d ' s  votes in  the Bundesrat can be cas t .  
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~ l t h o u g h  ch ief ly  adopted because of tradition, the practice of bloc 
voting does  have  i t s  a s s e t s .  I t  is especial ly  important to the West German 
federal system as i t  ensures  the maintenance of a degree of unity in the 
Land governments. Of course,  this  procedure a l s o  had i t s  drawbacks. Inner 
conflict within t h e  coali t ion Land governments is heightened in attempting 
to reach a compromise decision; valuable minority opinions are often exclud- 
ed for the s a k e  of expediency; and,  in  many ins tances ,  the Minister-Presi- 
dent merely dec ides  how the  Land votes in the Bundesrat shall  be cast .  1 
On paper the  powers of the present Bundesrat are not as great a s  
those of the  Imperial Bundesrat, though greater than those of the Weimar 
Reichsrat. In  prac t ice ,  however, today's Bundesrat appears to be more 
formidable than either of i t s  forerunners. Like them, the present Bundesrat 
likewise has  functions in both the legis la t ive and administrative fields. 2 
Since the  Basic Law dea ls  only briefly with the Bundesrat in 
Articles 50-53,  a federal  s ta tute  was  enacted in 1953 to fill in  these vague 
Provisions. Among other things,  this statute provides that ~ u n d e s r a t  de- 
cisions a rc  to  be made by majority vote,  and in some c a s e s  a special  two- 
thirds majority vote.  Generally the sess ions  of the Bundesrat are public, 
but  c l ~ s c d  sessions a rc  pcrmissible.3 The president and vice president of 
L G o l a y ,  np. c i t . ,  p. 5 4 .  
3 
Pinncy,  OJ. &. , p .  5 2 .  
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the Bundesrat a r e  e l e c t e d  by its members for o n e  year from among the Land 
~ ~ ~ i ~ t e r - ~ r e s i d e n t s .  Federa l  custom d i c t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  presidency is t o  
rotate from o n e  Land to ano ther  i n  order of  size. This  off ice  i s  important 
because t h e  Bundesra t  P res iden t  s u c c e e d s  t h e  federal  President  i f  the  la t ter  
becomes i n c a p a c i t a t e d  or  prematurely l e a v e s  h i s  off ice.  The Bundesrat 
president t h e n  acts as Pres iden t  pro  tem of the  Bundesrepublik. The regular 
duties o f  t h e  Bundesra t  P res iden t  inc lude presiding over tha t  body, and 
calling it i n t o  s e s s i o n  if t h e  federa l  Cabinet  o r  a n y  Land so  requests .  1 
The  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  Land Minister-Presidents  a r e  regular delegates  
to the  Bundesrat  g i v e s  it added pres t ige .  These  Minister-Presidents  and 
other regular  d e l e g a t e s  a r e  t h e  official  representa t ives  of the  Land govern- 
ments. Because  t h e  composi t ion  of the  Bundesrat is dependent  i n  many 
c a s e s  on t h e  composi t ion  of  Land c o a l i t i o n s ,  changes  caused  by Land 
elect ions h a v e  a big e f f e c t  o n  the s t a b i l i t y  of the  Bund and i t s  legis la t ive  
Program. Th i s  a l l o w s  t h e  Bundesrat t o  become a n  outlet  for public opinion 
during the  per iods  be tween  nat ional  e l e c t i o n s .  I t  should not be assumed ,  
however, t h a t  t h e  Bundesrat  is primarily the  servant  of the  Land governments. 
I t  is rather the i r  s p o k e s m a n .  2 
2 ~ d y l o r  C ~ l c ,  " ~ h p  W e s t  German Federal  Cdnsti tut ional  Court: An 
AItcr S i x  Y e a r s ,  " Ji>urndl of Pol i t ics ,  XX (May. 19383, p .  4 0 3  - 
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Members  of t h e  federa l  Cabinet  have the  right to  take  part in the 
discussions of  t h e  Bundesrat  and its committees.  They are  obliged to 
attend Bundesrat mee t ings  if thei r  Presence is requested.  The Cabinet a l so  
has the du ty  of  keep ing  t h e  Bundesrat informed on the  conduct of current 
Bund a f f a i r s  (Article 53).  This  la t ter  function is  usua l ly  carried out by the 
Office of t h e  Min i s t e r  for Bundesrat Affairs .  The work of th i s  office i s  
vital s i nce  it must  mainta in  a smooth flow of communication between the 
Bundesrat and  t h e  federa l  Cab ine t .  This is e spec i a l l y  true i n  cases where 
the Cabinet  r e l i e s  o n  t h e  Land Min is te r s  t o  enforce i t s  pol ic ies .  To help 
this flow of communication the  Cabinet  often a s s i g n s  representat ives from 
the federal minis t ry  concerned t o  t ake  part i n  Bundesrat committee meet- 
ings.  
The commit tees  of t h e  Bundesrat play a n  important part i n  the 
functioning of t ha t  organ.  Due to  a tradit ional  re l iance  by the  Bundesrat 
delegates  on exper t  a d v i c e ,  and because  o f  limited t ime,  the  Bundesrat 
leans heavi ly  o n  committee recommendations. In general ,  deba tes  in  the  
Bundesrat proper a r c  not l eng thy  because  the  main i s s u e s  o f  a question 
have a l rcady  been ironed out  i n  committee d i s cus s ions .  
T h e  Basic Law almost  completely ignores the ~ u n d e s r a t  commit- 
t ees .  Federal s t a t u t c s  h a v e ,  therefore ,  been lnacted to  provide the corn- 
mittpps with rules of proccdurc.  As of 1960,  there were thirteen regular 
Bundcsrat s tdnding c l ,mnl t t ccs .  Ever\. Land is 1-~1)resellteCi c7n each  
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t h e r e b y  mainta in ing t h e  federa l  principle. Actually deputy re- 
presentat ives,  who  a r e  s e n i o r  Land c iv i l  se rvan t s ,  d o  much of the  committee 
These  s e r v a n t s  add  t o  t h e  t echn ica l  exper t i se  of t h e  committees, and 
are highly regarded i n  Bundesrat  c i rc les .  
I n  summing u p  t h e  importance o f  the  Bundesrat committees, it 
can be sa id  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  ind i spensab le .  Virtually a l l  Bundesrat decis ions  
are based o n  commit tee  recommendations;  and voting i n  the  Bundesrat 
usually fol lows commit tee  l i n e s .  Only  rare ly  d o e s  the  Bundesrat deviate 
from committee p r o p o s a l s .  1 
O n e  of t h e  least used  const i tu t ional  powers of the  Bundesrat is 
i ts  right t o  i n i t i a t e  l e g i s l a t i o n  (Gesetzes in i t ia t ive) .  Although seemingly 
an important power ,  the  Bundesrat h a s  al lowed i t s  right to  ini t iate l eg i s l a -  
tion fall in to  d i s u s e .  In  the  period from 19  50-58,  the  Bundesrat ini t iated 
only 4 0  b i l l s  a s  compared t o  1 , 6 2 3  bi l l s  ini t iated by the  Bundestag for the 
same period. By 1 9 6 0  the  number of  Bundesrat ini t iated bi l ls  had only 
been ra ised  t o  4 9 .  Th i s  c o n s t i t u t e s  a mere 2 per cent  of a l l  legis la t ion  
enacted.  3 
l p i n n c y ,  . -- c i t . ,  pp. 5 3 ,  58-60. 
3 ~ c r ] ~ a r d  Lowcnbcrg,  "Parliamcntarism in  Western German).: The 
runctic)ninrl o f  thp  ~ l l l l d ~ ~ t r \ g  , "  American Pel i t ica l  Science  Reipierv, LV 
1 9 5 1 ) ,  p .  100 .  
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To in i t ia te  bi l ls  the Bundesrat must turn them over to the federal 
cabinet.  The Cabinet  then must submit the bill to  the Bundestag , stating 
its view on the bi l l  (Article 76-31. The initiation of a Bundesrat bill i s  thus 
an indirect process  through the medium of the federal Cabinet. Perhaps i t  
is  this indirect method which has  driven the legislative perogative of the 
Bundesrat into d i s u s e .  In  any  c a s e ,  i t  i s  apparent that the importance of 
the Bundesrat does  not stem from i t s  u s e  of legislative init iative,  a s  i s  the 
case in most federal  upper legis la t ive chambers. 
While deal ing with legislative init iative,  Article 76-2 of the 
Basic Law must a l s o  be mentioned. This art icle directs the federal 
Cabinet to  introduce i t s  bil ls  first into the Bundesrat. This procedure 
gives the Bundesrat a major portion of i t s  work, a s  most bills are initiated 
by the Cabinet.  The Bundesrat has  three weeks to consider a bill initiated 
in this manner. If i t  votes favorably on the bil l ,  the bill goes to the 
Bundes tag.  But if the bill i s  vetoed , the federal Cabinet must attempt to  
reach a compromise with the Bundesrat. In the meantime, the Cabinet 
m u s t  kccp the Bundestag informed a s  to what action i s  being taken. If i t  
wishes,  the Bundesrat can  by-pass any compromise action and introduce 
bill to the  Bundestag along with a statement of i t s  opinion of the bill. 
In  this instance the BunrJcsrat must again reconsider the  bill if the B ~ n d e -  
Stag takes  favorable act ion i t .  This procedure i s  rarell- f0ll0nred, 
11:)wcvcr. 1 
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The " p e r i o d i c  re-emergence1' of  a strong upper chamber is roughly 
parallel to t h e  fo r tunes  of  German federal ism. In  t h e  present  federal system 
a strong upper chamber  a g a i n  exists, but as shown by the  preceding para- 
graphs ,  its s t r e n g t h  is not  b a s e d  on  t h e  u s e  of its legis la t ive  ini t iat ive.  
1ts strength is b a s e d  o n  other  less recognizable  l eg i s l a t ive  functions. Be- 
cause o f  t h i s ,  t h e  ro le  of  t h e  present  Bundesrat is ambiguous. A public 
opinion poll  i n  1956 showed t h a t  86 per cen t  of t h o s e  quest ioned (in Germany) 
had e i ther  no i d e a ,  a vague i d e a ,  or  a f a l s e  impression concerning the  
Bundesrat and its purpose .  This  is some improvement over 1950,  when 
only 8 per c e n t  of t h o s e  ques t ioned  gave answers  showing some knowledge 
of the  upper h o u s e .  
This  "popular  ignorance"  concerning t h e  Bundesrat may be ex-  
plained ch ie f ly  b y  t h e  e l e v a t e d  nature of i t s  d i s c u s s i o n s  and i t s  exact ing,  
t echn ica l ,  and  somet imes  t i resome d e b a t e s .  This may be contrasted with 
the pol i t ica l ly  a c t i v e  Bundestag where  l i v e l y ,  well-publicized d e b t e s  
occur. Also t o  blame a r e  t h e  l e s s e n i n g  number of plenary meetings 
which t h e  Bundesrat  ho lds  b e c a u s e  o f  a dec reased  work load and the  em- 
~ l ~ y m c n t  of more s t reamlined procedural techniques .  
To unders tand t h e  overa l l  l eg i s l a t ive  role of the  Bundesrat i t  i s  
necessa ry  t o  examine  t h e  procedures which a re  used in  considering l eg i s -  
lation tha t  comes  before  i t .  In  considering legislat if in the  Bundesrat h a s  
a tw(3fold role d i s t i n g u i s h e d  by t h r  Basic Law. I n  one categcr?. fa l l  a l l  
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bills ~ h i c h  requ i re  t h e  ConCurrence (- of t h e  Bundesrat because 
they deal wi th  mat te r s  r e la ted  to Land i n t e r e s t s .  References to  such bills 
are ~ ~ a t t e r e d  throughout t h e  Basic Law. In t h e s e  ins tances  the  Bundesrat 
has a n  a b s o l u t e  veto .  
I n  ano ther  ca tegory  a r e  a l l  other b i l l s .  Over t h e s e  bi l ls  the  
Bundesrat mere ly  h a s  a s u s p e n s i v e  veto (Einspruch). In such c a s e s  a 
simple majori ty ve to  b y  t h e  Bundesrat c a n  be overridden by a simple major- 
i ty of the  Bundestag .  L i k e w i s e ,  i f  t he  Bundesrat ve toes  a bill  by a two- 
thirds majori ty,  t h e  Bundestag c a n  override the  veto only with a two-thirds 
vote (Articles 77-78).  In  e f f e c t ,  the  suspensory  veto i s  a n  absolute  veto 
i f  the opposi t ion  in  t h e  Bundesrat  c a n  ga in  sufficient  support among its 
party members and  f r iends  i n  t h e  Bundestag . This fac t  tends  t o  submerge 
purely Land i n t e r e s t s  t o  nat ional  party considera t ions .  1 
Included i n  t h e  f i r s t  ca tegory  of  legis la t ion  requiring Bundesrat 
approval (Zust immungsqesetze)  a r e  a l l  const i tut ional  amendments,  a l l  laws 
af fec t ing the  Land admin i s t ra t ive  s t ructures  and boundaries,  and various 
f i sca l  r egu la t ions .  The  Basic  Law mentions t h e s e  various ins tances  in  
Articles 2 9 ,  7 9 ,  84-85 ,  105-8 ,  120 ,  134-35,  and 143. The Bundesrat i t se l f  
has interpreted t h e s e  provis ions  i n  a manner which h a s  tended t o  maximize 
its Pc)wcrs i n  t h c  a r c a s  conccrnpd.  Up to 1958 no l e s s  than 5 0  per cent  of  
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all legis la t ion  approved b y  t h e  Bundesrat W a s  i n  th i s  category, and if certain 
peculiar l e g a l  e n a c t m e n t s  a r e  excluded the  rat io is as high as two-thirds. 1 
The mos t  important  a r e a  of  ~ u s t i m m u n q s q e s e t z e  for the  Bundesrat 
is derived from Article 84-1 o f  t h e  Basic Law. I t  s t a t es :  
If t h e  Laender  e x e c u t e  federa l  l aws  as matters of their own 
concern ,  t h e y  provide for  t h e  es tabl ishment  of authori t ies  and the  
regula t ion of admin i s t ra t ive  procedures insofar  as federal laws 
~ o n s e n t e d  t o  by t h e  Bundesrat  d o  not otherwise provide. 
The Bundesra t  became a c t i v e  i n  t h e  a rea  of administration when 
the Bund a t t empted  t o  e s t a b l i s h  cent ra l  control over th i s  a rea .  Much con- 
troversy h a s  a r i s e n  o v e r  t h i s  i s s u e  a n d  the  Bundesrat 's  interpretation of 
Article 84 .  G e n e r a l l y  the i s s u e  is between the  Bundesrat and the  federal 
Cabinet over  whe ther  o r  not t h e  ques t ion  involved fa l l s  into the  category 
of Zustimrnunqsqesetze.  In t h e  end s u c h  i s s u e s  can  only be se t t led  by 
the Federal C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Court .  2 
In t h e  same  a r e a  is t h e  right which the  Bundesrat p o s s e s s e s  
under Article 80-2  o f  t h e  Basic  Law to  re jec t  or  approve ministerial ordin- 
ances  which implement l eg i s l a t ion  i n  various f i e lds .  This power i s  im- 
Portant b e c a u s e  i t  is a common German pract ice  t o  enac t  broad legis la t ive  
provisions and  t h e n  l e a v e  to minis ters  the  promulgation of deta i led  proced- 
ures and provis ions  in  o rd inances  with the  e f f e c t  of law (~ech t sverordnunqen) .  
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power of t he  Bundesrat allows i t  to become directly involved in many 
decisions made by federal  minis ters ,  and thereby protect Land interests 
when they a re  involved. 1 
The two a r t i c l e s  just  mentioned have done much to  add to the 
status of t he  Bundesrat i n  t he  German federal system because of the manner 
in which that  body h a s  implemented them. Indeed, the Parliamentary Coun- 
cil had intended tha t  t he  Bundesrat would have an  absolute veto in cases  
where the balance of t he  federal system might be upset in favor of the 
Bund, but i t  did not ant ic ipate  the limits t o  which the Bundesrat would 
stretch th i s  right. The federal Cabinet must now seek Bundesrat approval 
for the policy i t  forms within a broad range of topics. In fact this assumed 
power has created a degree of legislative equality between the two legisla- 
tive chambers that  i s  t o  be found neither in the Basic Law nor related 
federal s ta tu tes .  
The Bundesrat has  been especial ly  active in the field of finance. 
With the help o f  the Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundesrat has been 
able to a s s e r t  i t s  right t o  have a controlling voice in any proposals for a 
centralized financial  administration. Finally, i t  can be said that the 
Zustimmunq power of  the  Bundesrat has  developed into the "elast ic  clause" 
of the Basic Law, " fac i l i t a t ing  compromises i n  controversies over the division 
of powers i n  f inance  and  administrat ion.  " 1 
Although not  as  important as the  Zustimmung power of the Bundes- 
rat ,  its Einspruch ( s u s p e n s o r ~  veto) powers must a l s o  be  examined t o  obtain 
a complete p ic ture  of  t h a t  organ. Before the  Einspruch can  be invoked 
against  a bi l l  in t roduced by the  Bundestag into the  Bundesrat, the mediation 
process set forth i n  Article 77-2 of  t he  Basic Law must be attempted. A s  
se t  forth i n  t h i s  a r t i c l e  t he  mediat ion procedure is: 
The Bundesrat  may ,  within two weeks  of the  receipt  of the 
adopted b i l l ,  demand tha t  a committee for joint consideration of 
b i l l s ,  composed of members of the  Bundestag and Bundesrat, be 
convened.  The composit ion and procedure of th is  committee are  
regulated b y  ru l e s  of procedure adopted by the Bundestag and 
requiring t he  consen t  of t h e  Bundesrat. The members of the  
Bundesrat on t h i s  committee a r e  not  bound by instructions.  If 
the consen t  of t he  Bundesrat is required for a l aw,  the  demand 
for convening t h i s  committee may a l s o  be made by the  Bundestag 
or the  Federal  Government. Should the  committee propose any  
amendment t o  t he  adopted b i l l ,  the  Bundestag must aqain  vote 
on the  b i l l .  
The t echn ique  of  "formal parliamentary compromise" stemming 
from th is  paragraph is a n  innovation in federal ism and the  German govern- 
mental t radit ion.  The inc lus ion  of  a Joint Mediation Committee 
lVcrmitt lunqsausschuss)  i n  the  Wes t  German governmental system replaced 
the (iiscrcdited mechanism o f  referendum, which was  employed in  the  
Wcimar rcgimc when legislative deadlock occurred.  The Mediation 
' ~ o l n ~ ,  OJ. &. , p p .  5 5 ,  110 .  
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commit tee  resembles  somewhat the Conference Committee of the United 
States Congress.  Like the  la t ter  Committee, the Mediation Committee deals 
only with conflicts which occur between the two legislative chambers over 
legislative matters .  Unlike the  Conference Committee, however, the Med- 
iation Committee must  serve two chambers of quite different composition, 
possessing very different  and even conflicting interests ,  and with unequal 
legislative powers.  
Under Article 77-2 a l l  of the three main organs of the West 
German government which a re  involved in  the legislative process have 
access  to  the Mediation Committee under specified conditions. The 
Bundesrat , however,  has  e a s i e s t  access  to the Mediation Committee be- 
cause the federal Cabinet  and the Bundestag may a s k  the Committee to 
meet only after the necessa ry  Bundesrat approval on bills has been denied. 
Since 1 9 5 0 ,  i t  h a s  been the practice for the Bundesrat to  call  the Media- 
tion Committee when deadlocks occur over both ordinary federal legislation 
and legislation which requires Bundesrat consent. The Bundesrat does not 
usually convene the Mediation Committee i f  i t s  desires  for change are 
likely to be adopted.  I t  has  generally been successful in this respect. 1 
But in general ,  the Mediation Committee i s  convened whenever the Bundes- 
ra t  disagrees wi th  a bill .  
l ~ i n n r y ,  *. a. , p p .  77-8 .  
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I n  cons ider ing  t h e  b i l l ,  t h e  Mediation Committee can  do anything 
to a bill if a major i ty  o f  its members Concur. I t  c an  accep t ,  re jec t ,  or amend 
a 1 After t h e  Committee h a s  f inished its consideration of a piece of  legis  - 
lation, the  b i l l  mus t  be  returned t o  both chambers for their consideration. 
1f rejected i n  e i t he r  chamber ,  it is los t ;  or i n  some ins tances ,  the  Bunde- 
stag can overrule  t h e  Bundesra t ' s  second objection. 
The s i z e  o f  t h e  Mediation Committee corresponds to the number 
of Laender i n  t h e  federa l  union. Thus there a re  e leven members and eleven 
deputy members from e a c h  chamber on the  Committee. In resolving a con- 
flict the  Mediat ion Committee f inds itself rehashing the  previous d i scus -  
sions and f indings of committees and the  two chambers i n  plenary s e s s ion ,  
and renewing d e b a t e  on  t he  i s s u e s  involved. But i n  this  respect  the Media- 
tion Committee should not be considered to  be a third chamber, because  i t  
cannot a c t  under i t s  own ini t ia t ive  and does  not make binding decis ions .  
The members o f  t he  Mediation Committee a re  supposedly inde- 
pendent from the  ins t ruc t ions  o f  their  parent bodies.  The meetings of  the 
Committee and i t s  proceedings a r e  not open to the public, s o  that  independ- 
ence of  thc  members may be insured.  In practice the  members of the Corn- 
mittee a rc  res t r i c ted  because  of  national party l imitat ions.  
Through thc  ycars  s i nce  the  government of the  ~undes republ ik  
has heen i n  npcra t inn ,  t he  number of b i l l s  to come before the  Mediation 
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committee h a s  dec l ined-  'r'his is largely the result  of not needing to convene 
the committee t o  consider  bil ls  which a re  similar to ones which contain 
issues that  have a l ready  been decided. I t  is a l so  to  be noted that the 
Bundesrat now h a s  fewer complaints to examine than previously, and that 
it has learned t o  compromise without creating unpleasant clashes with the 
federal Cabinet and the  Bundestag. ' Between 1949  andB60,  the Mediation 
Committee was  convened 75 t imes.  The Bundesrat requested i t  to be con- 
vened 70 t imes ,  t he  Cabinet  3 t imes ,  and the Bundestag 2 times. These 
figures show tha t  t h e  Joint Mediation Committee has not been used a 
great d e a l ,  but t hey  d o  indicate that this legislative device has  been used 
almost exclusively by the  Bundesrat a s  a bulwark against the more power- 
ful combination of the Bundestag and federal Cabinet. 2 
The main criticism of the Mediation Committee i s  i t s  extensive 
use of expert opinions.  The high degree of dependence placed on expert 
advice has  tended to  reduce the influence of "real  political mediation" 
within the Committee. If the Bundesrat i s  not satisfied with the results 
of the Mediation Committee 's  work, i t  may vote an  Einspruch against the 
compromised bill within one week (Article 77-3). This Einspruch i s  possible 
though only aga ins t  ordinary federal  laws which do not require Bundesrat 
- 
'p innry,  *. &. , p p .  7 9 ,  8 2 - 4 .  
2F'incr, -- l oc .  c i t .  
' f i nn ry ,  . &. , p p .  85-7. 
had used t h i s  Einspruch power on ly  three times. 
TO sum up t h e  importance of  the  Bundesrat 's Einspruch powers, 
one can  s t a t e  t h a t  t h e y  have  little ac tua l  value a s  shown by the inirequency 
of their u s e .  But t h i s  h a s  been  a matter of choice of the  Bundesrat i t se l f ,  
which ha s  c h o s e n  i n s t e a d  t o  maximize i t s  u s e  of Zustimmunq powers. 
By t h i s  t ime it should be  c lear  that  the  Bundesrat was  originally 
envisaged as a f ede r a l i s t i c  organ. The Christ ian Socia l is ts  i n  southwest- 
ern Germany (known co l l e c t i ve ly  as t he  Ellwanqer Kreis) felt tha t  they had 
created a Bundesrat  which  would protect the  local  party units from central- 
ized party l e ade r sh ip .  The Bundesrat was  constructed s o  that  i t  would 
supposedly a c t  as a check  aga in s t  a national party leader attempting t o  
strengthen h i s  pe rsona l  inf luence by co-ordinating the politics of both 
legislat ive chambers .  The bloc voting system in  the Bundesrat was  to be 
one of the  ch ie f  methods by which national  party leaders  would be stopped 
from imposing the i r  wi l l s  on  individual  Land ministers representing coali- 
tion Land governments .  In  th i s  way  t he  Bundesrat plan was unique a s  the 
usual f edera lupper  ch;imbpr f ree ly  a l lows voting along party l ines .  
Short ly a f t e r  Dr. Adenauer 's  e lec t ion a s  Chancellor in  1 9 4 9 ,  he 
began a n  a t tempt  t o  cen t ra l i ze  the  decentral ized structure of h is  own Christ-  
ian Democratic Par ty .  HQ was  largely succe s s fu l  In th is  attempt because  
the coal i t ions  with other par t ics  which he was  ab le  to arrange. Yet he 
W a s  n o t  successful wllcn i t  came to  the  central izat ion of h i s  party i n  the 
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~ ~ ~ d e s r a t .  The  Bundes ra t ,  inc luding CDU members, refused t o  approve one 
of h is  c a b i n e t  nominees  a n d  i n s t e a d  subs t i tu ted  another appointee. The 
~ ~ ~ d ~ s r a t  i n  so c t i n g  made  a powerful enemy; but more important, it proved 
that it would not  submi t  to Par ty  d i sc ip l ine  and poli t ical  pressure from 
above. 1 
More r e c e n t  e v e n t s  h a v e  s i n c e  overshadowed th i s  original victory 
of the Land i n t e r e s t s .  S i n c e  1 9 4 9 ,  t h e  W e s t  German poli t ical  scene  h a s  
been overwhelmingly  dominated  by two national  poli t ical  parties: the  
Christian Democra t i c  a n d  S o c i a l i s t  par t ies .  These  two part ies  now have 
a good amount o f  p a r t y  d i s c i p l i n e .  Thus i n  t h e  Bundesrepublik today,  a 
two -party s y s t e m  pract ical1y"exists  , with party power shifting gradually . 
fram the  Land par ty  c e n t e r s  t o  na t ional  party headquar te ts .  
Th i s  deve lopment  h a s  had a tremendous signif icance a s  far a s  
the  Bundesrat is c o n c e r n e d .  The Bundesra t ' s  original  role h a s  a l s o  changed 
concomitantly wi th  t h e  trend toward party cent ra l iza t ion .  The role of the  
Bundcsrat t o d a y  would  a p p e a r  t o  be  more t h a t  of a n  "instrument for the 
subord~na t ion  o f  Land t o  Bund p o l i c y , "  than one o f  ant i -cent ra l i s t  protect- 
or o f  Land i n t e r e s t s .  Th i s  change  i n  role h a s  been d u e ,  i n  pa r t ,  to  the 
growth , ) f  impor tance  o f  t h e  B u d e s r a t  i t s e l f  through the  u s e  o f  i t s  expanded 
Zustimmuncl powers .  a s  the importance o f  the  Bundesrat g rew,  the  more 
- 
l ~ r i d c n l ~ c i m c r ,  w. &. , pp. 81 1 - 1 4 .  
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were  t h e  n a t i o n a l  pol i t ica l  Part ies to  influence their members who 
were d e l e g a t e s  t o  t h a t  organ.  
p a r t y  i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  Bundesrat is of spec ia l  importance to the 
opposition party.  For wi th  a minority i n  t h e  Bundestag, it is s t i l l  possible 
to use the  Bundesra t  as  a means  of obstructing the  Cab ine t ' s  program. At 
the same t i m e ,  t h e  C a b i n e t  s e e k s  to broaden its influence i n  the Bundesrat 
SO that it c a n  g a i n  suppor t  for its pol ic ies .  This competition for Bundesrat 
votes h a s  turned Land e l e c t i o n s  in to  a source  of nat ional  party in te res t . l  
Consequently,  t h e  na t iona l  pol i t ica l  par t ies  intervene i n  Land political 
campaigns, t h e  formation of Land c a b i n e t s ,  and the  formulation of Land 
policy i n  the  Bundesrat .  S i n c e  t h e s e  Land e lec t ions  a re  not a l l  held a t  
the same t i m e ,  and a t  d i f fe ren t  t imes  than the  national  e l ec t ions ,  some 
unsteadiness  o c c u r s  i n  federa l  Cab ine t ,  Bundestag, and Bundesrat policies.  
These e l e c t i o n s  a r e  e s p e c i a l l y  d is rupt ive  in  the  c a s e  of the  Bundesrat 
because of t h e  cont inuous  turnover of  de lega tes  a t  varying intervals .  i! 
Final ly  mention must  be made of  one  of the most important leg-  
is lat ive i s s u e s  i n  which the  Bundesrat w a s  involved. That i s s u e  con- 
cerned the  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  a European Defense  Community, and it was  
an area of c o n f l i c t  spanning severa l  years i n  the  ea r ly  195 0's. 
l ~ i n i i y ,  w. &. , pp .  88-93.  
' r i n c r ,  . - c i t . , p.  499 .  
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The leg is la t ion  involved had been drafted by the federal Cabinet. 
It was almost cer ta in  t o  Pas s  t he  CDU-controlled Bundestag, but there was 
doubt a s  t o  whether it would get  through the Bundesrat because of strong 
socialist e lements  there .  The actual  i s s u e  became very confused with 
appeals made t o  t h e  Federal Consti t ional Court on several occasions. For 
the Bundesrat t h i s  l eg is la t ion  w a s  significant because a group of federal- 
minded Bundesrat members argued that the Bundesrat should have the 
right to vote on the  EDC t rea t ies  a s  a whole,  and not just those parts of 
the treaty deal ing with t a x e s  and other a reas  of Bund-Land administration. 
The outcome of the  d i spute  would set a vital precedent determining the 
potential powers of t h e  Bundesrat a s  a federal legislative organ. 
In  Apri l ,  1 9 5 3 ,  the  Bundesrat turned the problem over to the 
Federal Consti tutional Court to dec ide .  The Court was to determine if 
the treaties were cons t i tu t iona l ,  and if s o ,  whether the Bundesrat had 
the constitutional power to approve a l l  of ,  or only part o f ,  the EDC 
treaties. The CDU raised such a n  uproar over the i s sue  that Bundesrat 
never really voted on the t rea t ies  a s  a whole,  and they were sent out of 
the  Bundesrat on a technical i ty .  The failure of the Bundesrat to ac t  de-  
cisively on th i s  i s s u e  caused  i t  to lose  prestige and placed i t  in a poor 
position for asser t ing  i t s e l f  on ques t ior~s  o f  national policy when the 
Bundcs tag and Cabine t  wcrc on opppsite s ides .  In the political realm 
t h i s  cast: served as a rcmindpl. to t h e  members of the Bundesrat of the 
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dangers involved when  t h e y  al lowed themselves  t o  become instruments of 
national par ty  po l i t i c s .  
Signs  i nd i ca t e  tha t  t h e  Bundesrat membership i s  wiser because 
of their exper ience  wi th  t h e  EDC i s s u e .  The Bundesrat as a whole has  
reacted by s eek ing  " s a f e r  re la t ionships .  " I t  h a s  sought to  redefine i t s  
own role by  avo id ing  d i r ec t  poli t ical  conf l ic ts  with the  Bundestag and the 
federal Cab ine t .  It h a s  carried t h i s  t o  the  point of act ing a s  if it were 
above party po l i t i c s ,  but  t h i s  is a f a l s e  conception of real i ty.  1 
The a l t e red  concept ion of the  Bundesrat,  because  of i t s  action 
i n  the EDC i s s u e  and  other  more recent  i s s u e s ,  has  caused some observers 
to predict t ha t  W e s t  German federalism is moving toward a cr is is  period. 
They feel tha t  t h e  Bundesrat is not f i t ted to  maintain the  federal balance 
since i t  w a s  not cons t ruc ted  t o  dea l  with the  changing economic and 
political s c e n e .  In  viewing t h i s  ant i federa l  t rend,  the  fact should not be 
overlooked tha t  the  p a s s i v i t y  of  the  Laender themselves has  caused the 
Bundesrat to  be weakened .  This is true even though the  CDU and Social- 
ist Parties have re juvenated and strengthened "the small l i fe  energy of 
the Laender, which hi ther to  had been suffocat ing on the  fringes of decision- 
making. 11  2 
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In genera l ,  the  Bundesrat seems to have "scaled downf1 i t s  own 
role.  I t  h a s  recent ly  carried on a campaign to lessen i t s  legisla- 
tive tasks  in  order t o  concentrate on administrative reform. Today it pictures 
itself more a s  a mediator than a s  an active legislature. Thus the original 
of the three occupation powers and the Ellwaqner Kreis con- 
cerning the role which the  Bundesrat would play in the Bundesrepublik 
have proven to  b e  largely i l lusory.  I t  i s  apparent that in recent years the 
Bundesrat has  done l i t t l e  t o  maintain the balance between the executive 
and the legis la ture  branches of the West  German government. Federal 
principles have , therefore , suffered a t  the hands of "the centralizing 
tendencies of soc ia l  r ea l i t y , "  and i f  a cr is is  were to a r i se ,  i t  i s  doubtful 
whether the Bundesrat could again invoke i t s  original constitutional 
powers . 1 
Even with a l l  of i t s  ambiguities, somedefinite conclusions about 
the Bundesrat a s  a federal  insti tution are possible. It can be said that 
Bundesrat has  demonstrated that  i t  i s  a genuine federal organ by i t s  
representatian and protection of  the interests of the Laender. It i s  true 
that in many ins t ances  national political parties do determine the interests 
of the Laender for them, though this i s  not true in a l l  instances.  If  the 
Bund chose t o ,  i t  and thp national political parties could probably exercise 
c O m ~ l c t ~  control over the Land structures. But, short of a 
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great  enough t o  c a u s e  such  a development, the  Bundesrat may be ex- 
pected t o  cont inue t o  uphold Land in te res t s  as understood by the Land 
governments . 
~ l s o  important  as a federal  check is the  bureaucratic attitude 
which the  members of  t h e  Bundesrat have assumed.  The professional 
competence of t h e  Bundesrat  members and their expert ise i n  scrutinizing 
"legislat ive complexi t ies"  h a s  placed limitations on the freedom of the 
executive branch i n  l eg i s l a t i ve  and administrat ive a reas .  This bureau- 
cratic outlook is a l s o  va luab le  as a protector of the  federal structure be- 
cause of i t s  conserva t ive  nature .  At the  same time, th i s  conservative 
element is not s o  r igid as t o  have  stopped progress through socio- 
economic reform. 
In s u m ,  there  a r e  grounds for "caut ious  optimism" over the role 
of the Bundesrat i n  t h e  democrat ic  development and preservation of  the 
West German federa l  sy s t em.  For if  federal ism i s  a n  accepted principle 
i n  the Bundesrepublik,  there  is l i t t l e  that  even a n  anti-federal Bundesrat 
could do t o  harm i t  a s  i t  e x i s t s  today.  1 
Thc Federal  Const i tu t ional  Court.  The l a s t  important federal 
-
institution of t he  Bundcsrepublik to be considered is the Federal Constitu- 
tion Court (Bundesvcrfassungsqericht).  It exemplifies one of the three 
' p innry ,  OJ. G ,  pp. 238 -44 .  2 4 6 .  
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basic o f  a fede ra l  sys tem mentioned ear l ie r ,  i . e .  , a supreme 
body w h i c h  r e s o l v e s  federal-regional  and inter-federal disputes 
through cons t i tu t iona l  in terpre ta t ion .  In  f a c t ,  t he  Federal Constitutional 
Court may b e  v iewed as " t h e  most  important development i n  postwar 
German cons t i tu t iona l i sm."  Charged wi th  t h e  duty  of interpreting the Basic 
Law and a n y  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n ,  t h i s  judicial  organ holds a unique 
position i n  t h e  f e d e r a l  s t ruc tu re .  I t  s t a n d s  " a t  t h e  a p e x  of the  judicial 
pyramid, " ye t  it is d i s t i n c t  from t h e  r e s t  of t h e  W e s t  German judicial 
system. 1 
The t h r e e  o c c u p a t i o n  powers d id  much t o  encourage the  W e s t  
Germans t o  a d o p t  s u c h  a cons t i tu t iona l  court  a s  part of their federal 
system. The Germans  t h e m s e l v e s  were a l s o  very favorably inclined toward 
the idea of s u c h  a c o u r t .  The favorable  German at t i tude w a s  strengthened 
by  tradition which  began  with cons t i tu t ional  proposals  for a court with wide 
jurisdiction a t  t h e  Nat ional  Assembly  o f  1849,  and which continued in some 
form or o ther  down t o  the  end  of  the  Weimar Republic. Little precedent had 
been e s t a b l i s h e d  through t h e  d e c a d e s ,  however,  for a supreme court with 
wide Powers o f  judic ia l  r ev iew.  The members of  the  Parliamentary Council 
l p a u l  G .  Kauper  , " T h e  Const i tu t ions  of W e s t  Germany and the  
United States:  A Comgorat ivc  s t u d y ,  I' Michiqan Review, LVIII 
(June, 1960) ,  1092-184.  
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thus had to  combine innovation with precedents provided by the constitution- 
al courts of other federal  systems (especially the United States, Switzerland 
and Austria) i n  framing the provisions for the new German court. 
~ l t h o u g h  the pressure of the three occupation powers on the West 
Germans to  adopt such  a court was a factor,  even more important was the 
German reaction t o  the Naxi regime. This in turn was strengthened by a 
reaction to  the authoritarian regime which was established in the Soviet 
occupation zone. In a n y  c a s e ,  the democratic political groups of Western 
Germany overwhelmingly supported the general principle of "judicial review" 
in 1948. 
Except for broadly specifying the jurisdiction of the Federal Con- 
stitutional Court ,  the  Basic Law i s  quite brief in regard to the court and i t s  
procedures and functions.  I t  dea l s  with the court in Articles 2 0 ,  41, 92- 
94. 98-100, and 126. Article 92 designates  the Constitutional Court a s  
one of the several  courts of  the Bundesrepublik by which "judicial author- 
ity i s  exercised.  " In addi t ion,  Section I of the federal statute enacted to 
deal with the court s t a t e s  that  i t  i s ,  with "other constitutional organs, 
an ~utonomous  and independent court. " The Constitutional Caurt i tself  
has concluded from this  s ta tu te  and the Basic Law that i t  i s  not subordinate 
to a n y  other federal organ or administrative agency. 2 
1 OJ-. - c i t . , pp .  2 7 9 - 8 1 .  
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The jurisdiction of  t he  Federal Constitutional Court i s  given in 
of the  Basic Law. Article 93 gives the court the right and 
duty of interpreting the  Basic Law and the  power of judging the constitution- 
ality of Land and Bund Laws a s  well  a s  settling disputes that arise concern- 
ing the compatibil i ty o f  t h e s e  laws with each other and with the Basic Law. 
In addition, other cases may be ass igned to  it by federal law.  Article 98 
gives the court t he  power t o  impeach federal judges. Article 99 allows the 
court to  dec ide  on  consti tutional disputes  within a Land if the Land re- 
quests i t .  Article 1 0 0  g ives  the  court power t o  decide constitutional 
questions which a r i s e  i n  lower federal and Land courts. Under Article 126 
the court must dec ide  d i spu te s  regarding the continuance of law a s  federal 
law. 
Somewhat out of the  ordinary are the provisions of Article 21-2  
and Article 41-2 which give the Constitutional Court jurisdiction in two 
other specif ic  a r e a s .  Article 2 1-2 allows the court to decide on questions 
of unconstitutionality " in  c a s e s  concerning political parties which because 
of their aims or the  behavior o f  their adherents ,  seek to impair or destroy 
free democratic bas i s  o f  order or to  endanger the existence" of the 
Bundesrcpublik. In a very different  vein i s  Article 4 1 - 2  which gives the 
Court the Power to hear appea ls  against  decis ions  of the Bundestag. 
A s  the  prcccding shows,  the jurisdiction of the Constitutional 
Court dcci,rdincJ to the Basic Law i s  both brood and  specif ic  depending 3r-1 
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the circumstances involved.  Indeed , t h e  Basic Law allows any deci- 
.=ion or act t o  be  brought before the  court on the charge that 
i t  infr inges o n  t h e  cons t i tu t iona l  r ights  of the  party concerned, 1 
~~~t 
important, however ,  is t h e  power of  t he  court to decide  on the constitu- 
tionality of Land a n d  Bund leg i s la t ion .  
Bes ides  reviewing t h e  const i tu t ional  complaints of the various 
governmental o rgans  and  pol i t ica l  ins t i tu t ions ,  the  Constitutional Court 
also hears  cons t i tu t iona l  complaints  from individual citizerswho believe 
that their  cons t i tu t iona l  r igh t s  have  been violated.  These ca se s  make 
up the g r ea t e s t  pe rcen tage  of t h e  Cour t ' s  work. Due  to  the nature and 
quantity of them,  much thought h a s  been given to proposals  which would 
limit the  amount of pe rsona l  const i tu t ional  complaints to  be brought before 
the Const i tu t ional  Cour t .  Z 
Article 9 4  o f  t h e  Basic  Law d e a l s  briefly with the  structure of 
the Const i tu t ional  Cour t  and  the  manner in  which i t s  judges are  e lec ted.  
It provides tha t  ha l f  o f  the  members o f  the  Court are  chosen by the Bunde- 
stag and hal f  by t h e  Bundesrat .  Those chosen cannot be members of the 
Bund or Land par l i aments .  This  a r t i c le  further provides that  federal law 
will e s t ab l i sh  the  procedures  and consti tut ion o f  the  court.  
l ~ a i n o w ,  z. - c i t . , p.  38. 
L ~ o l c ,  *. -- c i t . , p p .  286-88.  
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A f e d e r a l  s t a t u t e  es tab l i sh ing  the  more detai led structure and 
procedures of t h e  Cons t i tu t iona l  c o u r t  w a s  adopted i n  1951. This statute 
was further amended  i n  1956. The s t a t u t e  provides that  the Constitutional 
Court  hall c o n s i s t  of  two main d i v i s i o n s ,  or  s e n a t e s ,  of eight judges each 
(originally t h e  number w a s  twe lve  per sena te ) .  The two chambers were 
created to  a l low s o m e  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  of judges ,  and a l s o  to  ensure an  
even dis t r ibut ion o f  cases. The pres ident  o f  the  entire Court presides 
over one s e n a t e  a n d  h i s  d e p u t y  chairman over the  other.  In each of the 
senates  th ree  of t h e  judges  a r e  c h o s e n  for l i f e ,  while the  res t  have only 
eight year t e rms .  Pe rpe tua l  re-e lec t ion is t radi t ional ,  however, i n  the 
latter i n s t a n c e  . I n  choos ing  t h e  judges , the  Bundestag must es tabl ish  
a special  commit tee  for t h a t  purpose .  No spec ia l  procedures were estab- 
lished in  the  c a s e  of t h e  Bundesrat .  
For t h e  s a k e  of pol i t ica l  s t ab i l i ty  in  the  Bundesrepublik, the 
Constitutional Cour t  d o e s  not  publ ish  d i s sen t ing  opinions. Also, s ince  
1956 ,  the Cour t  h a s  made i t  a pract ice  not t o  i s s u e  a n y  advisory opinions. 1 
The d i v i s i o n  of t h e  Const i tu t ional  Court into two sena tes  has  
been cons tan t  s o u r c e  o f  c r i t i c i sm.  Originally th i s  division a l s o  es tab-  
lished two c a t e g o r i e s  o f  i s s u e s  which limited e a c h  sena te  to acting in 
O n e  category.  The 1 9 5 6  amendment to the  federal  s ta tu te  dealing with 
the court a l t e red  t h i s ,  howcvpr ,  because  the  original distr ibutmn of c a s e s  
' r inc r  , OJ. . , pp. 465-66 .  
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between the  two s e n a t e s  had Proven to  be too unequal. Now the Plenum , 
consisting of members of both sena tes  , can adjust  the formula for distrib- 
uting c a s e s  between t h e  two sena te s  in certain instances.  When uncer- 
tainty a r i s e s  over which sena te  h a s  jurisdiction over a specific case ,  a 
committee of judges from both s e n a t e s  decides which senate will handle 
the case .  
In t he  1956 reorganization an  attempt was a l so  made to reduce 
the work of the  Court  as a whole. Now committees of three judges in 
each senate  can  r e j ec t  c a s e s  submitted to  the Court, except when certain 
specific const i tut ional  i s s u e s  are  involved. No further restraints on the 
jurisdiction or number of c a s e s  allowed before the court are expected. 
For although most of t he  court ' s  time i s  spent deciding constitutional com- 
plaints of a minor nature ,  i t s  reputation and position in the governmental 
structure have been great ly  enhanced because of i ts  ability to deal with 
such c a s e s .  One structural  change i s  s t i l l  hoped for though, the devel- 
opment of a s ingle  chamber court. The gradual diminution in the number 
of Judges si t t ing on the court has  been made in the hope that i t  may event- 
ually lead to  a s ing le  chamber Constitutional Court. 1 
Even though the Constitutional Court had been provided for in 
the Basic Law, i t  got o f f  to a slow start .  The enabling federal statute 
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dealing with the  de ta i led  act ivi t ies  of the Court was not adopted until 1951 
judges were then e lec ted  and I af ter  lengthy discussions between the various 
political fact ions , the  C0u1-t became operational on September 28, 195 1, 
in Kalsruhe, i s su ing  its f i rs t  decision in late October. Between 1949 and 
195 1, the Allied High Commission, under the authority of the Occupation 
statute, had assumed the  chief responsibility of guarding the young Basic 
L ~ ~ ,  even though a temporary German Court had been provided for. The 
High Commission g lad ly  turned i t s  judicial functions over to the West 
Germans a s  soon as the  Constitutional Court was established in 195 1.1 
After t h i s  delayed s ta r t ,  the Constitutional Court was a t  first 
still slow to  a c t  and very cautious when i t  did so. The Court acted a s  i f  
its principal t a s k  was to obtain favorable public opinion for its role as  an 
"arbitral power. " In looking to the future, the Court adopted a policy of 
noninvolvement, and acted with great sluggishness when important issues 
containing polit ical  i s s u e s  came before it. Thus for some time the Con- 
stitutional Court followed a policy of " judicial self-restraint. " Since 
these early s t ages  , however, there has  been a "marked growth in the 
judicial confidence and f inese  displayed by the Court. " 2  The increased 
' ~ d w a r d  M c m i n n e y ,  "Judicial Restraint and the West German 
Cour t ,  " Harvard - ~ a w  Review, IXYV (November. 1961) I 
PP.  10, 1 2 ,  19 .  
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responsibility a n d  p r e s t i ge  of  t h e  Consti tut ional  Court is the result of several 
d e c i s i o n s  which it h a s  handed down; several  of which directly 
concern federa l i sm.  Therefore ,  it is worthwhile to  briefly examine some of 
the c a s e s  involved.  
The f i r s t  federa l ism case t o  come before the Constitutional Court 
was the Southwest  C a s e ,  which dea l t  with the  territorial reorganization of 
southwest Germany. The i s s u e  had a r i sen  because  i n  1945 the three occu- 
pation powers had  d iv ided  t h e  h i s to r ic  s t a t e s  of Baden and Wuerttemberg 
in half when t h e y  c r ea t ed  thei r  occupation zones.  The two northern halves 
of these  s t a t e s  we re  combined in to  a s ingle  Land (Wuettemberg-Baden) i n  
the American zone.  L ikewise ,  a s ingle  Land (Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern) 
was created b y  t h e  French from the  southern halves.  From 1948 on there 
was much d i s c u s s i o n  about  t he  reorganization of these  two Laender either 
a s  a new combined Land,  or to  al low them to  ex i s t  a s  they did before 
1945.  Article 118 had been inse r ted  i n  the Basic Law in  order to provide 
for this  reorganizat ion.  
Since  the  Laender involved could not reach a n  agreement on the 
reorganization i s s u e ,  the  federa l  Parliament authorized a referendum to  
Settle the  problem i n  ~ a y ,  195 1. But before the referendum could be held 
the Land government o f  South Baden challenged the  federal legislat ion before 
the  Consti tut ional  Cour t .  The court ruled i n  favor df the referendum, and a 
sin(ilc Lalid ( ~ ~ d ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ t t ~ ~ b f r g )  was  cvcntuall\ .  created.  A papular 
movement i n  South Baden still agi ta ted  for t he  establishment of two separate 
laender, however ,  and  its l e ade r s  again  went to  the  Constitutional Court to 
seek the  r ight  of i n i t i a t i ve  o n  t h i s  i s s u e .  The Court ruled i n  favor of the 
initiative pet i t ion i n  1956 ,  but by then t he  movement had los t  its momentum 
and by 1960 w a s  a lmos t  nonexis tent .  1 
The sh i f t ing  of  Land boundaries,  or their creation or dissolution, 
directly invo lves  t h e  p r inc ip les  of  federalism. Although the Constitutional 
cour t ' s  d e c i s i o n s  concerning t h e  Southwest  C a s e  were not substantially 
significant ,  t h e  fact t h a t  it a c t e d  as the  final arbiter i n  the matter is 
important, b e c a u s e  i n  s o  doing t he  Court assumed its proper federal role 
under the provis ions  of t h e  Basic Law. Thus the  federal principle was 
upheld, and t h e  Court  w a s  a b l e  t o  es tab l i sh  precedent and prestige while 
the Bundesrepublik w a s  s t i l l  young. 
A more important  c a s e  concerning federalism, which was  decided 
by the Const i tu t ional  Cour t  i n  1 9 5 7 ,  was  t h e  Reichskonkordat Case .  In 
this c a se  the court  upheld t h e  power of  the  Laender to make policy deci -  
sions in the  a r ea  o f  cul tura l  matters  (speci f ica l ly  in  th is  ins tance ,  educa- 
tion) which the  Bund had  chal lenged.  It did s o  by utilizing the  federal 
Principle found i n  Article 73  o f  the  Basic Law. This ar t ic le  excludes 
cultural mat ters  from Bund control  by fai l ing t o  mention them. The i s sue  
invcjlved, howcvcr ,  w a s  fur ther  because  of  an  international 
110 
~ ~ n c l u d e d  i n  1933 between t h e  Reich government and the  Vatican. 
I n  its f ina l  d e c i s i o n  t he  Consti tut ional  Court held that an  
t r e a t y  obl igat ion of  t h e  Bund did not give it the power to 
interfere i n  a r e a s  where  t h e  Laender had powers reserved to  them by the 
Basic Law. ' Again i n  t h i s  i n s t ance  t h e  principle of federalism was 
maintained s u c c e s s f u l l y  a g a i n s t  Bund encroachment. 
The federa l  pr inciple ,  a s  found i n  the  governmental structure of 
the Bundesrepublik, w a s  further def ined when the  Constitutional Court 
ruled on wha t  t h e  Laender  might not  d o  consti tut ionally in  their relation- 
ship with the  Federa l  government.  Confl ict  a rose  in  long-standing debate 
which had been  go ing  on  between t he  Government and the  Opposition over 
rearmament. S i n c e  the opposi t ion Soc ia l i s t s  were outnumbered in  the 
federal Par l iament ,  t h e y  carried on t h e  fight through several Land parlia- 
ments which t h e y  con t ro l l ed ,  These  Land parliaments passed Laws auth- 
orizrng referenda o n  t h e  s p e c i f i c  i s s u e  o f  rearmament with atomic weapons,  
but af ter  t he  federa l  Parl iament had a l ready  passed legislat ion favorable to 
such rearmament. The federa l  Cab ine t  a sked  the  Constitutional Court 
to enjoin the  re fe renda  from being h e l d ,  even though they would have no 
legal b a s i s ,  b c c a u s c  o f  t h e  embarrassment which the referenda would cause  
Bund. B e s i d e s ,  t h i s  a r e a  w a s  completel>r within the  exclusive control 
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,f the ~ u n d .  The Cour t  O b v i o u s l ~  decided i n  favor of the Bund. this in- 
stance the  federa l  pr inciple  worked aga ins t  the b e n d e r  by preventing 
them from usurping Power which ac tua l ly  belonged to  the Bund. 1 
The m o s t  important  case t o  date  concerning federalism in the 
Bundesrep~bl ik  w a s  d e c i d e d  b y  t h e  Federal Constitutional Court in 1961. 
The Fernseh ( te levis ion)  d e c f  s i o n  h a s  been regarded a s  a turning point for 
the cons t i tu t iona l  Cour t .  I n  t h i s  dec i s ion  the  court directly challenged 
the Bund for t h e  f i r s t  t ime  on a n  i s s u e  which the latter considered to be 
vital. As e a r l y  as 1953 , t h e  Adenauer Government had ventured into the 
field of t e l e v i s i o n  regu la t ion .  The Laender sharply contested this inter- 
ference by t h e  Bund i n  a n  a r e a  which they considered a s  exclusively 
theirs by t h e  au thor i ty  left t o  them over cultural matters in the Basic Law. 
They were wi l l ing  to n e g o t i a t e ,  however,  and were prepared to split  
television control  wi th  t h e  Bund . No definite conclusion was reached on 
the matter and t h e  i s s u e  remained unresolved. In 1960 Chancellor Aden- 
suer raised the  mat ter  a g a i n  when he  attempted to gain complete control 
West German t e l e v i s i o n  through the  creation of a Bund m o n o ~ o l ~ .  To 
th is ,  h e  in i t i a t ed  l e g i s l a t i o n  which would have established a federal 
for control  of t h e  Fernseh program. Several Laender took h m e d -  
iate ac t ion,  and t h e  i s s u e  w a s  brought before the ~ o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Court* 
The Court dec idcd  i n  favor  sf Land control of Fernseh, because it 
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within the scope  of  t he  Laender's exclusively controlled cultural affairs 
The Court a l s o  went on  i n  its decision to  speak futther on Bund-Land areas 
of competence which a re  only vaguely enumerated in Articles 70-75 of the 
Basic Law. 
In th i s  ins tance  the Constitutional Court even went so far a s  to 
lecture the Adenauer regime on i t s  "political moralityu. In its decision 
the Court restated the  federal  principle in this manner: "the obligation of 
self-restraint i n  a federal  soc ie ty  is a reciprocal one, involving both Bund 
and Laender. " The Court  a l s o  referred to i ts  two earlier decisions given 
in the Konkordat C a s e  and the  c a s e  on atom rearmament which dealt with 
the federal relationship between Bund and the Laender. The Bund seemed 
to have ignored these  two decis ions from the start. In so doing, it had 
also ignored the Consti tutional Court, which i t  had never before met 
head-on, a s  well a s  Basic Law. 1 
Unfortunately in some respects access  to the Constitutional 
Court i s  too e a s y  for the various organs of the German government. The 
Court's availabil i ty to  decide any  constitutional issue makes it also 
available to  become embroiled in political conflicts. Its reputation 
and Prestige depend,  therefore ,  on i t s  limitations." a s  well 
as  the self-rest ra int  of  the other governmental organs in their use of the 
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1 ~f t h e  Cour t  cont inues  t o  conduct itself a s  it did in reaching its 
court. 
decision i n  t h e  Fernseh  a n d  other cases 1 th is  should present no problem. 
The mos t  important  consequence of the Fernseh decision, howeverl 
concerns federal ism i n  genera l .  I n  a n  age  when federalism in practice seems 
to be wasting a w a y  i n  t h e  governments of such nations a s  the United States 
and swi tzer land,  t h e  W e s t  German Constitutional Court has given new 
life to federa l ism i n  Germany. I n  its short existence the Federal Consti- 
tutional Court  h a s  b e e n  viewed: 
A s  the  guardian of a l ibera l  democratic constitution; a s  the final 
coordinating a g e n c y  i n  the  political system; a s  an experiment 
in judicial  pioneering;  as a judicial oligarcy; and a TrojanHorse 
which c o n c e a l s  behind a 'udicial  facade certain of the realities 
of German po l i t i ca l  l i fe .  2 
But the Cour t ' s  ro le  still cannot  be viewed a s  being permanent. Although 
now firmly e s t ab l i shed  a s  t h e  supreme judicial organ of the Bundesrepub- 
Ilk, i t s  posit ion is still evolving.  Out of necessi ty,  therefore, the deci- 
sions made by t h e  Const i tu t ional  Court must be viewed in respect to the 
changing pol i t ica l  s c e n e  i n  Western  Germany. 4 
The Basic  Law h a s  provided for a l l  possibilities by placing 
governmental a c t s  under the  guardianship of " a  comprehensive system of 
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judicial review.  " S o  far t h i s  innovation h a s  worked well in  a nation where 
tradition placed t h e s e  powers i n  the  hands of the  legislature.  In fac t ,  i t  
appears to  b e  s t rengthening the entire governmental structure. l In spite of 
continuing d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  l e g a l  s ta tus  of the  Constitutional Court, i t  i s  
a c c e p t e d  today  as " a  consti tutional organ endowed with a special 
status a longside t h e  Pres ident ,  and  the Bundestag, a s  well a s  being the 
highest court of t h e  land .  " 
Although viewed with skepticism by the  members of the Govern- 
ment in the p a s t ,  t h e  Federal  Consti tutional Court now receives more favor- 
able sympathy from them. The Bundesrat h a s  supported the Constitutional 
Court even more than  h a s  the  ruling coali t ion in  the  Bundestag. Most of 
the Land governments  a l s o  view the Court favorably a s  the protector of 
their rights a g a i n s t  Bund encroachment.  I n  general i t  may be said that 
there i s  no important pressure  group in  the  Bundesrepublik today that  would 
restrict the powers o f  thc  Const i tut ional  Court. Popular support for the 
Court i s  cont inuous ly  growing. 
I n  s p i t e  of a11 of the  Cour t ' s  prest ige,  criticism i s  s t i l l  heard 
concerning ce r t a in  a s p e c t s  of i t s  organization and procedure. Some West 
Germans cvcn  fccl  tha t  thc  Court has  too much jurisdiction under the 
fcdcral law.  T h e  cictrimcntsl th ings which ma)- resul t  i f  the  Ccnstitu:ional 
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Court should  become involved i n  political d isputes  as  well a s  the impract- 
icability of its t w o  s e n a t e  s tructure are  pointed out a s  the Court's greatest 
Y e t  e v e n  though criticism is evident,  no popular movement 
for reforming t h e  Cour t  h a s  appeared.  In f ac t ,  the prestige of the Consti- 
tutional Cour t  h a s  cont inuously  grown. It is popular with the private 
citizen as a guard ian  o f  h i s  personal  rights and a l so  with the higher political 
organs o f  t h e  Bund a n d  t h e  Laender. I t s  personnel are of the highest quality. 
~t has  faced c r i s i s  and  survived with increased respect .  Indeed, the 
Federal C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Cour t  h a s  earned i t s  reputation a s  the "Custodian" 
of the  Basic Law. 
Other  f ede ra l  f ea tu res .  The nature of the President 's office in 
the Bundesrepublik is f e d e r a l i s t i c  because of the manner of the President 's 
election and  the  s u c c e s s i o n  t o  tha t  office. Actually the President of 
Western Germany  h a s  very limited political importance and influence ex- 
cept in  t h e  d ip lomat ic  field i n  h i s  capacity a s  chief of s tate .  Federalism 
i s  linked t o  t h e  p res iden t i a l  o f f i ce  because the Laender participate in the 
des ignat ion  of t h c  Pres ident  through membership in the Federal Assembly 
( B u n d c ~ v e r s o m m l ~ ~ ~ ) ,  which is composed equally of members of the Bundestag 
'nd d f l c s a t c s  of t h e  Land parliaments (Article 54) .  The successor to the 
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president ,  i f  t h e  l a t t e r  becomes  unable t o  continue i n  h i s  of f ice ,  i s  the 
president o f  t h e  Bundesra t  (Article 57). This manner of success ion  is 
fede ra l i s t i c  b e c a u s e ,  i n  effect, the Laender have then chosen the  
federal  P r e s i d e n t .  
~t is a l s o  n e c e s s a r y  t o  consider  the  amending process of the 
Basic Law b e c a u s e  of i t s  v i t a l  importance i n  the  preservation of the 
federal s y s t e m .  I n  c r e a t i n g  t h e  Basic Law, a s  with any  federal constitu- 
t ional d o c u m e n t ,  it w a s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  provide safeguards s o  that the federal 
balance might  b e  ma in ta ined  as long as the Basic Law should ex i s t ,  yet  
s t i l l  a l l o w  for  a r e a s o n a b l e  amount of change. As a whole, the amending 
process as  set forth i n  Art icle  79 of the  Basic Law i s  not too rigid. In 
part ,  Art icle  79 states: 
(1) T h e  B a s i c  Law can  be  amended only by a law which expressly 
a m e n d s  o r  supp lemen t s  t h e  tex t  thereof.  
(2) Such a l a w  requi res  the  affirmative vote of two-thirds of the 
members of t h e  Bundestag and two-thirds of the  votes of the Bundesrat. 
(3) An amendment  o f  t h i s  Basic Law affecting the division of the 
Federa t ion  i n t o  Laender  , the  participation in  principle of the Laender 
in  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  o r  t h e  b a s i c  principles laid down in Articles 1 and 2 0 ,  
i s  i n a d m i s s i b l e .  
S e c t i o n  3 o f  Art icle  79 i s  espec ia l ly  important for the purposes 
of  f cdc ra l i sm.  1t prohib i t s  a n y  ant i-federal  amendments which would 
change t h c  fundamcn to l  f ede ra l  s t ructure of  the Basic Law.3 The safe-guards 
to federalism i n  t h e  amending Process of the Basic Law are twofold: 
(1) l aws  which  would s e e k  to amend the  Basic Law must be approved by 
both &ambers o f  t h e  f ede ra l  Parliament by a n  extraordinary majority, 
thereby ~ r o t e c t i n g  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of the  Laender through the participation of 
the Bundesrat;  a n d  (2) ce r t a in  legis la t ive  proposals which would "undermine" 
the federa l  s t ruc tu re  a n d  d iv is ion  of power within that structure by amend- 
ment a r e  prohibi ted .  1 
11. FEDERALISM I N  OTHER AREAS OF LIFE 
To many  pe r sons  "cultural affairs" denote opera houses ,  theatres,  
museums, l i b r a r i e s ,  etc. Mos t  of these  institutions are property of the 
Laender o r  l o c a l  governments  i n  West  Germany. Traditionally, the support 
of t h e s e  cul tura l  ins t i tu t ions  has  been a n  important part of Land and local 
self-government. To a W e s t  German, however, "cultural affairs" a l so  
include s u c h  t h i n g s  a s  educa t ion ,  mass communications media, and reli- 
gion. T h e s e  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s ,  a s  most other aspects  of cultural l i f e ,  are 
the private c o n c e r n s  o f  the  Laender and a re ,  therefore, of importance in 
this d i s c u s s i o n  of fede ra l i sm.  
The Laender have  control of "cultural affairs"  because they are 
not mcntiancd in  the  l i s t  o f  exclus ive  or concurrent Bund Powers. Only 
i n  Protecting cu l tu ra l  t r easures  from being removed abroad (Article 7 4 - 5 ) 1  
l ~ l i s c l ~ k r ,  *. 'it. , p .  3 6 .  
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and the  promotion o f  sc ien t i f i c  research (Article 74-3) does the Basic Law 
speci f ica l ly  g i v e  t h e  Bund legis la t ive  powers in  the area of "cultural 
af fa i rs .  " The Bund h a s  o f t en  threatened to expand i n  this  field , thereby 
causing h e a t e d  d i s p u t e s  with the  Laender. Generally this  area of Land 
jurisdiction h a s  b e e n  success full^ defended,  however, from serious Bund 
interference.  Today  t h e  primary responsibilities of the Laender in the 
field of  " cu l tu ra l  a f f a i r s "  is general ly accepted. 1 
Control  of t h e  m a s s  media (the press ,  radio and televlslon) . 
The s t r i c t  control  of t h e  p ress  by the Nazi regime has  caused a strong 
reaction i n  t h e  oppos i t e  d i rec t ion in the Bundesrepublik. Since 1945, 
decentra l iza t ion of control  of the  press has  been stressed. Article 5 
in the "Basic  Rights"  s e c t i o n  of the Basic Law states that there shall be 
"freedom of t h e  p r e s s ,  " and "no censorship. " 
Governmenta l  regulation of the press i s  largely in the hands of 
t h e  Laender,  a l though Article 75-2 of  the Basic Law does allow the Bund 
to enact  "genera l  r u l e s  o f  law" concerning the press. This right has not 
been implemented as  yet .  Several  times the federal Cabinet has attempted 
to enter  the  field o f  p r e s s  regulat ion,  but i t  has been unsuccessful.  In 
1952, a p r e s s  regulation bill  w a s  drafted but Was never submitted to Parha- 
mellt. In 1953 - 5 4  a n d  1957 further unsuccessful  attempts were 
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establish central  control over the Press relations of federal agencies, 
The ~ a e n d e r  originally gained control of press regulation from 
the occupation powers ear ly  in  the occupation. At first the German press 
was operated under l i censes  granted by the military government. In 1948, 
a directive was  i s sued  i n  the American zone to turn over such control to 
the Laender a s  soon a s  laws  Protecting the freedom of the press were 
inaugurated by the  Laender. I t  took a year for these laws to be drafted in 
a form acceptab le  t o  t he  Americans. In the French and British zones there 
were fewer s t ipulat ions  about control of the press; and, in many cases,  a 
revised version of the  1934 Reich Press Law which was based on an 1874 
statute was  adopted.  In 1958, the Federal Constitutional Court held that 
the portions of th i s  law which were adopted and are still in effect today 
are not Bund but Land law. Thus a federalistic diversity has replaced 
traditional central  control of press regulation. This, of course, has dis- 
advantages, e spec i a l ly  s ince the press laws are not uniform throughout 
the Bundesrepublik with those in some Laender being highly inferior to 
those in others .  1 
In Germany there has  been a continuing controversy over 
broadcasting should be centrally or  and-controlled, since 1923 
when radio broadcasting f i r s t  became widespread. Early centralized Reich 
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control g a v e  w a y  t o  a compromise which allowed Land participation in the 
m i d - t w e n t i e ~ .  Th i s  compromise allowed the Laender supervisory control 
over eight r eg iona l  r ad io  s ta t ions  , while the central government retained 
its authori ty over  f inanc ia l  and technical  matters. During the l a s t  years 
of the Weimar regime and under the Nazi regime the central government 
again assumed  complete  control of broadcasting. Under the occupation 
broadcasting w a s  natura l ly  controlled by the individual zone commanders. 
In 1948 t h e  rad io  networks  i n  t h e  three zones of Western Germany were 
returned t o  German control .  
The b roadcas t ing  i s s u e  flared up again when the Parliamentary 
Council d e l e g a t e s  began to draft the  Basic Law. Partial agreement was 
reached and  wri t ten  in to  Article 5 ,  which provides for freedom of radio 
reporting and t h e  prohibition of broadcasting censorship. Agreement a s  
to how much power the  Bund should be given over the broadcasting industry 
was not s o  e a s i l y  ob ta ined .  In the f irst  draft ,  a s  a reaction to the Nazi 
regime, cen t ra l  opera t ion w a s  excluded from the Basic Law. Further 
d iscuss ion brought c h a n g e s ,  none of which were incorporated in the 
Basic Law. The Bund w a s  allowed to assume supervisory control of the 
technical a s p e c t s  o f  broadcas t ing,  while the Laender were to have super- 
visory control  over  the  cul tura l  a spec t s  of broadcasting. Future confro- 
""SY was  insured  by allowing the question of jurisdiction over organiza- 
tional mat tcrs  to rcmain unresolved. 
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Today  t h e  administrat ion of  the broadcasting stations has taken 
on poli t ical  impl ica t ions  i n  the  Laender. Generally the stations are 
b y  a l a r g e  "broadcast ing council" selected from various groups 
t h e  Land.  By pract ice  the  political part ies ,  through the Land 
parliaments , h e l p  select t h e  council members and exert their influence 
in the  f i l l ing  of important  ~ o s i t i o n s  in the broadcasting stations. At the 
present the re  a r e  n ine  broadcast ing stat ions in the Bundesrepublik which 
have banded toge the r  i n  a l o o s e  network. The radio stations of the net- 
work produce most  of the i r  own programs, while most television programs 
are coopera t ive  ven tu res  because  of their cost .  
The Bund w a s  not sa t i s i fed  with the minor role to which it was 
~elegated in the broadcas t ing f ield.  It preferred the establishment of a 
dual Bund-Land s y s t e m .  Under th is  dual system it was envisaged that 
the Bund would s u p e r v i s e  s ta t ions  sending programs overseas and to East 
Germany, and  t h e  Laender would retain control of their existing stations. 
A supervisory c o u n c i l  composed of  both Land and Bund officials would 
regulate the  en t i r e  program. Also a national television network, in 
addition t o  t h a t  o f  the  Laender owned network, was p ro~osed .  Supporters 
of th is  Program fe l t  tha t  some central control would provide a better 
o f  programs , s t o p  unnecessary  duplication, and make the broad- 
casting s t a t i o n s  less dppcndent  on the political whims of the Laendere 
men the Bund bcge,, to t ake  the necessary action t s  implement this prOgramj 
12 2 
the ~ ~ ~ d e s t a g ,  t h e  Bundesrat ,  t he  national political parties,  the Laender 
governments a n d  f i n a l l y  t h e  Federal Constitutional Court all became in- 
"olved i n  t h e  e n s u i n g  d i spu te .  1 
I n  1953 1 a bi l l  w a s  introduced which incorporated some of these 
Government p r o ~ o s a l s  The bi l l  w a s  not acted on before the  Bundestag 
adjourned; and  b e c a u s e  of t h e  vigorous protests which then arose ,  it was 
not revived.  Between 1953-57 a joint Bund-Land commission attempted to 
reach a compromise o n  t h e  i s s u e ,  but no sat isfactory results  were achieved. 
In 1958,  t h e  Bund a g a i n  took ac t ion  and introduced a bill similar to the one 
which it in t roduced i n  1953. I t  provided for the establishment of short- 
wave and long-wave broadcast ing stat ions and a second commercial and 
privately run t e l e v i s i o n  network. A supreme broadcasting association 
would be formed a s  a co-ordinating body, and supervisory councils com- 
posed of  Bund, Land ,  and private representatives would be established to 
maintain the  independence  of the various broadcasting units. 
This  b i l l  w a s  not acceptable  to  the Laender governments, and 
t h u s  the members o f  t h e  Bundesrat from al l  political parties joined in 
condemning t h e  bi l l  which had received fair support in the Bundestag. The 
CDU Was a b l e  t o  g e t  the  bi l l  through the Bundestag in 1960 by excluding 
tc lcvis ion  provis ion  from i t  The revised bill was then returned to the 
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Bundesrat where  t h e  united front had broken, and the CDU was able to get 
the bill  through t h i s  organ a f t e r  it had been submitted to the Joint Media- 
tion commit tee .  This  w a s  not much of a victory for the Bund, however, a s  
the b i l l  d id  no t  have  many antifederal implications , the second 
television network w a s  no c lose r ,  and international broadcasts were not 
of too much concern  t o  t h e  Laender. 
Meanwhi le  t h e  Bund had continued with plans to provide a second 
commercial network.  When the  television provisions of the 1958 bill were 
stricken from t h a t  b i l l  by  t h e  federal Parliament, Adenauer established a 
"privately incorporated German Television Authority" on his  own in 1960. 
This author i ty  w a s  to have  power to  l icense  private organizations to produce 
television programs. If th is  "unilateral administrative edict" had been 
allowed t o  s t a n d ,  it would have represented a " juridicial coup" for Adenauer 
and h i s  Government.  Before the announcement of the authority was made 
public, however ,  a l l  the  Minister-Presidents from both parties met 
off ic ia l ly  and o f fe red  a counter-proposal to the Government. The Bund un- 
w i s ( ? l ~  re jec ted  t h i s  bid for compromise and negotiations collapsed. The 
i s sue  w a s  then  t aken  t o  the  Federal Constitutional Court by the Laender and 
a n  ' interim in junct ion"  w a s  is sued which halted the creation of the authoritl7. 
In i t s  f ina l  dec i s ion  on the matter, the Constitutional Court 
ruled a g a i n s t  t h e  Bund , thereby upholding the federal p r inc i~ le  in One 
few a r c s s  whcrc  t l ~ c  Lacndcr st i l l  have esclusive PoLver. 
The Court 
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felt that t he  Bund had "violated" Article 30  (which puts under Land control 
any Powers not given to the Bund) and had "exceeded" 
Article 73 (which p laces  only the technical aspects of broadcasting under 
~~~d The Court thus ruled that the Laender have the right to 
control broadcasting because of their constitutional right to control 
cultural affa i rs  (Articles 30, 70, 83). The Court also chastised the Bund 
for acting i n  the  manner which it did,  admonishing i t  to try and maintain 
a cooperative spir i t  with the Laender. 
This decis ion "marked a milestone" in the history of German 
federalism. I t a l s o  brought an  end to the Bund's attempt to organize a 
competitive broadcasting program. The next step was up to the Laender, 
and they proceeded i n  1961  to create a second independent public author- 
ity which h a s  operated a second nationwide non-commercial broadcasting 
Program s ince  1962 .  The existence of the Laender a s  functional units 
of the West  German federal system was again secure because of the broad- 
casting i s s u e .  This i s  not to s ay ,  however, that some extensive changes 
in the Land administration of the West German broadcasting system will 
not occur. There i s  s t i l l  much dissatisfaction with the existing system. 
important i s  the financial situation of the radio and television 
stations of the various Laendere The stations today receive funds 
a tax collected by the post  Off ice  for each television and radio set. In 
 bid., p p .  552-53.  
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areas where there a re  many viewers and listeners there i s  no problem, but 
in areas  of limited reception (such a s  Bremen) there are not enough "paying 
" At one time there was an equalization of revenues between the 
rich and poor broadcasting cor~ora t ions ,  but this no longer exists. ~t 
appears that  although the matter of administration of the broadcasting 
system by the Laender is permanent for the present time. some changes 
may have to  be made i n  the future. l 
Control of education. Under the Nazi regime a political educa- 
tional system had been established. During the course of World War I1 
this "distorted instrument of education" disintegrated and left an "educa- 
tional vacuum." The occupation powers tried to fill this vacuum a s  quickly 
a s  possible a f t e r  they  gained control. They had even stated an education 
policy in the  1945 Potsdam Agreement, but this dealt mainly with the 
wiping out of  Nazi and militaristic ideas. What remained of the former 
educational s ys tern was  i n  chaos.  There were few satisfactory teachers, 
the physical plants were destroyed, and the thousands of refugees from 
t h e  East made these  problems even more acute. The occupation powers 
able to open some schools a t  the prlmary level in the m-nmer of 
1945, edch according to thelr own ideas.  
In the  Western zones the occupation Powers wanted the Germans 
t r~  Partlclp.3tc i n  tllc reform and development of the new German 
l ~ c i l s ,  w. a. , pp. 91-92.  
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System. The Germans  r e s i s t e d  most reforms, however, and retained their 
traditional s y s t e m .  The tradit ion of  allowing Lutheran and Catholic 
to t a k e  pa r t  i n  the  sys tem was  also reinstated. Private schools 
were also g i v e n  a const i tu t ional  Warantee ,  but few were reopened. When 
the three  o c c u p a t i o n  Powers turned the administration of the educational 
system over  t o  t h e  Germans ,  the  Land system of administration begun 
under the  o c c u p i e r s  w a s  continued.  This system has been much criticized 
because  of its l a c k  of uniformity throughout the Bundesrepublik. The 
control of e d u c a t i o n  b y  t h e  individual Laender is strongly rooted in  historical 
German t radi t ion .  
The  Basic Law s a y s  l i t t le  of Bund activities in education. The 
Basic Rights s e c t i o n  of t h e  Basic Law merely mentioned education in 
public s c h o o l s  br ief ly .  M o s t  important of the provisions in this section 
i s  Article 7 (in r e f e r e n c e  to  Article 14) which gives the Laender the right 
to control the i r  indiv idual  educational  systems.  Tne Bund has not tried to 
invade t h i s  a r e a ,  a n d  i t  becomes involved in education only in "peripheral" 
One of the  main  i n s t a n c e s  i s  i t s  distribution of revenue to the 
Laender, which  may u s e  part  of  these  funds for educational purposes. 
Even wi th  o n l y  t e n  Laender, the German educational system i s  
not very uniform d u e  t o  t h e  l ack  of  overriding authority. This wide 
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is c a u s e d  by  t h e  fac t  that  education is one of the most con- 
troversial and c o s t l y  a r e a s  considered by the Land parliaments. Education 
concerns c o n s t i t u e n t s  i n  t h e  Laender directly a s  taxpayers and as parents, 
~ h ~ ~ ~ f o r e ,  the l g i s l a t o r s  must Pay c lose  attention to  the wishes of the 
c i t izens  of the i r  part icular  Land. Interstate educational agreements may 
be made, but t h e y  a r e  e a s i l y  breached if opposed a t  home. 
S e v e r a l  i n t e r s t a t e  educational associat ions do exist  in the Bundes- 
republik. The  mos t  important of  these  is the Permanent Conference of Min- 
i s ters  of Educat ion (Staendiqe Konferenz e Kultusminister der Bundes- 
-
republik) which w a s  es tab l i shed  i n  1948. I t  has  three full-time committees 
attached t o  it.  They a r e  concerned with: (1) institutions of higher learn- 
ing;  (2)  e l ementa ry ,  secondary ,  and vocational schools; (3) cultural 
matters s u c h  as  f ine  a r t s ,  museums,  libraries, e tc .  By 1958 this Confer- 
ence o f  M i n i s t e r s  had created  and adopted more than eighty agreements 
which a t tempted t o  c r e a t e  greater  uniformity among the Laender educational 
systems.  Among t h e s e  agreements ,  the Duesseldorf Agreement of 1955 is 
most important.  I t  s tandardized several elements in the educational 
systems o f  t h e  Laender ,  thereby aiding persons moving from one Land to 
M o s t  o f  t h e  Land governments adopted this agreement after i t  
Was by t h e  Canfe rence  of  ~ i n i s t e r - P r e s i d e n t s .  
Because educ3tion is purely a function of the individual Laendel/ 
various Lacnder h a v e  a good deal  of legislation in  this 
field. 
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The educa t iona l  l a w s  h a v e  not gained a permanent s ta tus ,  however and 
,till remain i n  a state of flux causing considerable conflict in the Land 
While t h e  Permanent Conference of Ministers of Education 
has created uniformity i n  Soi'tIe ins t ances ,  the areas of administrative 
appointment  o f  t eachers ,  and finance are very diversified 
throughout t h e  Bundesrepublik a s  a whole. 
The  p rev ious ly  mentioned Konkordat Case  i s  the most important 
event t o  occur  i n  t h e  f ie ld  of  education s ince  the Bundesrepublik was 
es tabl i shed.  Both educa t ion  and religion come under the heading of 
cultural a f fa i r s  , a n d  therefore ,  the  i s s u e  in  this case  involving church- 
s ta te  r e l a t ions  and  educat ion-  very important to  the independence of 
the Laender i n  t h e  federa l  sys tem.  
Prior t o  1933 ,  seve ra l  Laender had concordats with the Vatican 
and t r e a t i e s  wi th  t h e  Evangel ica l  Church. Since 1945 these agreements 
have been recogn ized  as s t i l l  remaining in effect in some of the Land 
const i tu t ions .  New agreements  have a l s o  been made by some Laender. 
The Federal C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Court  dbcision rendered in  1957 came a s  a 
result  o f  a n  i s s u e  r a i s e d  by one  o f  these  concordats with the Vatican in 
lg33 .  T h e  Land government o f  Niedersachsen had sought in 1954 to adopt 
a law which would establis1-l religious instruction for both Evangelical and 
Catholic chi ldrpn i n  the publ ic  schools .  The federal Cabinet challenged 
1933.  The 
this  law b e c a u s e  i t  w a s  contrary t o  the  concordat nlade in 
12 9 
rederal Cons t i tu t iona l  Court  ruled that  "while the Bund was the legal succes- 
sor of t h e  Reich wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  treaty obligations, nevertheless, under the 
~ ~ ~ i c  Law e d u c a t i o n  is completely reserved to the Laender." Hence the 
laender  a r e  not  l e g a l l y  bound t o  observe the school provisions of a treaty 
made by t h e  ~ u n d .  A Bund threat  to the  cultural autonomy of the Laender 
was warded o f f ,  a n d  thei r  integrity was  again upheld. 1 
Control  of t h e  police.  The Laender are able to assume exclusive 
control of t h e  po l i ce  power within their boundaries because, again, no 
mention of it is made i n  t h e  list of concurrent powers in Article 7 4  of the 
Basic Law.' The  i s s u e  of who should control the police system i s  made 
clearer by Article 7 3 - 1 0  of the  Basic Law. It was adopted a s  a compromise, 
but i t  a l s o  s e r v e s  t o  def ine  the  Bund's role in this field.3 This article 
s ta tes  tha t  t h e  Bund and t h e  Laender shall  "cooperate" in matters concern- 
ing the criminal po l i ce .  Although the cantrol of the police power by the 
individual Land is not spec i f i ca l ly  mentioned in  the Basic bw, their 
assumed control  of t h i s  power is a n  important bulwark for federalism. 
In s p i t e  o f  the  Bund encroachment in several areas ,  the ordinar:: 
police Power i n  t h e  Bundesrepublik is st i l l  chiefly under the control of the 
'wells, OJ. &. , pp. 94-98 ,  101-2  109- 
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individual Laender  The Land police system is directed by the Land Minister 
of the  In ter ior ,  who u s u a l l y  de lega tes  administrative authority to local 
Although t h e  American and British occupation powers tried to 
1ldecentralize a n d  municipal ize" the  Laender police systems, this pressure 
was largely d i s rega rded  i n  favor of more traditional patterns. Since the 
establishment o f  t h e  Bundesrepublik, much important Land police legislation 
has been  a d o p t e d .  Some important interstate  agreements have a lso  been 
reached i n  t h i s  f i e ld .  1 
111. THE STATUS OF GERMAN FEDERALISM TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE 
I n  c r e a t i n g  t h e  structure of the  Bundesrepublik there was a deliber- 
ate  return t o  the  f e d e r a l  principle. This was  the will not only of the occupy- 
ing powers but  a l s o  t h a t  o f  t h e  majority of the German people. The oppon- 
ents of t h e  federa l  s t ruc tu re  i n  Wes t  Germany contend that this structure, 
a s  i t  h a s  been  d e p i c t e d  i n  t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  overly complicates the administra- 
tive and l e g i s l a t i v e  t a s k s  o f  t h e  Wes t  German government. Thus, i t  is 
alleged to  be uneconomical  and ineff icient .  This i s  not a wholly invalid 
cri t icism, though a cen t ra l i zed  structure would probably be even more unac- 
ceptable. Thc  ind iv idua l  Laender might be neglected Or oppressed by the 
government ,  and  t h e  German people, who have a long particularist 
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ingra ined i n  their  culture might find it hard to adapt to such a 
y ~ t  e m , e s p e c i a l l y  after t he  resurgence of the particularist tendencies 
allowed under t h e  Bundesrepublik. 
The p r e sen t  federa l  structure would seem to have proven itself 
a s  evidenced by t h e  high degree  of economic and political progress which 
has been made s i n c e  1949 i n  the  Bundesrepublik. Proof of i t s  success i s  
even more s t r ik ing when compared t o  the results of the unitary system in 
Eastern Germany. ' Of course ,  there is no way to measure accurately how 
much of  the  W e s t  German "miracle" of recovery is attributable to federalism. 
The economic planning of  former Minister of Economics, Dr. Ludwig Erhard, 
and the  " indefat igable  pers is tence"  of the West German worker and manager 
have played a big part  in  th is  phenomenal success .  But here again 
federalism w a s  a c t i v e  i n  creating a favorable and unoppres sive atmosphere 
ir. which s u c h  in i t i a t ive  could be displayed a t  i t s  maximum strength.' If 
one considers  federa l i sm t o  be a major force behind the political and econ- 
omic accomplishments  which have occurred in postwar Western Germany, 
then the federal  s t ructure  o f  the  Bundesrepublik has proven itself to be "an 
eff ic ient  dev i s e  of constitutionalism;" i. e .  , a functional check against 
:he Centralist ambi t ions  of the Bund. In German11 this federal check would 
Fcdcrs l  Republic,  Press and Information Office. 
- (Wc i sbad rn ,  1 9 5 3 ) ,  p p .  51 ,  53. 
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seem e s p e c i a l l y  because of  past experience with the dilution of 
federal cons t i tu t ions  b y  the  central  government, 1 
AS pic tured i n  ear l ier  chapters ,  federalism is neither a simple, 
nor a n  unsoph is t i ca ted  poli t ical  form. Nor does it follow the same pattern 
i n  a l l  cases. For throughout the  world, federalsim has taken many different 
and unique forms , t h e  W e s t  German c a s e  being no exception. Americans 
seem t o  feel t h a t  the i r  form of federalism is the purest, and that hence 
the bes t  federa l  s y s t e m  exists i n  the United States.  The Swiss have a 
somewhat s imi lar  concept ion of  their type of federalism. But one form of 
federalism is no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  better than any other, for "successful feder- 
alism shows  var ia t ions .  " W e s t  German federalism is quite different in 
many r e s p e c t s  from e i the r  t h e  American or Swiss types,  but that is not to 
say  that  i t  is infer ior .  As previously mentioned, i t s  success a s  a 
functional s y s t e m  o f  government,  and the mere fact that i t  has existed 
since 1949  wi thout  major change ,  proves that West German federalism 
i s  a viable po l i t i ca l  form. 
Professor  W e l l s  bel ieves that the success  of West German 
federalism c a n  be expla ined by three reasons: (1) The Bundesrepublik 
Was built upon t h e  firm b a s e  o f  existing traditional German federalism, 
which lias been  g r e a t l y  a ided  by the equalization of the b e n d e r  in area /  
p o p u l ~ t i o n ,  and  resources; (2) well  created Land governmental structures 
l w c l l s ,  *. . , p .  111. 
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were f i r s t  c r e a t e d  (1945-49) and began t o  function before a federal structure 
was  i m p o s e d  upon  them at t h e  nat ional  level ;  and (3) the balance of power 
between t h e  Bund and t h e  LaeIlder is ef fec t ive ly  maintained by such federal 
organs as t h e  Bundesra t  and  t h e  Federal Constitutional Court. 1 
For p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n s  one  can  place particular emphasis on Pro- 
f e s so r  W e l l s '  t h i rd  poin t .  The Bundesrat,  supposedly the cornerstone of 
federalism i n  t h e  Bundesrepubl ik ,  c a n  protect "government integrity1[ and 
the i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  Laender  if it chooses  t o  ac t .2  Perhaps even more 
important from t h e  v iewpoint  of  dec i s ive  act ion is the unexpected role 
which t h e  F e d e r a l  Cons t i tu t iona l  Court has  assumed as the guardian of 
German fede ra l i sm.  
S i n c e  1 9 4 9 ,  t h e  Bund h a s  increasingly attempted to usurp the 
powers of t h e  Laender .  With  t h e  help of the Bundesrat and the Federal 
Cons t i tu t ional  C o u r t  t h e r e  h a s  o f  l a t e  been a "rejuvination" of the Laender 
which h a s  put  t h e  Bund o n  t h e  de fens ive .  The Bund has been told bluntly 
to keep o u t  o f  t h e  cu l tu ra l  a f f a i r s  f ie ld which belongs exclusively to  the 
Laender. The  f i n a n c i a l  pos i t ion  o f  the Laender has  improved to such a n  
extent t h a t  t hey  c a n  a f fo rd  t o  be blunt with the Bund. In fact ,  the Laender 
are even  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  es tab l i shment  of aid programs for the underde- 
veloped c o u n t r i e s ,  wh ich  is a f ield of  Bund priority. To become a more 
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Significant f o r c e  i n  W e s t  German polit ical l i fe ,  the  Laender are  making re- 
newed a t t e m p t s  at c r e a t i n g  a sol id front through coordination of policies 
achieved at f r equen t  i n t e r s t a t e  conferences and through the exchange of 
information. 
The  p o l i t i c a l  spokesman for t he  Laender defend this  spirit of 
r e j u v i n a t i ~ n  of t h e  f e d e r a l  pr inciple  with historical and doctrinal arguments. 
TO them,  f e d e r a l i s m  is a "co rps  intermediaire which exis t s  between the 
s t a t e  and  t h e  c i t i z e n ,  a means  t o  counteract  the mass s ta te  and the mass 
man, and  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  a l t e rna t ive  to  conformity and dictatorship." 1 
Furthermore, it o f f e r s  t h e  opposi t ion part ies  a n  opportunity to  play 
respons ib le  p o l i t i c a l  r o l e s  a t  t h e  Land leve l .  Finally,  i t  may represent 
the a n s w e r  for a un i t ed  Germany.  
There  a r e  na tu ra l ly  s t i l l  some West  Germans who feel that a 
federal  form of government  is not t he  bes t  type of government for Germany. 
They favor a s t r o n g  c e n t r a l  government and offer the democratic unitary 
system employed i n  G r e a t  Britain a s  a unitary alternative to German 
federa l i sm.  T h e y  c o n s i d e r  t h e  independent atti tude of the Laender to be 
archaic and " a n a c h r o n i s t i c n  i n  a postwar Europe of supra-national organi- 
z a t i o n ~ .  J u s t i f i a b l y ,  t h e y  state that  the present-day economic, social ,  
and d e f e n s e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s  a r e  too  complex for the Laender to CcQe with. 
Lacnder  t]lemselves wi l l  not  deny t h i s ,  and they realize the necessit)' 
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of co-ordinat in9 t h e  f ew Powers which they s t i l l  retain. Nor can they deny 
that t h e y  a r e  i n  t h e  mids t  o f  a centralizing trend with national party politics 
submerging   and pol i t ica l  i s s u e s .  This i s  a necessi ty i f  West Germans are 
to accept " t h e  po l i t i ca l  r ea l i t i e s  of l i fe"  in  the B ~ n d e s r e p ~ b l i k  today. 1 
~ u t  pe rhaps  t h i s  centralizing trend is merely a natural conse- 
quence  of  a l a rge r  pol i t ica l  evolution. For, a s  some political scientists 
bel ieve,  f ede ra l i sm may rrIerely be a "political way station on the road to 
the strongly in teg ra ted  nat ion-state.  " These political scientists argue 
that the  d i v i s i o n  of sovere ignty  (the bas is  of federalism) i s  valuable only 
when a nat ion  is f i r s t  ge t t ing  on i t s  feet and is to be abandoned for more 
appropriate un i t a ry  forms when the  s ta tus  of a great power has been reached. 
And is not t h e  a c h i e v e m e n t  of power status the political goal nvf ZVZTY 
ambitious n a t i o n ?  Only  the  future can answer this question fully, but 
i t  can  be s a i d  t h a t  W e s t  Germany i s  well on the way to regaining a 
portion of the  power s t a t u s  tha t  Germany once held. 
To predic t  t h e  future of federalism in the Bundesrepublik i s ,  
therefore, q u i t e  haza rdous .  The unitary trend started by the Bund has 
gained momentum and  still appears  to be a potent force. It i s  doubtful 
lvhether t h e  Laender ,  e v e n  with the aid of the Bundesrat and the Federal 
Consti tut ional  C o u r t ,  c a n  ha l t  th is  trend. Because of recent favorable 
d . ,  . "Lf., p .  559-60 .  
' ~ i n n c  y ,  OJ. - c i t .  , p .  173.  
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c o u r t  d e c i s i o n s  I t he  unitary trend h a s  been slowed for the 
present t ime .  T h i s  s t rugg le  would seem fut i le ,  however, because the unit- 
ary trend is no t  l imi t ed  t o  W e s t  Germany nor even federal s ta tes  alone, but 
is occurring throughout  t h e  world i n  both federal and unitary s ta tes  d i k e .  1 
There  is o n e  important  factor  which may tend to prolong the l i fe  
of federal ism i n  t h e  Bundesrepublik and Germany as a whole for some time 
to come--i. e .  , t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a reunited Germany. In 1948 when the 
creat ion of t h e  B a s i c  Law w a s  f i r s t  considered,  the  West  German politicians 
intended t h a t  t h i s  documen t  would be only a brief interim law which would 
suff ice un t i l  G e r m a n y  could  aga in  be united. Unification has s t i l l  not 
been a c h i e v e d ,  a n d  t h e  B a s i c  Law h a s  assumed a more permanent nature. 
Today one  of t h e  m o s t  u rgen t ,  but seemingly unsolvable,  problems for 
Western G e r m a n y  still r ema ins  th i s  one of a divided Germany. Worse than 
mere d i v i s i o n  is t h e  fact tha t  the  two governments are  hostile entit ies 
under p r e s s u r e  from h o s t i l e  internat ional  camps. 
T h e  G e r m a n s  o n  both s i d e s  find this  situation somewhat uncorn- 
prehensible .  N o  German pol i t ic ian  can  hope to  gain office, or retain this  
o f f i ce ,  u n l e s s  h e  at  least " p a y s  frequent l ip  service" t o  the goal o i  reuniii- 
cation. M o s t  G e r m a n s  r e a l i z e ,  however,  tha t  attaining this goal is b e l ~ n d  
'heir control  s i n c e  it is a n  i s s u e  o f  the Cold War. An impasse t h u s  exis ts  
i n  which nc i thcr  s ide  seems l i k e l y  to give i n ,  fdr the s takes arc tao high* 
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~t appears  t h a t  t h e  d i v i s i o n  of Germany will continue for some time into the future 
No one c a n  venture  to g u e s s  how long. 
Germany  itself is a l s o  involved direct ly in the cold War struggle. 
~t a f fo rd  neu t ra l i sm,  and furthermore gives lit t le indication of desir- 
ing it, a l though t h i s  had been  suggested as a solution to the problem of 
d iv is ion .  ' If Germany  could break away from outside pressure and become 
a strong a n d  independen t  state, i t  could again play an  important role a s  the 
"Land d e r  Mit te ."  Conce ivab ly ,  Germany might a lso  assume a position 
- -  
similar to t h i s  as  a member of a third force, e . g . ,  a Franco-German led 
supra-nat ional  European unit .  But the  real i t ies  of today will not allow 
German neu t ra l i za t ion  o r  complete leadership of a third force. The Bundes- 
republik h a s  become too important a s  a pawn and partner in the Western 
Alliance for t h e s e  poss ib i l i t i e s  t o  occur. From the Russian and American 
viewpoints ,  t h e  o n l y  f ina l  solut ion possible would be a united Germany 
on their s i d e .  S i n c e  t h i s  i s  very unlikely, division will continue. 
Although t h e  poss ib i l i ty  o f  reunification seems remote, if i t  
were to  be a t t a i n e d ,  i t  would seem that a federal structure would be the 
Only Prac t ica l  s y s t e m  which could be applied to the new German s ta te ,  
a t  l e a s t  from t h e  W e s t e r n  viewpoint.  Furthermore, what better model could 
be found than f e d e r a l  s tructure of  the ~undesrepublik which i s  a Proven 
 ill, . . , p p .  452. 4 5 6 .  
2 Colt, w. "i t .  , pp .  438-39, 441. 
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and tested sys tem* Besides the Bundesrepublik was established, as the 
preamble of the  Basic Law s ta tes  t "on behalf of those Germans to whom 
p,ticipation w a s  denied" (the East Germans). This statement provides a 
legal bas i s  on  which the application of the present federal system in a 
German state could rest .  A reunited German state thus depicts 
a possibly bright future for German federalism. That i s  not to say, however, 
that a federal  system adopted in a united German state would be eternal. 
For as soon a s  it w a s  adopted i t  might be caught in the unitary movement 




viewing the record of the Bundesrepublik over the last fifteen 
years, one can  state that  a new functional federal system of government 
has been created. The success  of this federal system is  based to a great 
extent on a viable constitutional document--the Basic Law. This Basic 
Law has proven to  be very s table ,  and only two major sets of amendments 
have been added to  it (one dealing with Bund-Land fiscal relations, and 
the other making rearmament possible). The delegates to the Parliamentary 
Council of 1948-49 can  be truly proud of the document which they adopted 
in 1949 ,  for i t  has  allowed the Bundesrepublik to rise from a state of 
almost total destruction to the status of one of the most potent economic 
and military powers of Western Europe. 
Although the efficiency of the West German political system is 
the envy of her neighbors, perfection in this area has not been achieved 
by any means. There are s t i l l  those who wo~lld make further constitutional 
changes, because they feel  that the Basic Law i s  too tentative in some of 
its Provisions. But the fact  remains that the Basic Law is almost unani- 
mously accepted by the West German people, as are the policies produced 
under i t .  Moreover, the average West German citizen has more political 
rQsPOnsibility than ever before under this Basic Law. He can indirectly 
pr'rticipdt(: in important political decisions by choosing from meaningfu1 
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i n  Bund a n d  Land elect ions and through membership in political 
I n  comparing the  Bundesrepublik with i t s  two federal pre- 
decessors,  o n e  c a n  jus t i f iably  state that it i s  the more perfect federal 
union. I n  fact, t h e  Bas ic  Law on which the Bundesrepublik is based i s  a 
truer const i tu t ion t h a n  a n y  of  i t s  ~ r e d e c e s s o r s ,  and is likely to continue 
a s  a funct ional  document  when ,  and if ,  Germany is reunited. 1 
U n l i k e  its p redecessors ,  the Basic Law firmly establishes the 
of federa l i sm.  The main purpose of the Basic Law i s  to protect 
the individual  c i t i z e n  a n d  t h e  Laender through a democratic federal govern- 
ment. Although t h e y  were  influsnced by the occupation powers, the 
members of t h e  Par l iamentary  Council maintained German political tradi- 
tions caus ing  t h e  federa l  s tructure to be mainly a German work. It i s  
perhaps fortunate t h a t  t h i s  is s o ,  for the occupation powers based their 
demands for a federa l  s tructure for the new government on highly debatable 
premises. They assumed:  (1) that  some federal systems are better than 
others; and (2)  t h a t  federa l i sm can be made to serve such purposes a s  the 
Promotion of democracy  and securi ty.  Merely because federalism is 
successful  i n  o n e  s t a t e  d o e s  not insure that i t  will be successful in another. 
In  c a s e ,  t h e  p ressure  applied on the West Germans to adopt specific 
1 Spi ro ,  oy. &t. , pp. 8 7 ,  425-36. 
' ~ o t t f r i p d  D ie fze ,  Federal Republic of Germany: An Eralua- 
Af t e r  T c n  Ypdr:;," ~ 1 , ~  ~f ~.,litics, W I  (~anuary ,  1 9 6 0 1  P *  123. 
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forms which t h e y  felt were impractical was almost an assurance that they 
would not be adopted-  ' 
In Summary I fulldamental federalism i s  to be found in the follow- 
ing o f  t he  Basic Law: (1) the division of legislative power be- 
tween the  ~ u n d  and  t h e  Laender (Articles 70-82); (2) the division of fiscal 
authority between the Bund and the Laender (Articles 105-115, 120); 
(3) ~ a e n d e r  participation in  the adoption of the Basic Law and its amend- 
ment (Article 144); (4) the  provision for a Federal Constitutional Court 
(Articles 92-95); (5) the  participation of the Laender in the election of the 
federal President and  the procedure by which he i s  replaced (Article 61); 
(6) the provision for the  Bundesrat a s  a representative organ of the 
Laender; (7) the employment of civil servants a t  the Bund level based on a 
federalistic formula (Article 36); and (8) the execution of Bund laws by the 
Laender a s  "mat ters  of  their own concern" (Articles 50-53). 
These e ight  federal features may be contrasted to only three 
main antifederal  o n e s .  They are: (1) the determination of the fundamental 
features of the Land constitutions by the Basic U w  (Article 28); (2) the in- 
vasion of Land jurisdiction by the Bund in the areas of local self-government 
(Article 28); and (3) the Bundls power to change the geographical boundaries 
Of the Lacndcr (Article 2 9 ) .  2 
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T h e s e  a r e  t h e  o b v i o u s  federa l  and antifederal features to be found 
the s y s t e m  of  t h e  Bundesrepublik, but they do not present 
the true p i c tu re  o f  f e d e r a l i s m  as it is found in  practice in the Bundesrepub- 
lik today. As  s t a t e d  p r e v i o u s l y ,  t he  future of federalism in Western Germ- 
any d o e s  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  b e  par t icu lar ly  bright. Socio-economic factors 
have come to o v e r r i d e  p o l i t i c a l  o n e s  i n  t he  world in  general a s  well a s  in 
the Bundesrepubl ik .  F e d e r a l i s m  everywhere has  suffered a s  a result ,  1 
This d o e s  not  m e a n ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  federal ism will be extinguished in the 
West German  g o v e r n m e n t a l  s t ruc tu re  or  i n  the governmental systems of the 
rest  o f  t h e  w o r l d ,  b u t  m e r e l y  t h a t  t he  tendency today i s  to dilute the 
theore t ica l ly  p u r e  forms of federa l i sm tha t  ex is t  or which have existed. 
T h i s  a n a l y s i s  h a s  a t tempted  to d e f i ~ e  federalism a s  it was 
es tab l i shed  i n  t h e  Bundesrepubl ik  and t o  picture i t s  development through 
the f l r s t  15  y e a r s  of t h i s  n a t i o n ' s  ex i s t ence .  I t  i s  useful to  study this 
Particular g o v e r n m e n t a l  s y s  tem because  i t  embodies old political traditions 
and p r lnc lp l e s  i n  a n  e n t i r e l y  new nation with striking and novel results.  
Certainly t h e  r o l e  w h i c h  t h e  Bundesrepublik,  and perhaps a future reunited 
Germany, w i l l  ploy i n  world a f f a i r s  will be of increasing importance- For 
this r e a s o n  a i ~ ~ n c ,  i t  is n e c e s s a r y  to comprehend ful ly  the nature of the 
State i t s c l f  , so that its a c t i o n s  c a n  be better understood. 
In conclusion, the words of the English political scientist and 
Lord Bryce perhaps best  UP the purpose back of this study: 
Every creation of a new scheme of government i s  a precious 
addition to  the  political resources of mankind. It respects a 
and scrutiny of the constitutional experience of the past. 
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